not be preferred." A plea of former jeopardy is sustained at second trial for libel based upon a libelous statement contained in a newspaper article, by evidence of former trial based upon a different libel contained in the same article published at same time, etc. People v. Stephens, 79 Cal. 428.

The commencement of a trial and discharge of the jury because of the sickness of one of the jurors without the consent of defendant, does not result in an acquittal, nor being in jeopardy. People v. Ross, $5 Cal. 383.

Section 1382 of Penal Code prescribing the time within which an information or indictment must be filed against a person charged with crime, and a time thereafter within which he must be tried, are mandatory and leaves no discretion in the court to prolong the time of imprisonment without a trial. Where an information was filed and the defendant within five days entered a plea of not guilty, the case should have been dismissed on his motion made more than sixty days after the filing of the information where he had not been brought to trial within that time, and the prosecution showed no valid reason for the delay. People v. Morino, 85 Cal. 515.

The Superior Court being led, through deceit and misrepresentation of counsel, to believe that the Supreme Court had, on appeal, reversed an order refusing a new trial, instead of having reversed an order granting a new trial, permitted the defendant to plead guilty

of a lesser offense than that with which she was charged, and had in fact been convicted by verdict of a jury. A fine having been paid in satisfaction of a judgment of the court entered on the plea of guilty, and the defendant having been again brought before the court to receive sentence upon the verdict of the jury. Held, she had not been in jeopardy by reason of the plea of guilty of the lesser offense and the judgment of fine. People v. Woods, 84 Cal. 441.

The right to have compulsory process for the attendance of witnesses does not give an absolute right to a defendant in a criminal case to have an order of court for the production of a witness confined in state prison. The necessity of the production is a matter of sound discretion with the trial court. Willard v. Superior Court, 82 Cal. 456.

The act of April 1, 1878 [Stats. p. 106], provided that on the death of a police officer of San Francisco, the city and county treasurer should pay a certain sum to his legal representatives out of a certain fund created by said act. Held, this did not create a vested right in the officer during his life, and the subsequent act of March 4, 1889 [Stats. p. 56], creating a police relief and pension fund in the several cities and counties of the state, and providing that any fund provided by law and theretofore existing in any county, city or town for the relief or pensioning of police officers, etc., or for the payment of a sum of money on their death, should be merged in the fund created

by the latter act, impliedly repealed the act of 1878, and did not deprive such officers of property without due process of law. Pennie v. Reis, 80 Cal. 266.

A person acquitted on trial for assault with deadly weapon for variance as to the name of the person assaulted, and a new information ordered, is not entitled to a plea of twice in jeopardy, on the second trial. People v. Oreileus, 79 Cal. 178.

The act of April 15, 1880 [Stats. p. 227], providing for protection of lands from overflow, authorizes the taking of property without due process of law, in that it does not provide for notice to the owners to be heard as to the validity of the assessment. Hutson v. Woodbridge, P. Dist., 79 Cal. 9.

Counsel should be appointed for a defendant charged with murder; a plea of not guilty having been entered, and insanity being relied upon as a defense, where the defendant's employed counsel is absent at the legislature, and his employment as counsel does not appear to have been made prior to commencement of legislative session. People v. Goldenson, 76 Cal. 328.

A defendant cannot plead once in jeopardy where at a former trial he consented to the discharge of a jury which had brought in a void judgment. People v. Curtis, 76 Cal. 57.

The examination before a magistrate, and discharge upon a criminal accusation is not jeopardy, and will not bar a second arrest and examination. Ex parte Fenton, 77 Cal. 183.

It has been held in New York that an act which substantially destroys the property in intoxicating liquors owned and possessed by a party within the state when the act took effect by preventing its sale, keeping, giving away, etc., is inoperative and void, as depriving a person of property without due process of law. The question not being properly presented to this court by the record, is not decided. Ex parte Campbell, 74 Cal. 20.

The provisions of the act of March 7, 1887 [Stats. p. 46], to prohibit the sophistication and adulteration of wine and to prevent fraud, are not so unreasonable in their restrictions as to deprive any persons of their property without due process of law. Ex parte Kohler, 74 Cal. 38.

A defendant convicted of assault with a deadly weapon under an information charging him with assault with intent to commit murder, is not placed twice in jeopardy by afterwards being tried upon a charge of attempt to commit robbery, although the offenses were so closely connected in point of time that it is impossible to separate the evidence relating to them [People v. Bentley, 77 Cal. 7], and where the verdict fails to find the degree of the crime. People v. Travers, 73 Cal. 580.

The power to determine the expediency of a public improvement is legislative in character, not judicial, and the act of March 26, 1876 [Stats. p. 433], for widening of Dupont street in San Francisco, which left it to the supervisors to first determine or pass upon the expe

diency of the proposed improvement, before the act should take effect, was not a taking of property without a due process of law. There is no constitutional right of the owner to be heard in such matters before an assessment is made. Lent v. Tillson, 72 Cal. 404.

A person is in jeopardy when placed upon trial before a competent court and jury upon a valid indictment, and cannot be again subjected to trial for same offense, unless the jury is discharged without a verdict by reason of some legal necessity, or by his consent, or unless their verdict, if against him, be set aside. at his instance. [People v. Webb, 38 Cal. 467]; People v. Horn, 70 Cal. 17.

One private person cannot take the property of another, either for the use of the taker or an alleged public use, without any compensation made or tendered. Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 265.

The action of the court in sending a jury in charge of an officer to view the premises where a homicide has been committed, the defendant not accompanying the jury, permits the receiving of evidence by the jury not in the presence of defendant, and is not allowing defendant to be present in person in all stages of the proceeding. Section 1119 Penal Code does not contemplate the absence of defendant. [Myrick and McKee, JJ., dissent.] There should be no evidence taken in the absence either of the court or defendant. [Searls, Comr., Thornton and McKinstry, J.J., concurring.] People r. Bush, 68 Cal. 623.

A person is not placed in jeopardy by a con