ment or decree rendered on false testimony, given by perjured witnesses, or on contracts or documents whose genuineness or validity was in issue, and which are afterwards ascertained to be forged or fraudulent, would be greater, by reason of the endless nature of the strife, than any compensation arising from doing justice in individual cases.

The case before us comes within this principle. The genuineness and validity of the concession from Micheltorena produced by complainant was the single question pending before the board of commissioners and the District Court for four years. It was the thing, and the only thing, that was controverted, and it was essential to the decree. To overrule the demurrer to this bill would be to retry, twenty years after the decision of these tribunals, the very matter which they tried, on the ground of fraud in the document on which the decree was made. If we can do this now, some other court may be called on twenty years hence to retry the same matter on another allegation of fraudulent combination in this suit to defeat the ends of justice; and so the number of suits would be without limit and the litigation endless about the single question of the validity of this document.

We have alluded to an allegation concerning the agent representing the United States before the board of commissioners.

The substance of it is that Howard, one of the present de. fendants, then the law agent of the government before the board, had, from the papers in some other suit, derived notice of the fraudulent character of the Micheltorena grant, and that he failed and neglected to inform the commissioners of the fact, or otherwise to defend the interest of the United States in the matter. If there had been a further allegation that Howard was then interested in the Richardson claim, or that Richardson had bribed him, or that from any corrupt motive he had betrayed the interest of the government, the case would have come within the rule which authorizes relief. But nothing of the kind is alleged; and the statement is a mere charge of care. lessness or negligence on the part of the attorney for the government, which would not have supported a motion for a new trial in a case at law at the same term, much less a suit in chancery to set aside a decree twenty years after it had been rendered.

Nor is there any such clear statement of the notice which Howard had as is necessary to establish his negligence.

In fact, one great if not fatal defect in the bill is the absence of any declaration of the means by which the fraud has been discovered or can be now established.

There is another objection to the bill which, though not going to the merits, is, in our opinion, equally fatal to it in its present shape.

We are of opinion that, unless by virtue of an act of Congress, no one but the Attorney-General, or some one authorized to use his name, can bring a suit to set aside a patent issued by the United States, or a judgment rendered in its courts on which such a patent is founded.

That is the case before us, and we see nothing in the bill to indicate to the court that it ever received the sanction of the Attorney-General, or was brought by his direction. The allegation already cited implies that Mr. Van Dyke, the district attorney, is the complainant; but if, construing it liberally, we hold that the United States is the complainant, the statement is clear that the bill was brought by the district attorney, and not by the Attorney-General. Leaving out of consideration all mere questions of form, there arises no presumption from the act of Congress which gives the Department of Justice a general supervision over the district attorneys, that this suit was brought by his direction; for they, in the strict line of their duty, bring innumerable suits, indictments, and prosecutions, in which the United States is plaintiff, without consulting him. In the class of cases to which this belongs, however, the practice of the English and the American courts has been to require the name of the Attorney-General as indorsing the suit before it will be entertained. The reason of this is obvious; namely, that in so important a matter as impeaching the grants of the government under its seal, its highest law officer should be consulted, and should give the support of his name and authority to the suit. He should, also, have control of it in every stage, so that if at any time during its progress he should become convinced that the proceeding is not well founded, or is oppressive, he may dismiss the bill.

There is appended to this record, though no part of it, a

bond, given by some private persons to the United States, to save it harmless of costs in regard to this suit. If it is intended by this to show that the Attorney-General authorized the suit, it fails to prove it, though the bond recites that that officer had directed the district attorney to bring the suit.

It is not in this way that the then Attorney-General should have placed himself on the record as responsible for such a bill. In confirmation of this view, it does not appear that he or his successors have ever given the slightest attention to the case. In the argument of it before us, no officer of the gov ernment appeared. It would be a very dangerous doctrine, one threatening the title to millions of acres of land held by patent from the government, if any man who has a grudge or a claim against his neighbor can, by indemnifying the govern ment for costs, and furnishing the needed stimulus to a district attorney, institute a suit in chancery in the United States to declare the patent void. It is essential, therefore, to such a suit, that without special regard to form, but in some way which the court can recognize, it should appear that the Attorney-General has brought it himself, or given such order for its institution as will make him officially responsible for it, and show his control of the cause.

It is unnecessary at this day to say that, as a substantive matter, standing alone, the Circuit Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with or relieve against a survey which, by the allegation of the bill itself, is pending before the District Court.

For these reasons, we are of opinion that the decree of the Circuit Court sustaining a demurrer to the bill, and dismissing it on the merits, was right.

Decree affirmed.

WILLIAMS v. HAGOOD.

Where a bill shows no equity in the complainant, and contains no averment that he has been injured by certain statutes of a State, this court will not pass upon an abstract question the object of which is plainly to obtain a decision touching their constitutionality, but will dismiss the bill without prejudice.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of South Carolina.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Mr. Denis McMahon for the appellant.

Mr. Le Roy F. Youmans, Attorney-General of South Carolina, contra.

MR. JUSTICE STRONG delivered the opinion of the court. This is a bill in equity against the comptroller-general of the State of South Carolina, the county treasurer of Charleston County, in said State, and the assignees in bankruptcy of the Blue Ridge Railroad Company, in which the relief sought is an injunction commanding the comptroller "to cease from refusing to levy a tax for retiring" certain certificates of the State indebtedness, and commanding the county treasurer "to cease from refusing to receive the same for taxes and dues to the State, except to pay interest on the public debt."

The facts of the case, so far as they are exhibited by the bill, and so far as they are material for present consideration, are as follows:

By an act of the legislature of the State, enacted March 2, 1872, reciting in its preamble that in pursuance of a former act the guaranty of the faith and credit of the State had been indorsed on four millions of dollars of bonds issued by the Blue Ridge Railroad Company, and that it was desired to recover and destroy the bonds thus issued and relieve the State from the liability incurred by its indorsement and guaranty thereof, the State treasurer was directed, with the written consent of the railroad company, to require the financial agent of the State to deliver to him for cancellation all the bonds of the company indorsed and guaranteed as aforesaid, then in the agent's possession and held by him as collateral security for advances.

The second section of the act enacted that upon the surren der by the company to the State treasury of the balance of the said four millions of dollars of bonds thus guaranteed by the State, the State treasurer should be authorized and required to deliver to the president of the railroad company treasury certificates of indebtedness (styled revenue-bond scrip) to the amount of $1,800,000, executed in a manner directed afterwards in the act. And if the company should not be able to deliver all of said bonds at one time, the act required the treasurer to deliver to the said president such amount of the treasury certificates as should be proportioned to the amount of bonds delivered.

The third section made it the duty of the State treasurer, in order to carry out the purposes of the act, to have treasury certificates of indebtedness prepared, to be known and designated as "revenue-bond scrip of the State of South Carolina," which should be signed by the treasurer, and which should express that the sum mentioned therein is due by the State of South Carolina to the bearer thereof, and that the same would be received in payment of taxes and all other dues to the State, except special tax levied to pay interest on the public debt.

The fourth section pledged the faith and funds of the State for the ultimate redemption of the scrip, and required county treasurers to receive it in payment of all taxes levied by the State, except in payment of special tax levied to pay interest on the public debt. It also required the State treasurer and all other public officers to receive the same in payment of all dues to the State; and, still further to provide for its redemption, the section levied an annual tax of three mills on the dollar in addition to all other taxes on the assessed value of all taxable property in the State, to be collected in the same manner and at the same time as might be provided by law for the levy and collection of the regular annual taxes of the State. And the State treasurer was required to retire, at the end of each year from their date, one-fourth of the amount of the treasury scrip authorized to be issued, and to apply to such purpose exclusively the taxes by the act required to be levied.

The sixth section required the guaranteed bonds to be cancelled and destroyed on their delivery to the treasurer.