any stipulations with Spain to relinquish it. These two objects militated against each other, because to enhance the value of the navigation, was also to enhance the value of the countries contiguous to it, and thereby disincline Britain to the dereliction of them. We thought, therefore, that the surest way to reconcile and obtain both objects would be by a composition beneficial to both parties. We therefore, proposed, that Britain should withdraw her pretensions to all the country above the Yazoo, and that we would cede all below it to her, in case she should have the Floridas at the end of the war; and, at all events, that she should have a right to navigate the river throughout its whole extent. This proposition was accepted, and we agreed to insert the contingent fact of it in a separate Article, for the express purpose of keeping it secret for the present. That Article ought not, therefore, to be considered as a mere matter of favor to Britain, but as the result of a bargain, in which that Article was a quid pro quo. It was in our opinion, both necessary and justifiable, to keep this Article secret. The negotiations between Spain, France, and Britain were then in full vigor, and embarrassed by a variety of clashing demands. The publication of this Article would have irritated Spain, and retarded, if not have prevented her coming to an agreement with Britain. Had we mentioned it to the French Minister, he must have not only informed Spain of it, but also been obliged to act a part respecting it, that would probably have been disagreeable to America; and he certainly has reason to rejoice that our silence saved him This was an Article, in which France had not the smallest interest, nor is there anything in her treaty with us, that restrains us from making what bargain we please with Britain about those or any other lands, without rendering account of such transaction to her or any other power whatever. The same observation applies with still greater force to Spain; and neither justice nor honor forbid us to dispose as we pleased of our own lands without her knowledge or consent. Spain at that very time extended her pretensions and claims of dominion, not only over the tract in question but over the vast region lying between the Floridas and Lake Superior; and this Court was also, at that very time, soothing and nursing those pretensions by a proposed conciliatory line for splitting the difference. Suppose, therefore, we had offered this tract to Spain, in case she retained the Floridas, should we even have had thanks for it? or would it have abated the chagrin she experienced from being disappointed in her - extravagant and improper designs on that whole country! We think not. We perfectly concur with you in sentiment, Sir, that "honesty is the best policy." But, until it be shown that we have trespassed on the rights of any man, or body of men, you must excuse our thinking that this remark as applied to our proceedings was unnecessary. Should any explanations, either with France or Spain become necessary on this subject, we hope and expect to meet with no embarrassment. We shall neither amuse them nor perplex ourselves with flimsy excuses, but tell them plainly, that it was not our ourselves at liberty to withhold it. And we shall remind the French Minister that he has more reason to be pleased than displeased with our silence. Since we have assumed a place in the political system of the world, let us move like a primary and not like a secondary planet. We are persuaded, Sir, that your remarks on these subjects resulted from real opinion and were made with candor and sincerity. The best men will. view objects of this kind in different lights even when standing on the same ground; and it is not to be wondered at, that we, who are on the spot and have the whole transaction under our eyes, should see many parts of it in a stronger point of light, than persons at a distance, who can only view it through the dull medium of representation. It would give us great pain if anything we have written or now write respecting this Court should be construed to impeach the friendship of the King and nation for us. We also believe that the Minister is so far our friend, and is disposed so far to do us good offices, as may correspond with, and be dictated by his system of policy for promoting the power, riches, and glory of France. God forbid that we should ever sacrifice our faith, our gratitude, or our honor, to any considerations of convenience; and may He also for bid that we should ever be unmindful of the dignity and independent spirit, which should always characterize a free and generous people. We shall immediately propose an Article to be inserted in the definitive treaty for postponing the payment of British debts for the time mentioned by Con There are, no doubt, certain ambiguities in our Articles, but it is not to be wondered at, when it is considered how exceedingly averse Britain was to any expressions, which explicitly wounded the tories; and how disinclined we were to use any, that should amount to absolute stipulations in their favor. The words for returning the property of real British subjects were well understood and explained between us, not to mean or comprehend American refugees. Mr Oswald and Mr Fitzherbert know this to have been the case, and will readily confess and admit it. This mode of expression was preferred by them, as a more delicate mode of excluding those refugees, and of making a proper distinction between them and the subjects of Britain, whose only particular interest in America consisted in holding lands or property there. The 6th Article, viz. where it declares, that no future confiscations shall be made, &c. ought to have fixed the time with greater accuracy. We think the most fair and true construction is, that it relates to the date of the cessation of hostilities. That is the time when peace in fact took place, in consequence of prior informal, though binding, contracts to terminate the war. We consider the definitive treaties, as only giving the dress of form to those contracts, and not as constituting the obligation of them. Had the cessation of hostilities been the effect of truce, and consequently nothing more than a temporary suspension of war, another construction would have been the true one. We are officially assured by Mr Hartley, that positive orders for the evacuation of New York have been despatched, and that no avoidable delay will retard that event. sioner would have contended, that it should be a time posterior to the date of the definitive treaty, and that would have been probably more disadvantageous to us, than as that Article now stands. We are surprised to hear, that any doubts have arisen in America, respecting the time when the cessation of hostilities took place there. It most certainly took place at the expiration of one month after the date of that declaration, in all parts of the world, whether by land or sea, that lay north of the latitude of the Canaries. The ships afterwards taken from us, in the more northerly latitudes, ought to be reclaimed and given up. We shall apply to Mr Hartley on this subject, and also on that of the transportation of negroes from New York, contrary to the words and intention of the provisional articles. We have the honor to be, &c. JOHN ADAMS, TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON. Paris, July 27th, 1783. Sir, The definitive treaties between the late belligerent powers are none of them yet completed. Ours has gone on slowly, owing partly to the necessity Mr Hartley, successor of Mr Oswald, thinks himself under of sending every proposition, either his own or ours, to his Court for their approbation, and their delay in answering, through negligence perhaps, since they have heard our ports are open, or through indecision, occasioned by ignorance of the subject, or through want of union among the Ministers. We |