during the term. Estill took possession and in May, 1857, assigned his contract to McCauley, retaining the right to draw one-half the monthly payments, and subsequently assigned all his interest. Payments were made under the contract by the state until December, 1857, when further payment was refused. Acts of the legislature passed subsequent to the making of the contract assumed the existence of the contract. Held, this was sufficient legislative affirmance of the contract. In pursuance of an act of February 26, 1858 [Stats. pp. 32, 259], the governor dispossessed the assignees of Estill, and by act of April 21, 1858 [Stats. p. 212], a board of examiners was created, by the terms of which act it would be incumbent upon said lessees to present their demands for monthly demands of the money provided by the contract to be paid by the state. Held, the law under which the contract was made gave an absolute right to the warrants for these demands, and that such right could not be changed by subsequent legislation making it depend upon the will and discretion of the board of examiners. By act of April 19, 1859 [Stats. p. 377], the act of 1856, under which the contract was entered into, was repealed. Held, the contract remained unaffected by such repeal, and that the rights and obligations of the parties to the contract became fixed beyond the reach of legislative power--they were vested interests. The legislature possesses entire control over financial affairs of the state. but after making

an appropriation in view of a contemplated contract which is thereafter executed, and funds to meet the appropriation are received into the treasury, it cannot deprive the party with whom it has contracted of such funds by repealing the appropriation. It may not direct any taxation, may repeal all laws relating to collection of revenue, and thus prevent the receipt of funds upon which the appropriation can operate, but the right of the parties remains when such funds are actually received. McCauley Brooks, 16 Cal. 1. [See also Montgomery v. Kasson, Id. 194; Rose v. Estudillo, 39 Cal. 274. As to validity of the contract, see State of California v. McCauley, 15 Cal. 429, and Beaudry r. Valdez, 32 Cal. 279.] The state could resume control of the state prison only upon making compensation as in other cases where it is authorized to take private property. Id. See also S. F. & S. J. R. R. v. Mahoney, 29 Id. 117; Fox v. W. P. R. R. Co., 31 Cal. 548, and Gilmer v. Lime Point, 18 Cal. 230.

Legislative grants are to be construed liberally in favor of the grantee. Hyman v. Read, 13 Cal. 444.

The act of March 26, 1857 [Stats. p. 106], authorizing the taking of hogs damage feasant, and holding them until charges and damages are paid by the owner, is, to this extent, valid. The constitutionality of the remaining provisions of the act by which the animals are to be turned over to a constable, and after certain notice sold, and as to the disposition of the

proceeds of sale, not decided. Rood v. MeCargar, 49 Cal. 117; Koppikus v. State Capitol Commissioners, 16 Id. 249; Heyneman v. Blake, 19 Id. 596; Dorsey v. Barry, 24 Id. 454.

Proceedings to condemn land for use of a railroad company is special case. S. & C. R. R. Co. v. Galgiani, 49 Cal. 139; Dalton v. Water Commissioners, 49 Cal. 222; Spencer Creek Water Co. v. Vallejo, 48 Cal. 70.

In construing section "70, Political Code, as amended in 1878" [amendment 1874 of Sec. 2950, Pol. Code], prohibiting the landing in this state of foreigners who are idiotic, infirm, criminals, lewd women, etc., it is said: "It would be difficult, perhaps impossible, to find in the reports a definition of the terms 'law of the land,' or 'due process of law,' which is accurate, complete, and appropriate under all circumstances, * * * and if it be found that like proceedings have always been recognized as constitutional in England and this country, and if the person who is subjected to them is accorded every reasonable opportunity to defend his individual rights which the nature of the case will admit the case being one in which the end sought to be attained is lawful--a statute cannot be said to deprive a party of the benefits of due process of law." [Cooley, Const. Lim., 356.] Ex parte Ah Fook, 49 Cal. 402.

Considering the right of the state to pass sanitary and police regulations for the purpose of excluding paupers, criminals, etc., it is held that the state cannot impose restrictions

upon commerce with foreign nations, nor forbid nor impose onerous restrictions upon the immigration of persons of good moral character, and who are sound in body and mind. The acts of 1852 [Stats. p. 78] and 1853 [Stats. p. 71], requiring masters of vessels to give bonds or pay sums of money for each passenger, so far as applicable to such persons is unconstitutional. The State v. S. S. Constitution, 42 Cal. 579.

The practice in personal actions, which sanctioned the appointment of an attorney to represent an absent defendant who is alleged to be concealed to avoid service of process, and permitting such defendant to appear personally within six months after judgment to contest such judgment, held not unconstitutional, and sustained as being "due process of law." Ware v. Robinson, 9 Cal. 108.

An action did not lie against a county at common law. A statute exempting the property of a county from execution does not impair the obligation of a contract with the county. Gilman v. Contra Costa County, 8 Cal. 52. Counties may prosecute and defend actions like individuals. Placer County r Astin, Id. 304. The legislature has power to delegate to the voters of a county the selection of a county seat, but cannot delegate its general legislative powers. Upham v. Supervisors, Id. 379.

Although the legislature may generally dispose of the revenue as it deemes proper, yet a construction of a statute which would impair

the rights of third parties will not be favored without express words requiring it. People v. Williams, 8 Cal. 97.

Statutes of limitation affect the remedy and not the right, and a change of the time within which action may be brought does not impair the obligation of contract. The amendatory act of April 11, 1855 [Stats. p. 109], repealed the statute of limitations of April 22, 1850 [Stats. p. 343] eleven days before the expiration of five years from the adoption of that act, and the statute of limitations, therefore, only commences to run from the adoption of the last act. Billings v. Hall, 7 Cal, 1.

But the 26th section of act of April 16, 1850 [Stats. p. 249] providing that conveyances of real estate which shall not be recorded as required by that act, shall be void as against any subsequent purchaser in good faith and for value where his own conveyance shall be first recorded, is held constitutional and held to apply to conveyances theretofore as well as thereafter made. Stafford v. Lick, 7 Cal. 480, Burnett J., dissenting.

The act consolidating the city and county of San Francisco, April 19, 1856 [Stats. p. 145] is not unconstitutional. There is no constitutional inhibition against incorporating a portion of the inhabitants of a county as a city, or creating a county out of the territory of a city. As a city may, by legislative enactment, spring from the body of a county, being the first subdivision of the territory and political power of the state, there