stitution, but such general law could not deprive the city of the constitutional privilege of framing a charter in accordance with section 8, article XI, and when such new charter was approved by the legislature, it superseded the former charter adopted in pursuance with the provisions of the statute of 1883. People v. Bagley, 85 Cal. 343. Since the foregoing decisions, section 6, article XI, has been amended so as to read, "and all charters thereof framed or adopted by authority of this constitution, except in municipal affairs, shall be subject to and controlled by general laws." Upon general authority it may be safely assumed that street improvement is a matter of municipal affairs. People v. Toal is referred to in Ex parte Sparks, 120 Cal. 395.

It was competent for the legislature, prior to adoption of constitution of 1879, to prescribe the form of complaint to be used in an action for collection of delinquent city taxes, and the charter of the city of Stockton of 1872 prescribing such form is not obnoxious to anything contained in section 6 of article XI of said constitution, and remained in force. City of Stockton v. Insurance Co., 73 Cal. 621.

A general law [Stats. 1885, p. 213] establishing police courts in cities of more than thirty thousand and less than one hundred thousand inhabitants, supersedes charter provisions in conflict therewith [citing In re Ah You, 82 Cal. 339], and said law is applicable to cities of Oakland and Los Angeles. People v. Toal, 23 Pac. Rep. 203. See section 8 of article XI,

as adopted in 1896, and Ex parte Sparks, 120 Cal. 395.

On re-hearing in this case, [85 Cal. 333] the court omits this approval of the Whitney act, and decides the case upon the question as to how municipal or inferior courts can be established and holds that they cannot be established by a charter which is merely approved by the legislature, and that they can only be established by a bill, enacted as other laws, while Chief Justice Beatty dissents and holds that such courts being essentially a part of every municipal system can be established by means of the charter. In Ex parte Ah You, Fox J., dissented, and held that sections 6 and 8 of article XI could be reconciled; the latter applying to freeholders' charters only, and that by such charters inferior courts might be established, but otherwise as to municipalities mentioned in section 6, and as to the latter that such courts must be established by general laws. He also maintained that the Whitney act was a special law and urged that the decision in People v. Henshaw, 76 Cal. 436 should be reversed. Again in Ex parte Riley, 85 Cal. 633, it is said: "The trial took place before a justice of the peace who styled himself ex officio police judge of the city of Los Angeles, and who appears to have been acting as such police judge by designation of the mayor, in pursuance of the so-called Whitney act, which it was intimated in the first decision in People v. Toal, 23 Pac. Rep. 203, applied to the city of Los Angeles,

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"Conceding that the Whitney act does not apply to the city of Los Angeles-and it seems it does not the justice of the peace had authority to act, and his judgment is valid." This decision however says that the charter provision concerning police courts was finally disposed of at the rehearing in the Toal case, 85 Cal. 333, as being valid.

The consolidation act of San Francisco is controled by the general law contained in the Political Code in relation to public schools. Kennedy Board of Education, 82 Cal. 483.

Counties are not municipal corporations within the meaning of this section. The policy of creating a new county and fixing its boundaries are matters for legislative determination alone. The legislature has power to create a new county by special act, and provide for its complete organization, making it thereafter subject to general laws. Making certain provisions of the act dependent upon the vote of the people of the county, does not delegate to the people the power to pass or repeal the act, the act being a valid statute from the time of its passage and approval, the legislature itself enacting the provision that it shall cease to be effective unless accepted by the people within a definite time. People v. County of Orange, 81 Cal. 489.

That counties are distinguishable from corporations for municipal purposes. See also, People v. McFadden, 81 Cal. 497.

Under the power to classify cities for the purposes of incorporation and organization,

the legislature cannot make arbitrary discriminations in the mode of exercising the right of eminent domain, and impose upon cities of the fifth and sixth classes conditions which are not made applicable to cities of other classes. City of Pasadena v. Stimson, 91 Cal. 238.

The power of legislature to create municipal corporations by general laws, is not confined to cities or towns. It may by general laws authorize the inhabitants of any district to organize themselves into a public corporation for governmental purposes, under such restrictions and by such preliminary steps as it may deem proper, and such public corporation need not be required to be formed in the same manner nor be provided with the same powers as municipal corporations organized for different purposes. The legislature may, by general laws, provide for the creation and maintenance of as many species of public corporations as, in its judgment, are demanded by the welfare of the state, and invest each with such powers only as are appropriate thereto. In re Bonds of Madera Ir. Dist., 92 Cal. 297.

The cases of Cody v. Murphy, 89 Cal. 522, and People v. Henshaw, 76 Cal. 444, are distinguished in the concurring opinion of Beatty C. J. in Dougherty v. Austin, 94 Cal. 621, because those decisions are sustained by section 6, which permits a classification of cities. in proportion to population, for the purpose of regulating fees of officers, while the act under consideration [section 211 of county government act of 1883, as amended in 1887, statutes

page 207], attempts to delegate to the supervisors the power to regulate salaries in certain counties.

Irrigation districts are municipal corporations authorized to be organized under general laws, and Wright act [Stats. 1887, p. 29], is constitutional. In re Bonds Madera Ir. Dist. supra. Crall v. Board Directors, etc., 87 Cal. 140; Irrigation Dist. v. DeLappe, 79 Cal. 351; Turlock Ir. Dist. v. Williams, 76 Cal. 360.

The term "system" employed by the legislature [Chap. 3, title III, part III, Political Code] itself imports a unity of purpose as well as an entirety of operation, and means one system, which shall be applicable to all the common schools in the state. Kennedy v. Miller, 97 Cal. 429.

Under sections 1001 Civil Code, and 1238 Code of Civil Procedure, a city may, by eminent domain, condemn the waters of a creek for use of inhabitants, though the city charter does not contain such authorization. City of Santa Cruz v. Enright, 95 Cal. 105.

Act of March 31, 1891 [Stats. p. 223], authorizing organization of sanitary districts throughout the state, will not be presumed to affect cities and towns, nor as violation of this secWoodward v. Fruitvale S. Dist., 99 Cal. Approving, In re Madera Ir. Dist. 92

554.

Cal. 296.

A public library in Los Angeles, organized under act of 1874 [Stats. p. 274], was not subject to or controlled by the act of 1880 [Stats. p. 524], but such library was controlled by the