invention, just as if the two combinations had been embodied in separate patents, for the reason that each combination in such a case, like what is secured in a division patent, must be regarded as a distinct invention, at least for the purpose of pleading the statutory defences to the charge of infringe

ment.

Ample support to that proposition is found in the language of the Patent Act and in the practice of the courts; but where the patent is an entire invention, incapable of division or separate use, the defences authorized by the act of Congress must be addressed to the thing patented, and the evidence to support the defence must show that the patentee was not the original and first inventor, or establish some one of the other statutory defences.

Patentees seeking redress for the infringement of their patent must undoubtedly allege and prove that they are the original and first inventors of the alleged improvement, and that the same has been infringed by the party against whom the suit is brought. In the first place, the burden to establish both of those allegations is upon the party instituting the suit; but the law is well settled that the patent in suit, if introduced in evidence, affords to the moving party a prima facie presumption that the first allegation is true, the effect of which is to shift the burden of proving the defence upon the defending party. Blanchard v. Putnam, 8 Wall. 42; Seymour v. Osborne, 11 id. 538. Infringement being denied, the burden of proof is upon the complainant to establish the charge.

Where the invention is embodied in a machine, manufacture, or product, the question of infringement, which is a question of fact, is ordinarily best determined by a comparison of the exhibit made by the respondent with the mechanism described in the complainant's patent. Both parties gave evidence upon the subject; but the weight of the proofs, in the judgment of the court, supports the affirmative of the charge.

Strong support to that view is derived from the stipulation filed in the case, in which the respondents admit that between the date of the patent and the filing the bill of complaint they made and sold drilling-machines with a vice attached, like complainant's exhibit B, which is equivalent to a confession of the

charge, leaving open only the question as to the extent of the infringement.

They also except to the master's report; but the exception is not well founded, and the amount of profits found being quite reasonable, it is clear that the decree of the Circuit Court is correct. Decree affirmed.

KESNER v. TRIGG.

1. In Virginia, a party cannot avail himself of the defence of usury, without averring and proving it, and he is required to pay the principal of his debt. 2. Where a party at the time of contracting a debt, executed to secure the pay. ment thereof, a deed of trust of lands to which he had a perfect record title, and a third party subsequently makes claim that he had, at the date of the deed, a title to them,- Held, that the trustee and cestui que trust must be considered as purchasers; and if they had no notice of such claim, the lands are subject to sale to satisfy the debt. If the sale yields a surplus, the rights of such third party thereto will be the same as they were to the land. 3. A post-nuptial contract, made upon sufficient consideration, and wholly or partially executed, will be sustained in equity.

4. By the common law, if the husband and wife sell and convey her lands, the money which he receives therefor, without any reservation of rights on her part, will belong to him.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Virginia.

Philip Kesner, of Washington County, Virginia, an adjudicated bankrupt, surrendered real estate, viz. :—

"One-half interest in 15018 acres of land lying in Washington County, Virginia, near Cedarville, with improvements thereon. "Life-estate in the other one-half of the above tract, $800. "The other half of this tract belongs to the petitioner's wife."

Afterwards, on the 6th of August, 1873, by leave of the court he filed an amended schedule, varying the description of his land, viz.:

"All the petitioner's interest in a tract of 15018 acres of land lying in Washington County, Virginia, near Cedarville, conveyed to petitioner by George Dutton, in consideration chiefly of his wife's lands, near Lyon's Gap, in Smyth County.

"If his wife's claim to one-half is sustained, then he surrenders his petitioner's life-interest in that half.

"Petitioner's wife claims one-half of this land: value of

"If his wife sustains her claim of one-half, will be "Value of life-interest

800"

Kesner's assignee advertised the land; but Jane B. Kesner, his wife, filed her bill, and a temporary injunction was awarded forbidding the sale.

She claims that the whole land is her own property, and that there was a contract between her and her husband, not reduced to writing, by which she was to claim no interest' in his property, and he none in hers; that an arrangement between one Thomas T. Hull, one George Dutton, and her husband, by which Dutton was to get Hull's land, Hull hers, and her husband Dutton's, was made, to which she assented, with the distinct understanding between her husband and herself, and in the belief, that she would have in the Cedarville land (the land surrendered by Philip Kesner) the same rights she had in her own land; that she was one of the three children of John Davis, who died intestate, leaving real estate at Lyon's Gap, which was divided, and one-third of it assigned to Kesner and wife, one-third to Moffett and wife, and onethird to Porterfield and wife; that Moffett and wife sold their third to Kesner and wife, who conveyed the two-thirds thus acquired to Hull's executor, by their deed, duly executed and acknowledged, May 26, 1852, and recorded 24th August, 1853; that the deed to the Cedarville land was made by Dutton and wife to Philip Kesner alone, on the 25th of January, 1851, and recorded Aug. 6, 1853; that the purchase-money paid to Moffett and wife was derived from the sale of certain slaves which the complainant received as part of her father's

estate.

The bill further alleges that Philip Kesner executed a deed of trust, conveying the Cedarville farm, Jan. 29, 1862, to one Bekem, to secure the payment of a promissory note, of even date therewith, for $2,000, borrowed money, payable two years thereafter to one Greenway; that the money borrowed consisted of Virginia and North Carolina notes, which were

greatly depreciated; that said debt is not a lien on the land, and that if it be set up as such, it should only be at its "scaled value."

The deed of said Kesner and wife to Hull's executor was acknowledged by her before two justices of the peace of the county, who state in their certificate that she was by them examined privily and apart from her husband, and that the deed having been fully explained to her, she acknowledged the same to be her act, and declared that she had voluntarily executed the same, and did not wish to retract it.

The remaining facts are stated in the opinion of the court. The bill makes Trigg, the assignee in bankruptcy, Greenway, and other persons parties. The grounds therein set up for relief are denied by the answers. Upon final hearing, the bill was dismissed, and the complainant appealed to this court.

Submitted on printed arguments by Mr. James H. Gilmore for the appellant, and by Mr. John W. Johnston for the ap pellees.

MR. JUSTICE SWAYNE delivered the opinion of the court.

The bill, so far as it relates to the debt claimed to be owing to the estate of John C. Greenway, deceased, secured by the deed of trust to Bekem, cannot be sustained, for several reasons. It is silent as to the objection of usury. In Virginia, a party cannot avail himself of this defence, without averring and proving it; and in such case he is required by statute to pay the principal of the debt. Brown v. Toell's Adm'r, 5 Rand. (Va.) 543; Harnsbarger v. Kinney, 6 Gratt. (Va.) 287.

It is asserted that the consideration of the note was a loan of Virginia and North Carolina bank-notes; that at the time of the transaction they were largely depreciated; that the value of the consideration should be fixed by scaling this currency; and that the amount to be paid on the note should be reduced accordingly. But, upon looking into the record, we find no evidence whatever upon the subject. The depreciation may have been more or less, or there may have been none. We cannot, as is suggested, take judicial notice of the facts, whatever they may have been. We must take the record as it is, and we cannot look beyond it.

No notice of any infirmity in the title of Kesner to the prem ises is brought home, either to the trustee or to the cestui que trust, and it is denied by the latter. Like a mortgagee, they are regarded as purchasers; and, in this case, they must be considered as such, bona fide, and without notice of the adverse rights of the appellant, if any she have. Wickham & Goshorn v. Lewis, Morton, & Co., 13 Gratt. (Va.) 427; Evans, Trustee, v. Greenhouse et al., 15 id. 156. This part of the case may, therefore, be laid out of view. The premises in question are clearly liable for the amount secured by the deed of trust. The position of the judgment creditors is different. They were not purchasers, and they can take by virtue of the liens of their judgments only what Kesner was entitled to. 15 Gratt.

supra.

It remains to consider the claim of the appellant touching the premises in controversy. It is clear that she inherited from her father one-third of Lyon's Gap farm, and received, as a distributee of the estate of her father and mother, several slaves; that she and Kesner bought another third of the farm from her sister, Mrs. Moffett, and took from Asbury, the attorney of her sister and her sister's husband, a bond for the execution of a deed. The purchase-money was procured by the sale of slaves which came to Kesner by the appellant. On the 26th of May, 1852, the appellant and her husband, Kesner, conveyed the two-thirds of the Lyon's Gap farm to Sheffy, as executor of Hull. On the 25th of January, 1851, Dutton and wife conveyed to Kesner alone the Cedarville farm, which is the property in controversy. The transaction was an exchange of lands. $600 was paid to Dutton, as the difference in value of the two tracts. Kesner raised the money in the same way as that before mentioned. The appellant is neither named nor referred to in the deed to her husband. On the 29th of January, 1862, Kesner alone executed the trust-deed to Bekem. It embraced the entire Cedarville property. The tract contained about a hundred and fifty acres. In his first inventory in bankruptcy Kesner gave in half of this farm, and his life-interest in the other half, which was stated to belong to his wife. In an amended schedule subsequently filed, he gave in all his interest in the entire tract, which, he alleged, was conveyed to him