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would be prohibited. She has in former years entered into a convention with Norway, which is still in force, for establishing a close time for the seal fisheries of that region, in which British and Norwegian vessels participate. Were only British instead of Canadian vessels concerned in the sealing business at Alaska, the convention would long ago have been completed. The interests of Great Britain are on the side of the preservation of the seals. The manufactures of sealskin are a very large industry in London—larger than in any other place in the world. And in the commercial value of the product, Great Britain has a larger interest than any other country. The relation between Great Britain and Canada is very peculiar. In theory the latter is a British colony. In fact it is independent. Great Britain can exercise a certain influence over it, but has no means of governmental control. An attempt to override the Canadian government is not likely to be made, and would not succeed. The Governor-General is but a dignified figure-head, with but little real authority, and is not expected to allow himself to be drawn into collision with the provincial government, or with Canadian public opinion. In matters like that under discussion, Canada takes her own course. In fitting out ships to take seals in the Bering Sea, she asks neither the consent nor the advice of the mother country, nor does that country or its people share the profit or loss of the adventure. Our controversy on the subject is really with Canada, and not with Great Britain. But in complaining against the depredations of these cruisers we can only address Great Britain, who thus stands between us and Canada, not as an umpire, but bound to support

the claims of her colony so far as she can, and not to concede away, unless compelled to, any right for which the colony contends. She may be unable to concur in its justice, but is not called upon to say so, as long as the question can be evaded. The consequence is, in such a case, that her Majesty's ministers temporize and delay; they engage in the discussion of abstract and incidental questions, or transmit the contentions of the colonial government, without committing themselves directly upon the decisive point on which the controversy turns. They courteously, slowly, and diplomatically evade the real issue, and decline to concede that the colony is in the wrong, well knowing by experience, that whatever administration may be charged for the time being with the government of the United States will, in the efforts it makes to assert its rights, encounter the hearty condemnation of the political party opposed to it; that the arguments it addresses to the foreign government will be abundantly answered and refuted by American writers, and their authors held up to derision; and that the next election is very likely to bring into power a new administration, which may abandon the contentions of their predecessors and put the case on entirely different grounds.

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In this, as in all other international controversies, one remark holds good. A nation divided against itself can never achieve a diplomatic success. government that is not backed up by the unanimous sentiment of its people, but is opposed in its dealings with foreign nations by a large share of the best intelligence of its own country, if not in the ends it seeks, at least in all the means it takes to obtain them, will

never be a formidable figure in diplomacy, especially when its force is found to expend itself in argument rather than in action. To peruse the discussions of most questions of this sort in the American press would lead the unlearned reader to conclude that one proposition in international law, at least, can be regarded as settled; that is, that whatever is asserted by our own government is necessarily wrong. This point is readily conceded by our adversaries, but tends more to simplify disputes than to conduct them to results favorable to our own side. If our government is demanding what is wrong, the demand should at once be abandoned. If it is claiming what is right, and what is worth claiming, it should receive the support of all parties, whether all the points taken, and all the arguments by which it endeavors to support its case, prove universally convincing or not. The task of refuting them may be well enough left to the other side. In the course of this controversy, very little has appeared in print in the United States which tends to support our government, or to indicate that American public sentiment sustains it. But much ability and learning have been devoted to answering the arguments and disproving the facts upon which the government has relied. The authors can have the satisfaction of knowing that all these contributions to the British side of the discussion are promptly put on file in Her Majesty's Foreign Office, and will not fail of their effect. Great Britain affords us no corresponding advantage. Not a word has been uttered or printed in that country, so far as is known, against the Canadian contention, or in support of that of the United States. The suggestion that the government might

be prejudiced in conducting the discussion silences at once the tongues and the pens of both parties. And if a new administration were to come into power, it would take up this subject where its predecessors left it, without any change of front whatever.

The application made by the American government to Great Britain, when the depredations complained of began, for a convention, by agreement of the countries interested, under which the capture of the seals should be regulated, was the proper course to be taken. International courtesy required it, before proceeding to any abrupt measures. That reasonable patience and forbearance should be shown by the United States in giving time for such a proposal to be considered and acted on, and all needful information regarding it to be obtained, was also an obvious propriety of diplomatic intercourse, which can rarely be expected to move rapidly. But five years have now passed away. It is virtually settled that no such convention as proposed will take place, and that Great Britain will not interfere to defend the Alaskan seal fisheries against the operations of the Canadian vessels. Meanwhile the destruction of seal life has gone on with such rapidity that, as already shown, four-fifths of its annual product is gone. If much more time is to be spent in discussion, the subject of the discussion will come to an end. If the United States government should now proceed temperately but firmly to put an end to the destruction of the seals in the breeding time, by preventing, through such exertion of force as may be necessary, the further prosecution of that business by any vessels whatever between Alaska and the Pribyloff Islands, can there be a question that such

a course would be completely justified? Is there any other alternative, except to submit to the speedy and final destruction of the seal and its dependent industries? That this would lead to any collision with Great Britain is not to be apprehended. The question then presented to that government would be, not whether it should admit in a paper discussion that Canada is in the wrong, and agree to undertake the defence of the United States against that colony, but whether she is prepared to send an armed force to assist and support Canada in the work of destruction; a work which, as has been seen, Great Britain has never asserted to be right, has once promised to agree in suppressing, and has joined with Norway in suppressing in another seal fishery. And in face of the fact also that the business interests of Great Britain are more largely interested in the preservation of the seal than those of Canada are in the temporary profits of its extermination. It would be an aspersion upon that country, not warranted by its history nor by the character of its people, to suppose that its government would fight in support of a cause that it cannot defend as just. Great Britain would be relieved of an embarrassment and an annoyance if the United States government would thus terminate a fruitless and unprofitable discussion, by the assertion in its own behalf of its plain rights, and cease importuning Great Britain to take that assertion upon herself. It would be derogatory to the dignity of our country to prolong such importunity after it is proved to be unavailing.

Arbitration has been spoken of as a means of composing the dispute. But that has been already proposed by the United States, without success. The

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