in the Senate all States having an equal representation; in the House of Representatives, a representation based upon population. In the election of a President, these two bases are combined, each State having two electoral votes, and as many more as it has Representatives in the House, which must at least be one. Thus New York, which has thirty-six Representatives, has thirty-eight electoral votes; while Delaware, which has but one Representative, has three electoral votes.

Under the Constitution the States acquire, also, all necessary protection. It is made the duty of the Federal government to protect each of them against invasion, and, on application of the legislature of a State or of its executive (when the legislature cannot be convened), against domestic violence.

Another source of strength to the American Federation is found in the similarity which it insures among the State governments. It is questionable whether this element may not be indispensable to the success of a national authority founded upon a federation, at least when its members are contiguous. It is provided in the Constitution that the United States shall guarantee to every State a republican form of government; that is to say, that even a majority of the people of any State would be restrained, by the interference of the national power, from establishing a government of any other character. The States that formed the Union had all pre-existing republican constitutions of their own. Before any State is admitted by Congress to the Union the form and nature of its proposed State government is scrutinized, and conditions in re spect to it may be imposed if Congress deems it proper. This appears to be essential to the symmetry of the

Union and to the discharge by the States of the obligations and requirements incurred by becoming members of it. It is essential also to those rights of intercitizenship among the citizens of different States that have been before described. They must be made friends in a common interest, not enemies in a conflicting one. The difference between the institutions of the Northern and of the Southern States arising out of the existence of slavery in the latter was a disturbing element from the very outset. It was felt in the convention that proposed the Constitution, and had then to be made the subject of compromise, and it continued to be a steadily increasing menace to the stability of the Union, till it resulted in civil war. It was found impossible to adjust the rights of inter-citizenship which the Constitution provided for, and which were necessary to the harmony of the States, consistently with the requirements of a system which was at war with all the principles on which the government was based and with all its other institutions, as well as violently opposed to the public opinion of the Northern States. And its history affords a striking illustration of the necessity that, in a federation of independent states into one government, the institutions of the states and the sentiments of their people should be substantially alike.

Besides the requirement that republican forms of government be maintained, the States, as has been seen, are specially and carefully debarred by the Constitution from all measures, of whatever sort, that would be inconsistent either with their relation to the national power or with harmony and free intercourse between each other. And the disturbing element of hostile

religions is excluded, by the provisions that no law respecting the establishment of religion shall be made, and that no religious test shall be required as a qualification for any office or public trust under the United States. It is not easy to see how any contest or controversy can now arise between the States.

Equally essential to the success, and even to the existence, of a federation under a written constitution, is the constant presence of some authority, in its nature judicial, to determine the questions of disputed jurisdiction between the national government and the States, that must continually arise, and which no language that can be employed can possibly preclude; and to decide upon the validity, under the provisions of the federation, of the legislative or executive action of one party or the other, when its authority is challenged or doubted. It is manifest that a tribunal that undertakes these delicate and important duties must be the instrument, not of the States which form the federation or of the government that results from it, but equally of both-that it should be of such character, dignity, and ability as to command general confidence and respect, and that its determinations, when pronounced, should be enforced, if need be, by the whole power of the national organization.

.

The Supreme Court of the United States stands in these respects impartially and in a commanding attitude between the Federal government and the States, the joint creation of both, equally interested for both, its members being citizens of different States, selected by the President, confirmed by the Senate, impeachable for judicial misconduct on presentation by the House and trial by the Senate, and, unless upon im

peachment, their independence assured by a life tenure of office and of compensation. It is no foreign tribunal, therefore, nor one appointed by one power to adjudicate upon the rights of another, that thus constitutes the balance-wheel of the system of American Federal government. Nor is there any department of the government which has at all times and uniformly, through all political changes and all administrations, so fully retained the public confidence. Its members have throughout been men of the first rank, and its later judgments, as well as the earlier, have been usually approved both by lawyers and by statesmen. The great business interests of the country have continued to feel themselves safe in its hands, while among the common people there has grown up a sort of vague faith that would sometimes be ludicrous, if human faith and trust could ever be altogether ludicrous, that there can be no great wrong or outrage for which, if found remediless elsewhere, there is not in the last resort, somehow or other, a redress to be obtained in the Supreme Court of the United States.

It is as material to the industry and the property of a country that confidence in their protection should be unimpaired as that they should actually be protected. It may be even better that they should be sometimes invaded than that it should be generally understood they are likely to be.

The system of checks and balances established by the Constitution between the various departments of the Federal government is another distinctive and important feature of its provisions. It is very complete, and binds together the sources of authority in such a manner that no serious abuse can take place without

the concurrence of at least two, if not of all three. Aside from the division of powers which excludes the Federal government from the exercise of a large share of them, which is left to the States, it will be seen that, in the legislative department, the two houses, each acting entirely and quite independently upon its own views, constitute a check upon each other. There is no tradition nor understanding that either must give way to the demands of the other, nor can either be in any respects coerced. The veto power of the President is a check upon both. There must be either a concurrence of the two branches of the Legislature and the Executive, or of two-thirds of both houses against the Executive, in order that any legislation whatever shall take effect. And when by either of these means a law is enacted, if its constitutionality is denied by any person whose rights are affected by it, the judgment of the judicial power must also be had in its favor.

The President, on the other hand, is subject to the action of Congress in the enactment of all laws that come within their constitutional authority, and which are duly enacted, and it is made his duty to see that they are faithfully executed. In the making of treaties and appointments to office he is checked by the action of the Senate in respect to their confirmation. He can expend no money for any purpose not first appropriated by Congress. His action, as well as that of the legislative department, may be subjected to the judgment of the courts, if it invades any personal right, and is in contravention of constitutional restrictions. And, finally, he may be impeached by the House and tried before the Senate for any offence that is the proper subject of that proceeding, and thus, if found guilty,