been if General Franklin had followed up and supported the gallant advance of the Pennsylvania Reserves !*

General Franklin had one of the finest opportunities ever offered to a man for gaining a world-wide distinction-and he neglected to improve it. He was unequal to the occasion. A glittering prize was within his grasp, and he refused to reach forth and take it. Was he wilfully blind, or was he unable to perceive its value? However it may have been, it was a loss which could not be remedied. Such an opportunity comes but seldom in a life-time. It did not come again to General Franklin, and, since that day, he has quietly settled into obscurity. A subsequent failure in Louisiana, springing from causes similar to that at Fredericksburg, extinguished his hopes of military renown, and, having been dropped to his regimental rank in the regular army, as Colonel of the 12th infantry, he resigned his commission soon after the close of the war, and retired into private life.

General Burnside, however, wished to spare his subordinate commanders, and was unwilling to adopt the cheap expedient of throwing upon them the blame of the defeat. His language concerning them has always been particularly generous. But for the honor of our military service, the country would have been glad to witness and record a heartier coöperation of many

*The following conversation, which is authentically reported as having taken place between Generals Meade and Lee, at the headquarters of the latter, shortly after his surrender, may throw some light upon the subjects discussed in the text:

GENERAL MEADE. At Fredericksburg, General Lee, I pierced your line, and if I had been supported, as I expected to be, I should have defeated you. GENERAL LEE. Yes, General; that is true.

MEADE. After I was driven back to the banks of the river, why did you not follow up your success? You then had the Army of the Potomac at an advantage at which you never held it before nor since.

LEE. I knew that at the time, and issued order after order to attack you; but I could not succeed in getting my orders obeyed.

MEADE. Indeed! How was that? We always thought that the discipline of your army was almost perfect.

LEE. (Bitterly.) Far from it, General. That disposition which my officers had to think and act for themselves, prevented me from reaping the benefits of almost all my successes, and thwarted almost all my plans of campaign.

of the officers of the Army of the Potomac with their commanding general.

General Lee did not receive a great amount of commendation for his conduct of the battle of Fredericksburg. It was thought by the people of his section of the country that he might have done more with the means which he possessed for the injury of General Burnside's army. It certainly exhibited no surpassing skill to keep one's troops in a defensive position, and to be content with simply resisting an attack from sheltered and almost impregnable works. Why did he not come out from his defences on the second day, and make an assault upon our forces in the open field? If the victory had been as decisive as some had thought it, he had every facility for disabling the Army of the Potomac to such a degree as virtually to destroy it as an organized force. If this army had suffered such a disastrous defeat as was represented, why was it allowed to remain unmolested for two days? With a river in its rear, it could have made but slight resistance to a vigorous assault, delivered by an army already flushed with a great success, gained at little cost. Or, if General Lee did not wish to take the risk of such an attempt, he could at least have opened his batteries upon the force which lay beneath his guns, incapable of further exertion. It is hinted, by Southern writers, that some sinister influence was at work at the enemy's headquar ters, which prevented the gathering of the spoils which were within the grasp of the rebel army. By what secret force the hand of General Lee was restrained, it is now impossible to say. Whether there was any such force or not is a matter of question. The fact doubtless was that General Lee, a man of slow mind, had formed no plan of defence which could be made available for attack. He was in doubt respecting General Burnside's intentions for a subsequent movement, and he hesitated to take the initiative, preferring to await the development of events. It is possible, also, that General Lee's resources of ammunition and other supplies did not warrant him in a renewal of hostilities. Both his generalship and his ma

terial were equally lacking. Moreover, it may have been the case and this is doubtless the true reason for General Lee's inaction that the Army of the Potomac had not suffered so serious a disaster as the exaggerated reports of the battle at first led the country to believe. General Burnside would not have been sorry to have met General Lee outside his intrenchments. President Lincoln's address to the army, which was published a few days after the battle, contained a truthful declaration when it stated, that "the attempt was not an error nor the failure other than an accident." The Army of the Potomac, though it had been somewhat rudely shaken, was still in effective condition. There was no general demoralization or despondency, and it was soon ready to prove, on other and more successful fields, that it possessed those qualities of persistence, courage and self-reliance which would, in “the fullness of time," ensure for it a complete and permanent triumph!

NOTE TO CHAPTER VIII.

The result of the battle of Fredericksburg gloomi ly affected the loyal people of the country. General Burnside had personally so strong a hold upon the public regard, as to induce many persons to feel that he had been led to fight against his better judgment, and that the authorities at Washington were responsible, not only for the battle itself, but also for the failure. In order to do away with such an impression, which was impairing the public confidence in the wisdom of those who were conducting military affairs at Washington, General Burnside, of his own generous motion and from the magnanimity of his nature, wrote to General Halleck the letter which is given below. It was published throughout the country, and had the desired effect, of relieving our military authorities from the distrust which had begun to form. It also had another effect which was entirely unexpected on the part of the writer. It called forth the highest commendations both in public and private, and General Burnside, instead of losing by the want of success at Fredericksburg, rather gained in public estimation, having by his generosity increased the respect of all whose respect was worth securing for his fine qualities as a man and a soldier:

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"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

Falmouth, Dec. 17th, 1862.

"TO MAJOR GENERAL HALLECK, General in Chief of the armies of the United States, Washington:

"GENERAL: I have the honor to offer the following reasons for moving the Army of the Potomac across the Rappahannock sooner than was anticipated by the President, Secretary of War and yourself, and for crossing at a point different from the one indicated to you at our last meeting at the President's.

"During my preparations for crossing at the place I had first selected, I discovered that the enemy had thrown a large portion of his force down the river and elsewhere, thus weakening his defences in front, and also thought I discovered that he did not anticipate the crossing of our whole force at Fredericksburg. And I hoped by rapidly throwing the whole command over at that place to separate, by a vigorous attack, the forces of the enemy on the river below from the forces behind and on the crest in the rear of the town, in which case we could fight him with great advantage in our favor.

To do this we had to gain a height on the extreme right of the crest, which height commanded a new road lately made by the enemy for the purpose of more rapid communication along his lines, which point gained, his positions along the crest would have been scarcely tenable, and he would have been driven from them easily by an attack on his front in connection with a movement in the rear of the crest.

How near we came of accomplishing our object future reports will show. But for the fog and unexpected and unavoidable delay in building the bridges, which gave the enemy twenty-four hours more to concentrate his forces in his strong positions, we would almost certainly have succeeded, in which case the battle would have been, in my opinion, far more decisive than if we had crossed at the places first selected. As it was, we came very near

success.

"Failing to accomplish the main object, we remained in order of battle two days, long enough to decide that the enemy would not come out of his stronghold to fight us with his infantry, after which we recrossed to this side of the river unmolested and without the loss of men or property.

"As the day broke, our long lines of troops were seen marching to their different positions as if going on parade. Not the least demoralization or disorganization existed.

"To the brave officers and soldiers who accomplished the feat of thus recrossing the river in the face of the enemy, I owe everything. For the failure in the attack I am responsible, as the extreme gallantry, courage and endurance shown by them was never exceeded, and would have carried the points had it been possible.

"To the families and friends of the dead I can only offer my heartfelt sympathies, but for the wounded I can offer my earnest prayers for their comfort and final recovery.

"The fact that I decided to move from Warrenton on to this line, rather against the opinion of the President, Secretary of War and yourself, and that you left the whole movement in my hands without giving me orders, makes me responsible.

"I will visit you very soon and give you more definite information, and finally I will send you my detailed report, in which a special acknowledgment will be made of the services of the different grand divisions, corps and my general and personal staff, of the departments of the Army of the Potomac, to whom I am much indebted for their hearty support and co-operation.

"I will add here that the movement was made earlier than you expected and after the President, Secretary of War and yourself requested me not to be in haste, for the reason that we were supplied much sooner by the different staff departments than was anticipated when I last saw you.

"Our killed amount to one thousand one hundred and fifty-two, our wounded to about nine thousand, and our prisoners seven hundred, which last have been paroled and exchanged for about the same number taken by us. The wounded were all removed to this side of the river, and are being well cared for, and the dead were all buried under a flag of truce. The surgeons report a much larger proportion of slight wounds than usual, one thousand six hundred and thirty only being treated in hospitals.

"I am glad to represent the army at the present time in good condition. "Thanking the Government for that entire support and confidence which I have always received from them, I remain, General,

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"Very respectfully,

"Your obedient servant,

"A. E. BURNSIDE,

"Major General Commanding Army of Potomac."