tation, and special powers were afterwards given to Mr Dana, which, in their nature, superseded that resolution. Mr Dana was by his commission and instructions empowered to sign the treaty or convention, for the protection of commerce in behalf of the United States, either with her Imperial Majesty, in conjunction with the other neutral powers, or if that shall be inadmissible, separately with her Imperial Majesty, or any of those, that is, those neutral powers. The treaty being only made to continue during the war, his powers terminated with the war, or, at most, extended only to sign it with the neutral powers, and not to form a new separate treaty.

Whereupon Congress came to the following resolution.

Whereas the primary object of the resolution of October 5th, 1780, and of the commission and instructions to Mr Dana, relative to the accession of the United States to the neutral confederacy, no longer can operate, and as the true interest of the States requires, that they should be as little as possible entangled in the politics and controversies of European nations, it is inexpedient to renew the said powers either to Mr Dana, or to the other Ministers of these United States in Europe. But, inasmuch as the liberal principles, on which the said confederacy was established, are conceived to be, in general, favorable to the interests of nations, and, particularly, to those of the United States, and ought, in that view, to be promoted by the latter, as far as will consist with their fundamental policy;

Resolved, that the Ministers Plenipotentiary of these United States for negotiating a peace be, and they are hereby instructed, in case they should comprise in the de

the rights of neutral nations, to avoid accompanying them by any engagements which shall oblige the contracting parties to support those stipulations by arms.

ELIAS BOUDINOT, President.

DAVID HARTLEY TO THE COMMISSIONERS.

Gentlemen,

Paris, June 14th, 1783.

Permit me to address the enclosed Memorial to your Excellencies, and to explain to you my reasons for so doing.

It is because many consequences, now at a great distance, and unforeseen by us, may arise between our two countries, perhaps from very minute and incidental transactions, which in their beginnings may be imperceptible and unsuspected as to their future effects. Our respective territories are in vicinity, and therefore we must be inseparable. Great Britain, with the British power in America, is the only nation with whom, by absolute necessity, you must have the most intimate concerns, either of friendship or hostility. All other nations are three thousand miles distant from you. You may have political connexions with any of these distant nations, but with regard to Great Britain it must be so. Political intercourse and interests will obtrude themselves between our two countries, because they are the two great powers dividing the continent of North America. These matters are not to come into discussion between us now. They are of too much importance, either to be involved, or even glanced at, in any present transaction.

the two nations shall have recovered from the animosities of the war. Let them have a pacific interval, to consider deliberately of their mutual and combined interests, and of their engagements with other nations. Let us not, at the outset of a temporary convention, adopt the severe principle of reducing every transaction between the two countries to the footing of exact reciprocity alone. Such a principle would cast a gloom upon conciliatory prospects. America is not restrained from any conciliation with Great Britain by any treaty with any other power. The principles of conciliation would be most desirable between Great Britain and America; and forbearance is the road to conciliation. After a war of animosities, time should be allowed for recollection. There are all reasonable appearances of conciliatory dispositions on all sides, which may be perfected in time. Let us not, therefore, at such a moment as this, and without the most urgent necessity, establish a morose principle between us; if it were a decided point against amity and conciliation, it would be time enough to talk of partition and strict reciprocity. To presume in favor of conciliation may help it forward; to presume against it, may destroy that conciliation, which might otherwise have taken place.

But, in the present case, there is more than reason to presume conciliation. I think myself happy, that I have it in my power to assure you, from authority, that it is the fundamental principle of the British Councils, to establish amity and confidence between Great Britain and the American States, as a succedaneum for the relation, in which they formerly stood one to the other. The proof of this consists, not in words, but in substantial facts. His

orders to his commanders in North America, for the speedy and complete evacuation of all the territories of the United States. His Majesty has given orders in council, on the 14th of the last month, for the admission of American ships and cargoes into Great Britain; and on the 6th instant, he has given farther orders, permitting the importation from America of several articles, which have been usually considered as manufactures. He has, likewise, provided for the convenience of American merchants, who may wish to land tobacco in Great Britain for re-exportation. Upon the same principle, Mr Fox, the Secretary of State, corresponding with America, has moved for, and received the liberty of the House of Commons, (nem. con.) to bring in a bill, that any American merchants, importing rice into Great Britain, may, upon re-exportation, draw back the whole duty paid on its first importation. All these circumstances put together, undoubtedly form the most indisputable evidence of the disposition, which prevails in the British Councils to give every facility to the re-establishment of that intercourse, which must be so beneficial to both nations.

I am ordered to inform you, that his Majesty entirely approves of the plan of making a temporary convention, for the purpose of restoring immediate intercourse and commerce, and more particularly for the purpose of putting off, for a time, the decision of that important question, how far the British acts of navigation ought to be sacrificed to commercial considerations, drawn from the peculiar circumstances of the present crisis; a question, which will require much deliberation, and very much inquiry, before it can be determined. I am sure, Gentlemen, you will see

a case, with deliberation and discretion; more especially, when these acts of prudence do not proceed from any motives of coolness or reserve towards you. In the meantime, the temporary convention may proceed upon principles of real and accommodating reciprocity. For instance, we agree to put you upon a more favorable footing than any other nation. We do not ask a rigid reciprocity for this, because we know, by your present subsisting treaties, it is not in your power to give it to us. We desire only to be put upon the footing of other nations with you, and, yet, we consent that you shall be upon a better footing with us than any other nation.

Thus far, we must be allowed to be giving something more than reciprocity, and this we do, as I said before, because we are unwilling to ask what you are unable to give. Surely, it is not unreasonable, nor more than, from pinciples of reciprocity, we have a right to expect that you should imitate our conduct in this particular, and that you should abstain from asking things, under the title of exact and literal reciprocity, which, upon the consideration of our case, you inust know that we cannot give. and substantial reciprocity we are willing to give; literal reciprocity is impossible, as much from your engagements, as from our system of navigation.

Virtual

If we can agree upon an article of intercourse and commerce, in the nature of a temporary convention, on the basis of the Memorial, which I had the honor of giving lately to you, bearing date 19th of May, 1783, no time need be lost in finishing this business; but with this explanation, that although it is proposed, that the commerce between the United States and the British West Indies