An ordinance of the city and county of San Francisco requiring persons conducting a laundry or wash house within certain prescribed limits to procure a certificate from the health office that proper drainage was provided for, and a certificate from the fire wardens that the heating appliances were in safe condition, and prohibiting washing or ironing from ten o'clock P. M. to 6 o'clock A. M., and on Sunday. Held, constitutional. Ex parte Moynier, 65 Cal. 33.

Sections 300, 301, Penal Code, as they existed in 1881, prohibiting the keeping open of saloons, etc., on Sunday, are not unconstitutional as granting special privileges or immunities. Ex parte Koser, 60 Cal. 177, McKinstry, Sharpstein and Ross, JJ., dissenting.

The act of March 11, 1889 [Stats. pp. 100106], establishing the Preston School of Industry, is not unconstitutional in authorizing juvenile offenders to be sent there for a longer period than the term provided by the general law for imprisonment of adults for similar offenses. The objects of the act are reformation and education. Ex parte Nichols, 110 Cal. 652.

This section is referred to in discussing section 310 of the Penal Code, as enacted in 1895 [Stats. p. 247, Palm Ed.], requiring barber shops to be closed after 12 o'clock M. on Sundays and holidays, in Ex parte Jentzsch, 112 Cal. 470.

A city ordinance requiring a quarterly license of fifty dollars of persons selling differ

ent articles of apparel, cutlery, groceries, etc., not at a regular place of business and to persons not regularly engaged in and carrying on such lines of business, is within the license taxing power of the municipality, and is not invalid by reason of the rate of license being greater than that required of persons conducting the same lines of business at a regular place of business in the city. Ex parte Haskell, 112 Cal. 415.

Section 2853 of the Political Code, providing that "No toll-bridge or ferry must be established within one mile immediately above or below a regularly established ferry or tollbridge, is not in conflict with the constitutional provision prohibiting the granting of special privileges or immunities, nor with subdivision 19 of section 25 of article IV, prohibiting special laws granting special privileges or immunities; nor with subdivision 25 of said section 25. Fortain v. Smith, 114 Cal. 494.

SECTION 22. The provisions of this constitution are mandatory and prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to be otherwise.

See Dougherty v. Austin, 94 Cal. 608, as to sections 5-9, article XI. People v. Parks, 58 Cal. 624, as to section 24, article IV.

This section, as a rule of construction, applies to all sections of the constitution alike. Ewing v. Oroville M. Co., 56 Cal. 649. The following cases may also be consulted: People v. C. P. R. R. Co., 83 Id. 403; Davies v.

City of L. A., 86 Id. 50. The word "may" in section 16, article XII, expressly renders the section permissive. Nat. Bank v. Superior Court, 83 Id. 494; Oakland Pav. Co. v. Hilton, 69 Id. 492, 512. Ex parte Wolters, 65 Id. 271; Matter of Maguire, 57 Id. 609.

The constitution is mandatory and prohibitory in the matter of the passage of special laws. [Sec. 11, Art. I; Sec. 25, Art. IV; Sec. 5, Art. XI.] Bruch v. Colombet, 104 Cal. 351.

The constitutional provision as to classification of counties is not merely permissive. It was unnecessary to give the legislature "permission" to classify; it would have that power anyway, unless it was expressly withheld. The mode designated by the constitution is mandatory, and is the only one contemplated for the fixing of official compensation. Dwyer v. Parker, 115 Cal. 546.

SECTION 23. This enumeration of rights shall not be construed to impair or deny others retained by the people.

Const. 1849, Art. I, Sec. 21.

SECTION 24. No property qualification shall ever be required for any person to vote or hold office.

The fact that owners of lands in irrigation districts are non-residents of the district, and that the residents need not own land to entitle them to vote in elections affecting the organization, etc., of the district, is of no constitutional consequence. No property qualification can be required, and only those who

are residents of the district can, by the c tution, be permitted to vote at any ele It is no more than exists in every popular vote which involves the creation of a municipal debt or the creation of a municipal organization. In re Madera Ir. Dist., 92 Cal. 321.

Reclamation districts are considered as not being municipal corporations, and the property qualification required for participation therein is not unconstitutional. There are no "electors" of these districts, and the right of appointment of persons to conduct the improvement is not unusual and does not constitute an exercise of the elective franchise. People v. Reclamation Dist., 117 Cal. 123.

ARTICLE II.

RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE.

SECTION 1. Every native male citizen of the United States, every male person who shall have acquired the rights of citizenship under or by virtue of the treaty of Queretaro, and every male naturalized citizen thereof, who shall have become such ninety days prior to any election, of the age of twenty-one years, who shall have been resident of the state one year next preceding the election, and of the county in which he claims his vote ninety days, and in the election precinct thirty days, shall be entitled to vote at all elections which are now or may hereafter be authorized by law; provided, no native of China, no idiot, no insane person, no person convicted of any infamous crime, no person hereafter convicted of the embezzlement or misappropriation of public money, and no person who shall not be able to read the constitution in the English language and write his name, shall ever exercise the privileges of an elector in this state; provided, that the provisions of this amend

ment relative to an educational qualification shall not apply to any person prevented by a physical disability from complying with its requisitions, nor to any person who now has the right to vote, nor to any person who shall be sixty years of age and upwards at the time this amendment shall take effect. [Amendment ratified at election Nov. 6, 1894.]

[Original section.]

SECTION 1. Every native male citizen of the United States, every male person who shall have acquired the rights of citizenship under or by virtue of the treaty of Queretaro, and every male naturalized citizen thereof, who shall have become such ninety days prior to any election, of the age of twenty-one years, who shall have been a resident of the state one year next preceding the election, and of the county in which he claims his vote ninety days, and in the election precinct thirty days, shall be entitled to vote at all elections which are now or may hereafter be authorized by law; provided, no native of China, no idiot, insane person, or person convicted of any infamous crime, and no person hereafter convicted of the embezzlement or misappropriation of public money shall ever exercise the privileges of an elector in this state.

Const. 1849, Art. II, Sec. 1.

Every male naturalized citizen thereof does not include a native of China, naturalized by a court of the state of New York. Natives of China are not entitled to naturalization under the laws of the United States, and a certificate to practice as an attorney-at-law, issued to such person in another state, will not entitle to admission in this state. In re Hong Yen Chang, 84 Cal. 163.

Residence in the election precinct for thirty days is just as essential a condition of the