to take effectual measures immediately for completing the army and putting it in condition to begin an early campaign. It is also necessary to concert, as far as the distance of places will permit, a plan of common operations; and this is one of the principal points on which the underwritten Minister is ordered to consult with Congress. He is also ordered to assure this Assembly, that the King being informed of the wants of the American army, with respect to arms and ammunition, has commanded his Ministers to make suitable arrangements for supplying them. It is necessary that the underwritten Minister should confer with Congress on the subjects just mentioned. Besides, he has some particular circumstances to communicate relative to the present or probable state of the negotiations; and he desires that this assembly will be pleased to inform him in what manner they will receive the communication, the subject of which, as well as the plan of operations for the ensuing campaign, requires the most profound secrecy. In the meanwhile, he now only assures Congress, that in the whole course of the negotiations carried on last year,. the King would not listen to either peace or truce, without an assurance, of some sort, of the independence of the United States. LUZERNE. REPORT OF A COMMITTEE ON THE COMMUNICATIONS OF THE FRENCH MINISTER. In Congress, January 28th, 1780. The committee appointed to receive the communica Sir, TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS. Translation. Philadelphia, January 25th, 1780. The Minister Plenipotentiary of France has received express orders from the King, his master, to inform Congress, that the present situation of the affairs of the alliance in Europe announces the necessity of another campaign, which is indispensable to bring England to an acknowledgment of the independence of the Thirteen United States, which is the essential purpose of the present war. That power is making preparations the most proper for continuing the war with vigor, and appears willing to employ, in the course of this year, all the means possible to procure reparation, by some important enterprise, for the losses it has already sustained. Congress cannot doubt, that in this situation of affairs his Most Christian Majesty and the King of Spain have concerted plans to maintain that superiority by sea, which has begun to appear in their favor; and the underwritten bas reason to believe, that the United States have nothing to desire of their ally, touching the use he is making of the resources of his realm, and the efficacy of the measures adopted by the Cabinets of Versailles and Madrid. But while this powerful diversion retains in Europe, and the West Indies, the greater part of the land and sea forces of the common enemy, it is absolutely necessary, that the United States, on their part, should make efforts proportionable to the greatness of the object for which they are contending. The only means of putting an end to to take effectual measures immediately for completing the army and putting it in condition to begin an early campaign. It is also necessary to concert, as far as the distance of places will permit, a plan of common operations; and this is one of the principal points on which the underwritten Minister is ordered to consult with Congress. He is also ordered to assure this Assembly, that the King being informed of the wants of the American army, with respect to arms and ammunition, has commanded his Ministers to make suitable arrangements for supplying them. It is necessary that the underwritten Minister should confer with Congress on the subjects just mentioned. Besides, he has some particular circumstances to communicate relative to the present or probable state of the negotiations; and he desires that this assembly will be pleased to inform him in what manner they will receive the communication, the subject of which, as well as the plan of operations for the ensuing campaign, requires the most profound secrecy. In the meanwhile, he now only assures Congress, that in the whole course of the negotiations carried on last year, the King would not listen to either peace or truce, without an assurance, of some sort, of the independence of the United States. LUZERNE. REPORT OF A COMMITTEE ON THE COMMUNICATIONS OF THE FRENCH MINISTER. In Congress, January 28th, 1780. The committee appointed to receive the communica summary, accompanied with extracts of papers, which he had recently received.* The Minister of France informed the Committee, that he had it in command from his King to impress upon the minds of Congress, that the British Cabinet have an almost insuperable reluctance to admit the idea of the independence of these United States, and will use every possible endeavor to prevent it That they have filled several of the Courts of Europe with negotiations, in order to excite them to a war against France, or to obtain succors; and are employing the most strenuous endeavors to persuade the several powers, that the United States are disposed to enter into treaties of accommodation. That many persons in Europe are actually employed in bringing such treaties to perfection; and that they have no doubt of their success. That the objects which the British Cabinet hope for from those measures are, to destroy the superiority, which France has now at sea, by diverting her powers and resources from naval to land operations, and by engaging her in a land war, where she must risk very important interests, while England would risk nothing but money; or to break, or weaken the alliance, by destroying the confidence, which the allies ought to have in each other. That his Most Christian Majesty gives no credit to the suggestions of Britain, relative to the disposition of the United States; and it is necessary, that measures be taken for the preventing of other powers from being deceived into a belief of them. That the negotiations of Britain, as far as could yet be learned, had not succeeded. That the * These extracts were the same as had been sent to General Washington, and are printed above, in connexion with M. de la dispositions of all the European powers are, as far as can be known, very friendly to France; but some of them may be engaged in secret treaties with Britain, which may oblige them, in some event, to assist her with troops even against their inclinations. That such event may arise, and if it should, it is probable it will produce an armed medi⚫ation, the consequences of which would be, that the allies must accept of the terms proposed by the mediator, or continue the war under the disadvantage of having the forces of the mediator united with those of their enemies. That in such event, it is possible the terms proposed will be such as Spain offered, and Britain rejected, in the last proposed mediation. That, though the powers who may be under such engagements by treaty to Great Britain, from their friendly disposition towards his Most Christian Majesty, may be very unwilling to give assistance to his enemies, yet they may find it indispensably necessary in compliance with their engagements; but it is not improbable that their reluctance, or the distance of their dominions, may delay such assistance, if granted at all, so as to be too late for the next campaign. That should the enemy be in be in possession of any part of the United States at the close of the next campaign, it will be extremely difficult to bring Great Britain to acknowledge their independence; and if a mediator should be offered, while the enemy is in possession of any part, an impartial mediator could not easily refute the arguments, which might be used for its retaining such possessions. And, probably, a mediator well disposed towards Great Britain might insist on her holding them; and if not agreed to, the hostility of such a mediator would |