shown by the willingness of the administration to have it settled by an arbitration which we have no hand in appointing, to which we are not a party, before which we are not heard, and which is charged with no consideration of any rights of ours. We profess, in short, no other interest in the matter than that it should be determined one way or the other, whether right or wrong, by arbitration. Such being the conditions of the case, and they are not open to dispute, upon what theory is the position of the United States sought to be justified? The answer offered to an astonished world is, that it is the necessary result of the Monroe Doctrine, and is to be charged to that account. Now a proposition that entails such consequences ought to be pretty carefully examined. It behooves us to ascertain what it stands for, what it means, how far it is sound, how far it is going, and what are its limits if it has any.

What, then, is the "Monroe Doctrine"? The phrase is of frequent use lately, but of very infrequent attempts at definition. Expressing nothing, it may be understood to express anything. It is generally supposed to embody a vague idea of some sort of control that may be or ought to be exerted by the United States over the relations between European governments and those of South America. But what control, under what right, for what purposes, and in what cases, we are not informed. The name by which such principle as it is thought to stand for is called would be immaterial, if it were not that a name often gives currency to an idea that can only exist under an indefinable phrase, because as soon as it is stated in plain language it refutes itself. It is the constant and necessary resort of

those who undertake to maintain an unmaintainable proposition, to find a phraseology that will be accepted as conveying its meaning, without exposing its futility. When such terms are correctly defined, their contents disappear. The uncertainty of what is meant by the Monroe Doctrine is made apparent by the efforts of recent writers and orators to define it, for no two of them agree. Some have gone so far that the ground taken by the President has become moderate in comparison. One asserts that it is the right in our government to forbid any dispute as to a boundary line or other question between a European and a South American government, however immaterial to us, to be settled in any way by the parties to it, without our consent. Another still more advanced writer defines it to be our right, and corresponding duty, to require that every difference that arises between a European nation and one in South America shall be adjusted by arbitration; a species of voluntary agreement that he conceives we have a divine mission to compel other governments to accept against their will, in matters with which we have no concern. Various other novel incursions into the field of international law find their only defence against absurdity under the convenient shelter of the phrase "the Monroe Doctrine," which is assumed to be a feature of the American theory of government, inherited by some strange canon of descent from President Monroe, its inventor, and which we are all bound to support whether we understand it or not. And when finally we resort to the diplomatic communications from our government to that of Great Britain, in order to ascertain if possible what is the precise right we claim in the present case, and why we

claim it, we find the answer to those reasonable inquiries to be farther off than ever.

The pretext for annexing the name of Mr. Monroe to these extravagant proposals is found in some language employed in his message to Congress in the year 1823. He said: "The occasion has been judged proper for asserting a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintained, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European power." Later in the same message he said: "We owe it therefore to candor, and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those" (Allied) "powers, to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety." And again: "We could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them" (the independent South American countries), "or controlling in any other manner their destiny by any European power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States." This is what Mr. Monroe said, and substantially all that he said, on the subject. The occasion which called forth this language, and the matter it referred to, was an intention shown by certain European nations, combined under what was called the Holy Alliance, to aid Spain in regaining her lost authority over eight provinces in South America, which had achieved their independence and established republican institutions. This was in the infancy of our own republic,

when that form of government was almost unknown, and was still an untried experiment. It might well be contended that to re-establish a European monarchy by force over so large a portion of South America against the will of its people would have been at that time a serious menace to our political system, against which, on well-settled principles, we were justified in protecting ourselves. And this position was heartily concurred in by Great Britain. In respect to the right of colonization on this hemisphere by European countries, more doubt might arise as to the soundness of President Monroe's proposition. It has been opposed by eminent statesmen and writers, and rejected by Congress in former days. Unless there was something in the locality of the proposed colonization that made it a menace to us, it might be difficult to sustain the objection to it. But that point need not here be discussed, since it is altogether foreign to the present subject, nor is it at all likely at this day that the question will ever recur.

It will be seen, therefore, that President Monroe never asserted, nor did the case he was dealing with call for the assertion of any right in this government that supports or even approaches the proposition now brought forward under the professed sanction of his name. What he did say related to an entirely different state of facts from those now before us, and referred to a principle long fundamental in international law and universally admitted, of which he was in no sense the author: the right of national self-preservation and defence in every case and under all circumstances that call for its exercise. That is not only the right, but the first and paramount duty of every independent nation.

And it applies as fully to the acquisition of territory by another power, when it seriously endangers the safety or the important interests of a country, as to any other aggression. If this unquestionable right is what is meant by the term "Monroe Doctrine,” the phrase is capable of being clearly understood and accurately defined, and it will encounter no denial in any quarter. Such is the view of Mr. Monroe's propositions taken by Mr. Webster in his celebrated speech on the Panama mission, in which he warmly defended the message, which had been earnestly attacked. He said: "The general rule of national law is unquestionably against interference in the transactions of other states. There are, however, acknowledged exceptions growing out of circumstances and founded in those circumstances. . . . The ground of these exceptions is, as I have already stated, selfpreservation. It is not a slight injury to our interests, it is not even a great inconvenience, that makes out a case. There must be danger to our security, or danger, manifest and imminent danger, to our essential rights and our essential interests. Our right to interfere in any such case is but the exercise of the right of reasonable and necessary self-defence. It is a high and delicate exercise of that right; one not to be made but on grounds of strong and manifest reason, justice, and necessity."

The limits of this occasion do not admit of sustaining Mr. Webster's views by adducing those of other statesmen and writers to the same effect. Nor is it necessary. The propriety of the proposition he has so lucidly stated is almost self-evident, and has never been denied by any recognized authority. Nor can