The rights of a riparian owner may be taken under power of eminent domain (compensation being made), for the purpose of sup plying farming neighborhood with water. Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255.

The use of water appropriated for sale, rental, or distribution is a public use; and the right to collect compensation for use of water to the inhabitants of any city is a franchise which cannot be exercised except by authority of and in the manner prescribed by law. Water appropriated for distribution and sale is ipso facto devoted to a public use. Each member of the community, by paying the rate fixed for supplying it has a right to use a reasonable quantity of it, in a reasonable manner. McCreary v. Beaudry, 67 Cal. 120. Is a public use. People v. Stephens, 62 Cal.

209.

The consolidated city and county government of San Francisco exists under the consolidation act of 1856. Under said act-its charter-it is provided that ordinances upon certain enumerated subjects shall not be effective unless approved by the mayor, or, unless after his veto, nine members of the board shall vote therefor. Held, the constitutional requirement for fixing water rates in February of each year, is not of that class of acts which requires approval of the mayor. The fixing of rates may be accomplished by a majority vote of the board, and to hold that approval of the mayor was requisite would require nine members of the board to overcome any

objection raised by the mayor, which might prevent a compliance with the requirements of the constitution. Jacobs v. Board of Supervisors, 100 Cal. 121.

The power of the state to fix and regulate the rates of compensation to be charged by persons or corporations in charge of public utilities (such as water), is so limited by the constitution of the United States that it cannot be exercised to such an extent as to require such persons or corporations to furnish its services or property without reward; and the courts may review such action to the extent of ascertaining whether the rates fixed will yield some reward for the services or property furnished. San Diego Water Co. v. San Diego, 118 Cal. 565, 585.

The section is mentioned in Merton v. Broderick, 118 Cal. 479-an action brought to oust the board of supervisors of the city and county of San Francisco for failure to fix water rates for the year.

This section and Jacobs v. Board of Supervisors, 100 Cal. 121, cited to the effect that the mayor of San Francisco was not authorized to veto an ordinance fixing water rates in Eisenhuth v. Ackerman, 105 Cal. 91.

One community cannot be suppressed for the benefit of another. The rights of riparian owners and dwellers cannot be appropriated to public use without compensation. People v. Elk River M. & L. Co., 107 Cal. 225.

It is held that the rates fixed by the municipal or county authorities must be reason

able, and afford just compensation. [S. V. W. Works v. San Francisco, 82 Cal. 286.] San Diego W. Co. v. Flume Co., 108 Cal. 560.

In an action by a corporation to condemn land for purposes of its irrigating ditches, the complaint alleged its ownership of ditches and land in the county where the action was brought. Defendant's answer traversed all the material allegations, and then, in abatement, pleaded non-compliance with section 299, Civil Code, which requires the filing of articles of incorporation in each county where the corporation owns land. The plea in abatement was held good. Emigrant Ditch Co. v. Webber, 108 Cal. 90.

The word "appropriated" in the constitution, relating to waters for sale or distribution, is not to be confined to water appropriated under the provisions of the Civil Code; but when water is designed, set apart and devoted to purposes of sale, rental or distribution, it is "appropriated" to such uses, or some of them, and becomes subject to the "public use," declared by the constitution, without reference to the mode of its acquisition. Merrill v. Southside Ir. Co., 112 Cal. 433.

SECTION 2. The right to collect rates or compensation for the use of water supplied to any county, city and county, or town, or the inhabitants thereof, is a franchise, and cannot be exercised except by authority of and in the manner prescribed by law.

The right to collect rates is a franchise. The section has no application to water fur

nished by the municipality itself, but it refers to rates or compensation to be collected for water authorized by section 19, article XI, to be introduced into cities by individuals or companies incorporated for that purpose. Sections 1 and 2, article XIV, and section 19, article XI, are to be read and taken together. People v. Stephens, 62 Cal. 209.

The act of March 7, 1887 [Stats. p. 29], known as the Wright act, is constitutional. The corporations for which it provides are quasi public corporations, and the mode prescribed for their exercise of the power of taxation need not follow exactly the mode provided in the constitution for the assessment and collection of taxes for general state purposes. In re Madera Ir. Dist., 92 Cal. 324. See In re Central Ir. Dist., 117 Cal. 389.

Perhaps to a greater extent than any of the other states, California, speaking through the acts of her legislature, her court of last resort, and her constitution, seems to have considered the irrigation of lands and the supplying of mines with water as of great public concern. Irrigation District v. Williams, 76 Cal. 369.

The Spring Valley Water Company was organized under the act of 1858 [Stats. p. 218], and the 4th section of that act provided that the water rates should be fixed by a board of commissioners to be selected as therein prescribed. Held, said section of the act was superseded by the adoption of the constitution of 1879, and that rates must thereafter be

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fixed as provided in article XIV of said instrument, and the statute enacted to carry it into effect. [Stats. 1881, p. 54.]

W. v. Supervisors, 61 Cal. 3.

S. V. W.

Since the new constitution, the supervisors have had the power to fix the rate or compensation to be allowed for water supplied to the city for fires, street sprinkling, parks, etc., as well as for water supplied to private persons; and an ordinance leaving the rate to be charged to private persons indefinite and dependent upon amount paid by the public, is not a compliance with the constitution, because it does not fix the rate. According to the decision in S. V. W. W. v. Supervisors, 52 Cal. 122, the company is not required to furnish water to the city for public purposes free except for fires. S. F. P. W. Factory v. Brickwedel, 60 Cal. 166; S. V. W. W. Co. v. San Francisco, 61 Cal. 38.

Whether the use to which it is proposed to devote water is a public or private one, is a material issue in proceedings to condemn a right of way for a ditch, and must be specifically found upon. Cummings v. Peters, 56 Cal. 593.

This section is also referred to in most of the cases collected under section 1 of this article.