a contract arising from a grant of property to a municipality and a like grant to an individual. A legislative grant is an actual contract, and it cannot be divested or destroyed by any subsequent legislative enactment. Grogan r. San Francisco, 18 Cal. 607. See note under section 37, article IV. But it was held in Meyers v. English, 9 Cal. 341, that this section refers to contracts between individuals, and not to contracts between the state and individuals.

This court has not decided that a voluntary appropriation, by public act, of property or its proceeds, by a municipal body, when not associated with a contract as part of its obligation or sanction, removes such property or proceeds from control of the municipality or the legislature, or that the terms of the act making the appropriation are unalterable. Even where such appropriation is connected with a trust, the municipality would have the equity of redemption, and could dispose of the subject of the trust subject to the rights of the creditors or of their trustees, or the legislature could authorize such disposition. [Citing Hart v. Burnett, 15 Cal. 530; People v. Supervisors, 11 Id. 206; Payne & Dewey v. Treadwell, 16 Id. 220.] City and County of S. F. . Biedeman, 17 Cal. 444.

Where the state grants to persons performing the work of reclaiming swamp land onehalf of the land reclaimed, and parties enter upon the work in accordance with the act, they acquire a vested right to proceed to the

completion thereof, and a subsequent act attempting to destroy this right is unconstitutional. Montgomery v. Kasson, 16 Cal. 196.

The legislature may from time to time change the remedy, but may not materially affect the right. Whenever it so far alters the remedy as to render the right scarcely worth pursuing, it necessarily impairs the obligation of a contract upon which the right is founded. An act which divests the lien of the judgment creditor, exempts the property of the debtor from execution, places it in the hands of trustees with power to sell as they think proper, and compels the creditor to fund his scrip at a less rate of interest, and submit to a delay of twenty years without any guaranty that he will then be paid, and renders his right worthless by withdrawing his remedy, is unconstitutional. Smith . Morse, 2 Cal. 525. Approved in Thorne v. San Francisco 4 Cal. 148; Heydenfeldt . Hitchcock, 15 Id. 514; Wheeler v. Miller, 16 Id. 125; Ellis v. Eastman, 32 Id. 448.

For decisions under Legal Tender Act, see Belloc v. Davis, 38 Cal. 254.

SECTION 17. Foreigners who are or who may hereafter become bona fide residents of this state shall enjoy the same right in respect to the possession, enjoyment and inheritance of property as native born citizens.

A non-resident alien can acquire property in this state by purchase, but not by descent or other operation of law. Norris v. Hoyt, 18 Cal. 217. The statute permitting bona fide

resident aliens to inherit is not unconstitutional. The rights of resident aliens may be enlarged by the legislature, but may not be restricted. State of Cal. v. Rogers, 13 Cal. 159. Also Farrell v. Enright, 12 Cal. 450.

SECTION 18. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, unless for the punishment of crime, shall ever be tolerated in this state.

SECTION 19. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable seizures and searches, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue, but on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons and things to be seized.

SECTION 20. Treason against the state shall consist only in levying war against it, adhering to its enemies, or giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason, unless on the evidence of two witnesses to the same overt act, or confession in open court.

SECTION 21. This enumeration of rights shall not be construed to impair or deny others retained by the people.

SECTION 22. The legislature shall have no power to make an appropriation, for any purpose whatever, for a longer period than two years.

[This section was added by amendment ratified September 6, 1871.1

ARTICLE II.

RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE.

SECTION 1. Every white male citizen of the United States, and every white male citizen of Mexico who shall have elected to become a citizen of the United States, under the treaty of peace exchanged and ratified at Queretaro, on the thirtieth day of May, eighteen hundred and forty-eight, of the age of twenty-one years, who shall have been a resident of the state six months next preceding the election, and the county or district in which he claims his vote thirty days, shall be entitled to vote at all elections which are now or hereafter may be authorized by law; provided that nothing herein contained shall be construed to prevent the legislature, by a two-thirds concurrent vote, from admitting to the right of suffrage Indians or the descendants of Indians, in such special cases as such a proportion of the legislative body may deem just and proper.

The fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States does not annul the provision of the state constitution which denies to females the right to vote. Van Valkenberg . Brown, 43 Cal. 43.

SECTION 2. Electors shall, in all cases except treason, felony, or breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest on the days of election, during their attendance at such election, going to and returning therefrom.

-SECTION 3. No elector shall be obliged to perform militia duty on the day of election, except in time of war or public danger.

SECTION 4. For the purpose of voting, no person shall be deemed to have gained or lost a residence by reason of his presence or absence while employed in the service of the United States, nor

The rights of a riparian owner may be taken under power of eminent domain (compensation being made), for the purpose of sup· plying farming neighborhood with water. Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255.

The use of water appropriated for sale, rental, or distribution is a public use; and the right to collect compensation for use of water to the inhabitants of any city is a franchise which cannot be exercised except by authority of and in the manner prescribed by law. Water appropriated for distribution and sale is ipso facto devoted to a public use. Each member of the community, by paying the rate fixed for supplying it has a right to use a reasonable quantity of it, in a reasonable manner. McCreary v. Beaudry, 67 Cal. 120. Is a public use. People v. Stephens, 62 Cal. 209.

The consolidated city and county government of San Francisco exists under the consolidation act of 1856. Under said act-its charter-it is provided that ordinances upon certain enumerated subjects shall not be effective unless approved by the mayor, or, unless after his veto, nine members of the board shall vote therefor. Held, the constitutional requirement for fixing water rates in February of each year, is not of that class of acts which requires approval of the mayor. The fixing of facts may be accomplished by a majority

of the board, and to hold that approval ce mayer was requisite would require Mine members of the board to overcome any