tion, and was not repealed by it. The same law exists against increasing or diminishing the salary of the incumbent as will exist against increasing or diminishing the salary of his successor during his incumbency. [Section 14, article VI, constitution.] The legislature by the amendment of 1881 to section 755, Political Code, did not decrease the salary of the incumbent. Gross v. Kenfield, 57 Cal. 627.

The street law of San Francisco, of 1872, which did not require an assessment to be levied and collected prior to the contract for doing the work, was repealed by section 19, article XI. And when that section was amended, the former law was not thereby revived, but said work must be done under the general law of 1885. Thomason v. Ruggles, 69 Cal. 465. But see dissenting opinions in same

case.

It seems that the act of April 24, 1862 [Stats. p. 341], amending the charter of Oakland, and authorizing that city by ordinance to require a license to be procured by every person who at a fixed place of business sells any goods, wares or merchandise, and affix a penalty for a refusal to procure the same, was not repealed by the constitution. Ex parte Mount, 66 Cal. 448.

The act of April 1, 1877 [Stats. p. 953], in relation to the house of correction in San Francisco is not repealed by constitution of 1879, and it is applicable to the Superior Courts. Ex parte Flood, 64 Cal. 251.

12

It was not the intention of the constitution to repeal sections 1183 to 1190, Code of Civil Procedure, concerning liens of mechanics, and such law is continued in force. Germania B. & L. Asso. v. Wagner, 61 Cal. 349. See Latson v. Nelson, XI Pac. L. J. 589.

The license tax for selling merchandise at a fixed place of business, provided for by section 3360, Political Code, prior to the present constitution, was a tax prohibited by section 12, article XJ, and section 3360 became inoperative upon the adoption of the constitution. McKee dissenting, People v. Martin, 60 Cal. 153.

The act of March 27, 1878 [Stats. p. 574], to regulate fees and salaries in Los Angeles county, provided that certain officers of the county should receive salaries for their compensation, and that all fees collected should be paid into the county treasury, but this provision of the act should not affect the then incumbents of said offices. Held, that the act was a perfect law and was in force at the adoption of the constitution-the proviso that it should not affect certain persons then in office related only to a status, but did not postpone the taking effect of the act itself. [This case is to be distinguished from Speegle v. Joy, 60 Cal. 278; Whiting v. Haggard, Id. 513, and Peachy v. Supervisors, 59 Cal. 548, in which cases the acts referred to were not to take effect until a date subsequent to the date of the taking effect of this constitution.] County of Los Angeles r. Lamb, 61 Cal. 196.

An act passed March 26, 1878 [Stats p.547],

in relation to certain officers in Plumas county, portions of which act were, by its terms, not to take effect until March, 1880, never did take effect as to such portions. A law which could not take effect until after the adoption of the constitution, necessarily was not in effect at its adoption. People v. Whiting, 64 Cal. 67. To same effect see Speegle v. Joy, 60 Cal. 278; Peachy v. Supervisors, 59 Cal. 548.

Section 1552, Political Code, relative to salary of county superintendent of schools, was a general statutory provision when the constitution went into effect, and the special act of March 9, 1878 [Stats. p. 204], relative to salary of such office in Calaveras county, and which by its own terms was not to go into effect until March, 1880, never did go into effect because of the adoption of the constitution. Peachy v. Supervisors, 59 Cal. 548.

Referred to in dissenting opinion of Justice Harrison in McClatchy v. Superior Court, 119 Cal. 428, a case of contempt by newspaper publication.

The consolidation act of San Francisco was not repealed by the constitution of 1879. [In re Stuart, 53 Cal. 746; Wood v. Board of Election Commissioners, 58 Cal. 561; In re Guerrero, 69 Cal. 88; Kahn v. Sutro, 114 Cal. 318.] People Babcock, 114 Cal. 559.

SECTION 2. That all recognizances, obligations, and all other instruments entered into or executed before the adoption of this constitution, to this state, or to any subdivision thereof, or any municipal

ity therein, and all fines, taxes, penalties and forfeitures due or owing to this state, or any subdivision or municipality thereof, and all writs, prosecutions, actions and causes of action, except as herein otherwise provided, shall continue and remain unaffected by the adoption of this constitution. All indictments or informations which shall have been found, or may hereafter be found, for any crime or offense committed before this constitution takes effect, may be proceeded upon as if no change had taken place, except as otherwise provided in this constitution.

SECTION 3. All courts now existing, save justices' and police courts, are hereby abolished; and all records, books, papers and proceedings from such courts, as are abolished by this constitution, shall be transferred on the first day of January, eighteen hundred and eighty, to the courts provided for in this constitution; and the courts to which the same are thus transferred shall have the same power and jurisdiction over them as if they had been in the first instance commenced, filed lodged therein.

or

The Superior Court of city and county of San Francisco is the constitutional successor of the municipal criminal court. Ex parte Lizzie Williams, 87 Cal. 78.

An action brought in the District Court in San Francisco, prior to adoption of this constitution, to foreclose a mortgage on lands in Fresno county, was succeeded to by the Superior Court in and for San Francisco, and its decree of foreclosure was valid. The provision of the present constitution, requiring such actions to be brought in the county where the land affected thereby is situated, is prospective. Watt v. Wright, 66 Cal. 202.

The Superior Court of San Francisco succeeded to an action pending in the District Court of San Francisco at the time of the adoption of this constitution, although the action was for recovery of possession of land situate in Sonoma county. Prior to the adoption of this constitution said action was properly commenced in said District Court, Gurnee v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 88; approved in S. F. Sav. U. v. Abbott, 59 Cal. 400.

At the time the constitution went into effect, January 1, 1880, an appeal from city criminal court was pending in the County Court. The Superior Court afterwards affirmed the judgment and issued its bench warrant for the arrest of the defendant. Held, the court had power to issue the warrant for arrest. Ex parte Toland, 54 Cal. 344.

Justices courts were not abolished but expressly continued by the constitution. At the election in 1879 one Topham was elected justice of the peace but did not qualify. The incumbent remained in office, and was himself elected at the following election in 1882, but he also failed to qualify after this election. A vacancy existed under these circumstances, which could have been filled by the supervisors by appointment, but the fact that the jurisdiction of such courts had been enlarged, nor the fact that the supervisors had provided for the election of but one justice where there had formerly been two, did not affect the matter. French v. Santa Clara County, 69 Cal. 519, and In re Guerrero, 69 Cal. 99.