might use the tracks of another in any one street to five blocks [C. C. section 499], was a general law, and an ordinance of San Francisco granting such privilege for more than five blocks was void. Omnibus R. R. Co. v. Baldwin, 57 Cal. 160.

The McClure Charter for San Francisco [Stats. 1880, p. 414], was not a general law. It could have no effect anywhere except in San Francisco, by its terms, and as it was not adopted as a special charter by vote of the people of San Francisco, it never became operative anywhere. Desmond v. Dunn, 55 Cal. 242.

An act of the legislature validating conveyances from the city of San Diego, which had no corporate seal, is constitutional, and is operative in all cases where no vested rights in third persons accrued between the execution of the deed and the passage of the curative act. Gordon v. City of San Diego, 101 Cal. 528.

The act of March 11, 1885 [Stats. p. 45], regulating the height of division fences in cities must be construed as a general law, and so construed is not unconstitutional. Western, etc., Co. v. Knickerbocker, 103 Cal. 114.

The constitution must be construed to permit of classifications. Such classification, however, must be founded upon differences which are either defined by the constitution or natural, and which will suggest a reason which might rationally be held to justify the diversity in the legislation. Darcy v. Mayor of San José, 104 Cal. 645.

Section 195 of the county government act of 1891 [Stats. 1891, p. 397], which provided for the collection by the county clerk in certain counties of a fee of one dollar for each one thousand dollars of the value of an estate (in excess of $5000.00), in probate cases, was held violative of this and other provisions of the constitution. Bloss v. Lewis, 109 Cal. 497. For similar case affecting witness fees in counties of twenty-eighth class, see Turner v.County of Siskiyou, 109 Cal. 334.

The act of March 11, 1889 [Stats. p. 100106] establishing the Preston Industrial School is not unconstitutional in the respect that juvenile offenders may be confined there instead of at a state prison or county jail, nor because a justice of the peace may impose a longer term of confinement there than he could in a common jail. Ex parte Nichols,

110 Cal. 652.

The subject of primary elections is one to which a general law having a uniform operation is applicable, and the primary election law of 1895 [Stats. p. 207], applying only to counties of the first and second classes, is unconstitutional. Marsh v. Supervisors Los Angeles County, 111 Cal. 370. See also Gett v. Supervisors Sacramento, 111 Cal. 367.

The provisions of sections 162 and 216 of the county government act of 1895 [Stats. pp. 1-11], requiring assessors in counties of the second class to pay into the county treasury the percentages allowed for collecting poll taxes, personal property taxes, and the sums

allowed for returning names of persons subject. to military duty, do not constitute "special" legislation in the prohibited sense, nor destroy the uniformity of operation required by the constitution. Said provisions apply with uniformity to all counties of a given class, and the class is constituted by a general law in conformity with the constitutional provision. [Art. XI, Secs. 5, 6.]. Summerland v. Bicknell, 111 Cal. 568.

It is only general laws that are to have a uniform operation, and it is uniformly held that a law is general which applies to all of a class the classification being a proper one— and that the requirement of uniformity is satisfied if it applies to all of the class alike. The word uniform does not mean universal. Hellman v. Shoulters, 114 Cal. 139. See also Ex parte Jeutzsch, 112 Cal. 474.

Under the rule of construction that an independent section or clause of a statute may be declared void without holding the entire statute void, and the rule that the legislature will not be presumed to have knowingly enacted an unconstitutional provision, it is held that the provisions of subdivisions 24 and 26 of section 170 of the county government act of 1893 [Stats. p. 346], requiring certain officers in certain counties to be elected biennially, being in conflict with the general provisions. of the act, and destructive of the uniform operation of the act, should be disregarded as invalid, and the general provisions requiring

quadrennial elections should be applicable to all counties. Hale v. McGettigan, 114 Cal. 113. Neither this nor any other provision of the constitution requires that the term of office of justices of the peace shall be the same in cities as in townships. Kahn v. Sutro, 114 Cal. 318. That portion of the fee bill of 1895 [Stats. p. 9 Palm Ed.], which gives the district attorney supervisory control over fees of justices and constables in criminal cases is unconstitutional, both as destroying a uniformity of operation and as improperly regulating the compensation of officers. [Sec. 5, Art. XI, Const.] The fee bill of 1895, however, fixes the amount which officers may legally charge and collect for services, and is applicable to the city and county of San Francisco. Dwyer v. Parker, 115 Cal. 546; Reid v. Groezinger, 115 Cal. 552.

The act of 1880 [Stats. p. 400], requiring mining corporations to post weekly reports of their superintendents and imposing a fine of one thousand dollars for failure to comply therewith, is not unconstitutional, but the same is a general law having a uniform operation upon the subjects with which it deals. Miles v. Woodward, 115 Cal. 310.

The act of 1891 [Stats. p. 433], assuming to create police courts in cities having fifteen thousand and under eighteen thousand inhabitants is unconstitutional, in its "classification.” Ex parte Giambonini, 117 Cal. 574.

An act regulating the payment of official fees in San Francisco being based upon an

arbitrary distinction, and there being no apparent reason why the inhabitants of a city of more than one hundred thousand inhabitants should be accorded a special protection which is not accorded to other cities, the act is unconstitutional. Rauer v. Williams, 118 Cal. 404-408. See further as to "classification," Tulare County v. May, 118 Cal. 305.

The distinction between secured and unsecured taxes is intrinsic and justifies a classification based thereupon, and a law providing for the collection of the unsecured tax on personal property at a different time and in a different manner from the collection of personal property taxes secured by lien upon real estate is not unconstitutional. Rode . Siebe, 119 Cal. 519.

SECTION 12. The military shall be subordinate to the civil power. No standing army shall be kept up by this state in time of peace, and no soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house without the consent of the owner; nor in time of war, except in the manner prescribed by law.

Const. 1849, Art. I, Secs. 12, 13.

SECTION 13. In criminal prosecutions, in any court whatever the party accused shall have the right to a speedy and public trial; to have the process of the court to compel the attendance of witnesses in his behalf, and to appear and defend, in person and with counsel. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense, nor be compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness against himself; nor be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. The legislature shall have power to provide for the taking, in the presence of the party accused and his counsel, of depo