ence to the fact whether they are or not the editors or proprietors of the newspapers. In re Kowalsky, 73 Cal. 120.

A court, even of equity jurisdiction, has no jurisdiction to enjoin the production on a theatrical stage of a play representing facts or scenes connected with a homicide, even while the person accused of the homicide, is on trial for murder. The right to write, speak or publish cannot be abused until it is exercised; before it is exercised there can be no responsibility. The purpose of this provision of the constitution was the abolishment of censorship, and for courts to act as censors is directly violative of that purpose. Daily v. Superior Court, 112 Cal. 96.

The contention that there is no libel where express malice is absent in the publication cannot be sustained. Gilman v. McClatchy, 111 Cal. 613.

Criminal libel was one of the offences required to be prosecuted by indictment. Justices of the Supreme Court, judges of the Superior Court, justices of the peace and police judges may sit as magistrates, and when so sitting, they have the jurisdiction and powers conferred by law upon magistrates and not those which pertain to their respective judicial offices. They derive their powers from the constitution, operating with the acts of the legislature upon the subject. Police judges in San Francisco have authority to hold examinations of such offences as criminal libel. People v. Crespi, 115 Cal. 52.

SECTION 10. The people shall have the right to freely assemble together to consult for the common good, to instruct their representatives and to petition the legislature for redress of grievances.

Const. 1849, Art. I, Sec. 10.

SECTION 11. All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation.

Const. 1849, Art. I Sec. 11.

The act of legislature amending county government act [Stats. 1887, p. 207], authorizing supervisors in counties of certain classes to appoint deputies for county clerk, when deemed necessary, and pay such deputies from county treasury, is void, and makes the county government act lacking in that uniformity of operation which is required by court. Dougherty v. Austin, 94 Cal. 626 and 603; McFarland and Paterson, JJ., dissenting.

The legislative act [Stats. 1883, Sec. 870; p. 273], requiring cities of fifth and sixth classes to make an effort to agree with property owners as to value of land sought to be condemned for public use, before bringing action under powers of eminent domain, and which effort is not required to be made by cities of other classes is a discrimination against cities of fifth and sixth classes and void. City of Pasadena v. Stimson, 91 Cal. 238.

Section 64 of insolvent act of 1880, permitting an appeal to Supreme Court from an order adjudging a party guilty of contempt is in conflict with section 1222 Code of Civil Procedure, and must yield to the latter in order

that laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation. Er parte Clancy, 90 Cal. 553. The act of March 18, 1885 [Stats. p. 213], commonly known as the "Whitney Act," establishing police courts in cities having a population of more than thirty thousand and less than one hundred thousand inhabitants, is not a special law, nor unconstitutional; such classification of cities is consistent with a general law, whether the city was organized before or after the constitution of 1879. People v. Henshaw, 76 Cal. 436. Approved in Ex parte Halstead, 89 Cal. 472.

The act of March 14, 1891 [Stats. p. 106], readjusting and reducing the salaries of officers in counties of thirty-fifth class, being appliable alike to all counties of a class authorized to be created by the constitution is a general law; (distinguishing Miller v. Kister, 68 Cal. 142, and citing People v. Henshaw, 76 Id. 444; Longan v. Solano County, 65 Id. 125; Thomason v. Ashworth, 73 Id. 73), Cody v. Murphy, 89 Cal. 522.

A law to be general in its scope need not include all classes of individuals in the scale. It answers the requirements of the constitution if it relates to and operates uniformly upon the whole of any single class. Abeel v. Clark, 84 Cal. 227.

The amendment of 1889 [Stats. p. 232], to the county government act, requiring license taxes collected in any incorporated city or town, under ordinances of the county supervisors or under Political Code, part 3, title 7, chapter

15, is not a general law being applicable to a single class of counties. [Art. IV, Sec. 25, Subs. 9, 33.] County of San Luis Obispo v. Graves, 84 Cal. 71.

It is left to the legislature by section 13, article XIII, to provide for carrying into effect the constitutional system of taxation. But this power is controlled by other provisions inhibiting special and discriminating legislation. The scheme provided in sections 3665 to 3670, Political Code for assessment of railroad property and form of complaint in actions for collection thereof, is obnoxious to all these provisions. People v. C. P. R. R., 83 Cal. 393.

The act of March 25, 1885 [Stats. p. 213], is not special legislation; it has a uniform operation within the class of cities to which it is applicable, and is a general law in the sense that the police courts established thereby supersede the police courts theretofore existing in the cities therein specified. People v. Henshaw, 76 Cal. 436.

The act of March 15, 1883 [Sec. 1388 Penal Code], providing that the court may suspend judgment against a minor convicted of a criminal offense and commit such minor to some non-sectarian charitable institution, is a general law having a uniform operation. Boys and Girls' Aid Society v. Reis, 71 Cal. 627.

The act of March 14, 1883 [Stats. p. 299], establishing a uniform system of county and township government was declared to be a general law and constitutional in Longan v.

Solano County, 65 Cal. 122. The act of March 18, 1885 [Stats. pp. 166-195], amending the former act, without reclassifying counties of the thirty-fifth class, and purporting to affect only three of the forty-eight classes into which the counties of the state have been classified (reducing salaries in said three classes), is exceptional, eccentric, and causative of discrimination between officers upon whom it operates, and is unconstitutional. [Citing Omnibus R. R. Co. v. Baldwin, 57 Cal. 165; French v. Teschemaker, 24 Cal. 544; Christy v. Board of Supervisors, 39 Cal. 3], Miller v. Kister, 68 Cal. 142.

An ordinance of the supervisors of the city and county of San Francisco requiring persons conducting laundries or wash houses within certain limits to procure a certificate from the health officer showing that proper drainage was provided, and a certificate from the fire wardens that the heating appliances were in a safe condition, and prohibiting washing or ironing from ten o'clock P. M. to six o'clock a. M. and on Sunday. Held constitutional. Ex parte Moynier, 65 Cal. 33. And as to Modesta Laundry ordinance, In re Hang Kie, 69 Id. 149.

The Sunday Law contained in section 300 of Penal Code, as adopted in 1872, was a general law, and uniform in its operation, and was not repealed by this constitution. Ex parte Burke, 59 Cal. 6. As to what is a general law, affirmed in Ex parte Koser, 60 Id. 178.

The act of March 29, 1870 [Stats. p. 481], limiting the distance which one street railway