siderable argument can be presented against the best of them. The only ground on which any machinery of government is accepted is that its merits overcome its defects; so that while not free from blemish, and not all that could be desired, it is on the whole, upon striking the general balance, the best attainable. No reflecting man can contemplate our own system of government without seeing in many directions the gravest and most dangerous abuses. If we fix our eyes upon those exclusively, we should be ready to abandon republican government in despair. But when we propose to ourselves the question what should we substitute for it, and turn our attention to the condition of all other systems which the world has known, we come back with satisfaction to our own; not as perfect, not as incapable of abuse, indeed as certain of abuse by unscrupulous men to a greater or less extent, but as on the whole the best system yet found out, in which the advantages most largely preponderate over the disadvantages, and which has the largest capacity for the gradual improvement which experience from time to time may prove to be necessary. The argument of the President therefore, in order to be effectual, must go to this extent, that the legislatures of our States, with the concurrence of the governors, or else by majorities so great as to overrule the veto of the governors, may be expected to engage, by means of temporary party majorities, in the commission of deliberate frauds and wrongs, obvious to all mankind, in the organization of those political divisions upon which the national government in both its legislative and executive departments depends; not in rare instances only, but to

such an extent as seriously to affect results. And that in this conduct they will be sustained by the people of their States. Is this conclusion really justified? Is it established by the few instances of that sort which on one side or the other have actually occurred; or are they rather to be regarded as exceptions rare enough not to be very important, and the scandal and reproach of which may be justly expected to prevent their frequent recurrence?

Notwithstanding these cases, and they are not, mostly, of recent occurrence, it has never been on that account proposed that members of Congress should be elected by general ticket, although the complexion of the national legislature, which would thereby be determined, is of far greater importance to the country than the election of President. If the "gerrymandering" of districts is not frequent enough to make it advisable to elect members of Congress by general ticket, why should the apprehension of it make it necessary to choose the electors in that way? Why is there more danger of it in one case than in the other? There seems to be no reason to fear that the few bad examples of this sort will ever be followed to any considerable or alarming extent. The game is one that both sides can play at. Neither could obtain much ultimate advantage from it. And the wrong done by one would be sure to be set right by the other, as soon as the legislative majority should change. If it be conceded that four or five districts are to be found in the United States out of three hundred and twenty-five, which by one political party or another have been unjustly constructed, and which its opponent has not yet had the opportunity to correct, and if it be further

conceded that the same thing may perhaps occur again in exceptional cases, can that be regarded, upon a candid and thoughtful consideration of the whole subject, as outweighing the great improvement which the proposed change must necessarily accomplish?

While, as has been remarked, abuses may be looked for as possible under every feature of every system of government, nothing is more deceptive than the attempt to anticipate them. Many such that were regarded by the wise framers of our Constitution as most important to be guarded against have turned out in experience to be imaginary. Others, the danger of which was not perceived beforehand, have been among the first to require remedy. The history of our Constitution has been a history of growth and consequent change, dictated not by theoretical argument but by actual experience. In the present instance, that test has demonstrated the great and increasing mischiefs of the method that has prevailed; which, without undue confidence or hasty judgment, may well be esteemed much more important than the small possible drawbacks which will perhaps accompany the necessary remedy. Above all, when the only objection that can be stated to the remedy rests, as has been shown, upon the assumption that the people of the United States will tolerate, and their legislatures will adopt, a course of procedure affecting the Federal elections, known to be thoroughly dishonest and corrupt, and destructive to the integrity of government. If that assumption is justified as to the future of the nation to such a degree that it must be accepted as the cardinal consideration in framing

our institutions, so that our political system comes to be, like the criminal law, only a contrivance for the prevention of offences which the majority of the people may be expected to engage in if the chance is afforded them, what remains to be said in behalf of republican government? Does it not rest upon the sole foundation of the virtue and intelligence of the general mass of the people? Is it true that these qualities can no longer be relied upon in our country to prevent deliberate abuses so flagrant as those which the President deprecates?

In this, as in so many other things, we must trust the American people. Their moral sense may be depended on to prevent in the future, as it has in the past, these apprehended abuses from becoming numerous enough to be dangerous. We may have faith in our countrymen, at least to this extent. When that faith no longer remains, popular government must come to an end.

It is not to be hoped that unanimity of opinion on this subject will at once be reached. Established customs give way slowly. The discussion must continue, and will continue, and should be conducted with that candor and fairness, and that respect for the views of honest opponents, which alone can make it useful. When the result in Michigan, and in other States in which similar legislation is probable, shall have been tested by experience, it is not unreasonable to expect that it will commend itself to the general good sense of the country.