also expressly mentioned Fredericksburg as one of the places or points through which this chord passed, and within easy and uninterrupted communication with Washington and other parts of the country, by way of the railroad to Aquia Creek and the Potomac river.

With these suggestions in mind, General Burnside prepared his plan of operations. Accompanying the order assigning him to the command was an order from General Halleck, directing him to report what he "purposed doing with " his troops. On the 9th of November General Burnsitle prepared his plan, and on the 10th sent it to Washington by Major E. M. Neill, who, on the 11th, delivered it to General G. W. Cullum, General Halleck's Chief of Staff. That plan can best be stated in General Burnside's own words. It was as follows:

"In accordance with the order of the General in Chief, of the 5th inst., I have the honor to make the following report of the movement proposed for this army:

"To concentrate all the forces near this place, and impress upon the enemy a belief that we are to attack Culpepper or Gordonsville, and at the same time accumulate a four or five days' supply for the men and animals. Then make a rapid move of the whole force to Fredericksburg, with a view to a movement upon Richmond from that point. The following are my reasons for deciding upon this plan :

"If we move upon Culpepper and Gordonsville, with a fight there, or a general engagement, even with results in our favor, the enemy will have many lines of retreat for his defeated army, and will in all likelihood be able to reach Richmond with enough of his force to render it necessary to fight another battle at that place, and should he leave even one corps, with cavalry, on our right flank, it would render the pursuit very precarious, owing to the great lack of supplies in this country, and the liability to an interruption of our communications with Washington. Should the enemy retreat in the direction of Richmond upon our approach to Culpepper and Gordonsville, we would simply follow a retreating army well supplied with

provisions, at least at depots in his rear, whilst this army would have to rely upon a long line of communications for its supplies, and as in the other case, a small portion of the enemy's force on our flank might tend to interrupt our communieations. It may be well to add here, while on the subject of interrupted communications, that the enemy's sources for gaining information are far superior to our own. The General in Chief will readily understand the reason-the difference is more than usual in their favor at present, from the fact that. nearly all the negroes are being run South, and kept under strict guard. Should the enemy retreat before us in the direction of Staunton and Lynchburg, the same difficulty would follow, with the certainty that he would also have a small portion of his force on our left flank. In moving by way of Fredericksburg, there is no point up to the time when we should reach that place at which we will not be nearer to Washington than the enemy, and we will all the time be on the shortest road to Richmond, the taking of which, I think, should be the great object of the campaign, as the fall of that place would tend more to cripple the rebel cause than almost any other military event except the absolute breaking up of their army. The presence of a large army on the Fredericksburg line would render it almost impossible for the enemy to make a successful move upon Washington, by any road upon this side of the Potomac. I take it that there are forces enough at Washington, and on the line of the Potomac connected with the fortifications about Washington, to repulse any movement of the enemy on the Capital by way of the Upper Potomac. It is hardly probable that he would attempt any serious invasion of Pennsylvania at this season of the year, and even should he make a lodgement in that State of any force that he can spare, the destruction of that force would be the result very soon after winter sets in. The destruction of property by him would be small in comparison with the other expenses of the Could the army before Richmond be beaten and the rebe taken, the loss of half a dozen of our towns and ci

interior of Pennsylvania could well be afforded. A movement of the enemy upon Baltimore I consider altogether improbable, as an attack upon that place would render the destruction of the city certain.

"In connection with this movement in the direction of Fredericksburg, I would suggest that at least thirty canal boats and barges be at once loaded with commissary stores and forage and be towed to the neighborhood of Aquia Creek, from which place they can be brought into Belle Plain after the arrival of our force in that vicinity. These should be followed at once by enough stores and forage to subsist the army for forty days. A great portion of these, I think, could be towed up the Rappahannock under convoy of light draft gun boats, but that is a matter for after consideration. It will be also necessary to start at once, from Washington or Alexandria, by way of Dumfries, a quantity of beef cattle, and all the wagon trains that can be spared filled with small rations, such as bread, salt, coffee, sugar, soap and candles. This train should be preceded by ponton trains enough to span the Rappahannock with two tracks. But a small escort of cavalry for this train would be necessary, as we would be all the time between the enemy and the train. I will, however, if notified of its departure by telegraph, see that it is protected by my cavalry. During these movements, it would be well for General Sigel to remain with his force at Centreville and its neighborhood, holding Manassas Junction, Thoroughfare Gap, Aldie and Leesburg with forces sufficient to protect them against any light attack, any one of which can fall back on the main body if attacked by too large a force. The main portion of his cavalry can be kept in Loudon county, where there is an abundance of subsistence and forage. Below Fredericksburg, between the Rappahannock and the Potomac, there must be quite an amount of forage, which could be used by our brokendown animals after we reach Fredericksburg. We will need some fresh horses and mules on our arrival, which can be driven direct from Washington on this side the Potomac, or direct from

Baltimore to Smith's Point, opposite Aquia Creek, from which place they can be brought over in ferry boats, several of which it would be advisable to send us. An abundance of horses can also be brought by light draft vessels from New York and Philadelphia to a point near Belle Plain, where they can be thrown overboard and swim ashore. I cannot impress too strongly upon the General-in-Chief the necessity of furnishing by all these means an abundant supply of horses, mules and beef cattle. These should be sent to Fredericksburg, even at the risk of arriving after we have left. After reaching Fredericksburg, our wagon trains can be organized and filled with at least twelve days' provisions, when a rapid movement can be made upon Richmond direct, by way of such roads as are open to us; and as soon as the army arrives in front of the place, an attack should be made at once, and with a strong hope of success. The details of the movement from Fredericksburg I will give you hereafter.

"A great reason for feeling that the Fredericksburg route is the best is that if we are detained by the elements it would be much better for us to be on that line.

"I hope the General in Chief will impress upon the Secretary of War the necessity of sanctioning the changes which I now propose to make in this army:

"First, to divide it into three grand divisions, right, left and centre, under command of the three ranking Generals present. "Second, to do away with the very massive and elaborate Adjutant General's office at these headquarters, and require the different commanders of the grand divisions and corps to correspond directly with Washington in reference to all such matters as resignations, leaves of absence, discharges, recruit-· ing service, &c., &c., about which they necessarily know more than I do. I should have to be governed by their suggestions, and the attention to these matters in detail would surround me with a large number of staff officials and embarrass me with a responsibility which I cannot assume.

"Third, to make Brigadier General Seth Williams an in

spector of the different staff departments of the command, by which means I shall ascertain if these duties are properly performed by the persons to whom they are delegated.

"To keep my own Adjutant General, Lieutenant Colonel Lewis Richmond at my Headquarters, and to use as far as possible my own staff officers, with promotions necessary to their positions. I shall make as few changes as possible, but I am very anxious to keep my staff as small as possible and to throw the labor and detail upon the officers immediately in command of the troops. A telegraph from you approving of my plans will put us to work at once."

General Burnside's plan was, in brief, to demonstrate towards Culpepper, and then to make a rapid march to Falmouth, to cross the Rappahannock upon pontons at that place, to seize Fredericksburg and the heights beyond, and to establish a temporary base of supplies at Aquia Creek. The movement beyond Fredericksburg was to be a matter for subsequent consideration. But it was in General Burnside's mind to push immediately on towards Richmond upon the roads leading through Spottsylvania Court House, Bowling Green and the villages beyond; have supplies in waiting at York river, then cross the peninsula rapidly to the James river, and with that for a base, march direct upon the city of his destination.

General Burnside did not fix upon his plan of operations without consultation with other officers. He was aware of the value which attached to the advice of those who had made the art of war a study, and he was ready to listen to any suggestions which his brethren in arms might make. He was not tenacious of his own opinion, except as it could be supported by reasons which he deemed more powerful than those adduced by others. General Sigel suggested to General Burnside a plan, which contemplated a march towards the James River, striking it above Richmond, near Louisa Court House. But this proposition was rejected on account of the difficulty of moving the army through hostile territory to so great a distance from the base of supplies in an uncertain season of the year. General