NINTH. Regulating county and township business, or the election of county and township offi

cers.

TENTH. For the assessment or collection of taxes. ELEVENTH. Providing for conducting elections, or designating the places of voting, except on the organization of new counties.

TWELFTH. Affecting estates of deceased persons, minors, or other persons under legal disabilities. THIRTEENTH. Extending the time for the collection of taxes.

FOURTEENTH. Giving effect to invalid deeds, wills or other instruments.

FIFTEENTH. Refunding money paid into the state treasury.

SIXTEENTH.

Releasing or extinguishing, in whole or in part the indebtedness, liability, or obligation of any corporation or person to this state, or to any municipal corporation therein.

SEVENTEENTH. Declaring any person of age, or authorizing any minor to sell, lease or encumber his or her property.

EIGHTEENTH. Legalizing, except as against the state, the unauthorized or invalid act of any officer. NINETEENTH. Granting to any corporation, association or individual any special or exclusive right, privilege or immunity.

TWENTIETH. Exempting property from taxa

tion.

TWENTY-FIRST. Changing county seats.
TWENTY-SECOND. Restoring to

persons convicted of infamous crimes.

citizenship

TWENTY-THIRD. Regulating the rate of inter

est on money.

TWENTY-FOURTH.

Authorizing the creation,

extension or impairing of liens.

TWENTY-FIFTH. Chartering or licensing ferries, bridges or roads.

TWENTY-SIXTH. Remitting fines, penalties or

forfeitures.

TWENTY-SEVENTH. Providing for the management of common schools.

pre

TWENTY-EIGHTH. Creating offices, or scribing the powers and duties of officers in counties cities, cities and counties, townships, election or school districts.

TWENTY-NINTH. Affecting the fees or salary of any officer.

THIRTIETH. Changing the law of descent or succession.

THIRTY-FIRST. Authorizing the adoption or legitimation of children.

THIRTY-SECOND. For limitation of civil or criminal actions.

THIRTY-THIRD. In all other cases where a general law can be made applicable.

THE SECTION GENERALLY. A tax sale made under a local statute prior to the adoption of this constitution is not void on the ground that such law contravenes the provisions of section 25, article IV, of this constitution; Rollins v. Wright, 93 Cal. 395.

The mode of exercising the power of eminent domain is susceptible of being prescribed and governed by general law applicable to all persons alike. While the legislature is authorized to classify municipal corporations for the purpose of incorporation and organization, the mode of exercising the right of eminent domain must apply to all alike. It is unconstitutional to discriminate by applying conditions for the exercise of this right to cities of fifth and sixth classes, which are not made applicable to all classes. City of Pasadena v. Stimson, 91 Cal. 238.

It is clearly the intention to emancipate municipal governments from the authority and control formerly exercised over them by the

legislature, and this is the more apparent from the fact that a charter framed by freeholders and ratified by the people cannot be amended by the legislature. [Secs. 8, 13, 14, Art. XI; Sec. 25, Art. IV.] People v. Hoge,

55 Cal. 612, 618.

The provision of the county government act of 1893 [Stats. p. 346], requiring the board of supervisors of a county from which territory has been taken in forming a new county to fix by order the class to which such county has been reduced, is a general law applicable to all counties from which territory may be taken in creating new counties, and is therefore not prohibited by the constitution. Kumler v. Board of Supervisors, 103 Cal. 395.

The term "system" itself imports a unity of purpose as well as an entirety of operation, and this section is cited in connection with section 5, article XI, to the effect that section 1645 of Political Code, as amended in 1893, which provides that in cities having a board of education the city treasurer is to have the custody of the state and county school moneys, was unconstitutional as special legislation. Bruch v. Colombet, 104 Cal. 350.

Sections 3668 to 3670 of the Political Code are held not to contravene subdivision 10, nor any provision of section 25 of article IV of the constitution. The distinction between a special and a general law may not be capable of being formulated in a definition which will be exhaustive and applicable to every case. Each particular case presented may best be

considered by taking into view the purpose and character of the law, as well as the individuals upon which it is to operate. It is not required that all laws passed by the legislature shall have a uniform operation in every part of the state. Nor does the constitution prohibit legislation for different classes of citizens. People v. C. P. R. R. Co., 105 Cal. 584. See also Levy v. Superior Court, 105 Cal. 616.

Section 410 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not "special" or prohibited legislation in respect that it authorizes service of summons by persons other than the sheriff, nor does it conflict with section 4175 of the Political Code nor the corresponding provisions of the county government act. Hibernia S. &. L. Society, v. Clarke, 110 Cal. 28.

The act of March 15, 1883 [Stats p. 370], and amendatory act of 1893 [Stats. p. 59], relating to funding of municipal indebtedness, are in conflict with the constitutional provisions prohibiting special legislation, for the reason that such acts apply only to cities other than of the first class. City of Los Angeles v. Teed, 112 Cal. 323.

Several subdivisions of section 25 are referred to in Currey v. Miller, 113 Cal. 645, where it was held that the Fee Bill of 1895 was applicable to San Francisco.

Under the provisions of this section the legislature has no power to pass any local or special act directing money to be paid out of the funds of any particular municipality, whether the payment be in satisfaction of an

enforceable obligation or not, or whether the claim be liquidated or unliquidated, or be judicially determined valid or not. The cases of Stevenson v. Colgan, 91 Cal. 649, and Rankin v. Colgan, 92 Cal. 606, are distinguished because those cases dealt with the question of control of state funds as distinguished from municipal funds. Conlin v. Board of Supervisors, San Francisco, 114 Cal. 606. And see Conlin v. Supervisors, 99 Cal. 17.

The act of 1880 [Stats. p. 400], requiring mining corporations to post weekly reports of their superintendents, and imposing a fine of one thousand dollars for failure to comply therewith, is not unconstitutional as special legislation. Miles v. Woodward, 115 Cal. 310.

The provisions of section 173 of county government act of 1893 [Stats. pp. 415, 416], empowering certain county officers in counties of the eleventh class to appoint a specified number of deputies, whose salaries are fixed by the act, and made payable out of the county treasury, are not unconstitutional. Tulare County . May, 118 Cal. 305.

PARAGRAPH 1. The act of March 7, 1881 [Stats. p. 75], creating an additional court, known as the police judges court No. 2, in San Francisco, is not in contravention of either sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 28 or 29 of section 25, article IV, constitution. Ex parte Jordan, 62 Cal. 464.

PARAGRAPH 2. The consolidation act of San Francisco conferred ample power upon the supervisors to pass an ordinance making it a