because I have no other plan of campaign for this winter, and I am not disposed to go into winter quarters.

"It may be well to add, that recent information goes to show that the enemy's force has not been diminished in our front to any great extent."

The replies of the officials thus addressed sufficiently indicate the wishes of the military authorities at this time. On the 7th, General Halleck wrote to General Burnside: "Your communication of the 5th was delivered to me by your Aidede-Camp at twelve o'clock, meridian, to-day.

"In all my communications and interviews with you since you took command of the Army of the Potomac, I have advised a forward movement across the Rappahannock. At our interview at Warrenton, I urged that you should cross by the fords above Fredericksburg, rather than to fall down to that place; and when I left you at Warrenton, it was understood that at least a considerable part of your army would cross by the fords, and I so represented to the President. It was this modification of the plan proposed by you that I telegraphed you had received his approval.* When the attempt at Fredericksburg was abandoned, I advised you to renew the attempt at some other point, either in whole or in part, to turn the enemy's works or to threaten their wings or communications; in other words, to keep the enemy occupied till a favorable opportunity offered to strike a decisive blow. I particularly advised you to use your cavalry and light artillery upon his communications, and attempt to cut off his supplies and engage him at an advantage. In all our interviews, I have urged that our first object was, not Richmond, but the defeat or scattering of Lee's army, which threatened Washington and the line of the Upper Potomac. I now recur to these things simply to remind you of the general views which I have expressed, and which I still hold. The circumstances of the case, however, have somewhat changed since the early part of November.

* This is the first intimation of General Halleck's idea of a plan other than that which has already been given.

The chances of an extended line of operations are now, on account of the advanced season, much less than then. But the chances are still in our favor to meet and defeat the enemy on the Rappahannock, if we can effect a crossing in a position where we can meet the enemy on favorable or even equal terms. I therefore still advise a movement against him.

"The character of that movement, however, must depend upon circumstances which may change any day and almost any hour. If the enemy should concentrate his forces at the place you have selected for a crossing, make it a feint, and try another place. Again, the circumstances at the time may be such as to render an attempt to cross the entire army not advisable. In that case, theory suggests that, while the enemy concentrates at that point, advantages can be gained by crossing smaller forces at other points, to cut off his lines, destroy his communications, and capture his rear-guards, outposts, &c. The great object is to occupy the enemy, to prevent his making large detachments or distant raids, and to injure him all you can with the least injury to yourself. If this can be best accomplished by feints of a general crossing and detached real crossings, take that course; if by an actual general crossing with feints on other points, adopt that course. There seems to me to be many reasons why a crossing at some point should be attempted. It will not do to keep your large army inactive. As you yourself admit, it devolves on you to decide upon the time, place and character of the crossing which you may attempt. I can only advise that an attempt be made, and as early as possible."

On this the President made the following endorsement :

"JANUARY 8, 1863. "I understand General Halleck has sent you a letter, of which this is a copy. I approve this letter. I deplore the want of concurrence with you in opinion by your general officers, but I do not see the remedy. Be cautious, and do not understand that the government or country is driving you. I

do not yet see how I could profit by changing the command of the Army of the Potomac, and if I did, I should not wish to do it by accepting the resignation of your commission.

"A. LINCOLN."

Fortified by these opinions, and deeming it best, with General Halleck, that both the army and the enemy should be occupied, General Burnside was encouraged to believe that something might yet be accomplished which would redound to the honor of the country and effect its deliverance from the burdens which the rebellion had brought. He did not yet, by any means, despair of success. With the hopeful temperament which enabled him to bear the burden of repeated failure with equanimity, he was still resolute. In the long-continued good weather, he saw reason for encouragement, and he determined. to make at least one more effort to accomplish a favorable result. His new plan was to cross his army either above or below Fredericksburg, and thus turn the position, draw General Lee into the open field, and then fight him at better advantage. He decided to cross at the upper fords, and turn General Lee's left flank. Careful reconnaissances were made, for many miles. up and down the river, by experienced officers, and it was finally determined to make the passage at Banks's ford and United States ford. Demonstrations were made at a point below Fredericksburg, and a portion of the enemy's forces were drawn down towards Port Royal. General Lee, suspecting some movement, also sent a force up to the United States ford, leaving Banks's ford comparatively unguarded. General Burnside resolved to throw his entire army across the river at the latter point, and with this view the ponton trains were sent up to the neighborhood of the ford, and engineer parties were set busily at work to prepare the roads. He succeeded in deceiving the enemy by his movements, and with an advantage of nearly forty-eight hours' start, he moved his command to the neighborhood of the upper fords.

The army marched out of its encampments on the morning

of the 20th of January. For the first day all went well. The men were in good spirits, the sun shone bright, and all hoped for success. Towards evening, the omens were not so favorable. Heavy clouds began to gather, and at sunset the sky was overcast. The army bivouacked near Banks's Ford with the preparations for crossing nearly completed. But after nightfall a most furious storm burst upon the scene. The wind roared through the forests, along the plains, over the hills. The rain fell in torrents. The roads were soon reduced to a mass of mud and mire. The artillery, the wagons, horses and mules and men were stopped as effectually as though a hundred armies blocked the way. Winter, which with extreme forbearance had held off until that moment, now came on with relentless rigor.

It was utterly impossible to fight the elements, and General Burnside on the morning of the 22d, finding further efforts useless, ordered the army to return to its former position. The march back to Falmouth was made with extreme difficulty. The troops, on their arrival, went into winter quarters, and all idea of moving again until the spring opened, was abandoned. General Burnside, for the purpose of freeing the Administration from embarrassment, again tendered his resignation to the President, who again refused to accept it, preferring to relieve him in Virginia, and to retain his services for use in other quarters. General Burnside was accordingly relieved of the command on the 25th of January. General Hooker was appointed in his place. General Franklin was relieved by order of the Secretary of War. General Sumner, who was General Hooker's senior in rank, was relieved at hisown request. General Burnside immediately proceeded to Providence, where he was received by his fellow-citizens with every demonstration of welcome and esteem.

It was not strange that General Burnside should have failed in command of the Army of the Potomac. Any officer who should have immediately succeeded General McClellan would have met with the same fate. That army was divided by jea

lousies and partizanship. Army correspondents spoke of these strifes and bickerings as "notorious and scandalous." No man could have secured a cordial coöperation from his subordinate officers. Thus the efficiency of the command was seriously impaired by its internal dissensions. The feeling in favor of 'General McClellan in some quarters was so strong as to manifest itself on several occasions, not only in expressions of dissatisfaction with his successor, but also in assemblages which are described as "almost seditious in their character." In other quarters there were equally strong expressions of disapproval of General McClellan. These however did not take the form of support to General Burnside, but of laudations of this, that or the other general officer, who was supposed to be the best fitted to command the Army of the Potomac. The feeling even proceeded so far as to affect questions of comparatively minor importance. On the march from Fredericksburg and in camp at Falmouth if any delay occurred or supplies were short, or the railroad was not put in order as soon as was expected, the hardships were contrasted with the plenty enjoyed in Maryland and the blame laid at General Burnside's door. The partizans in the army had their friends and partizans at home. General McClellan allowed himself to be identified with a political movement, which culminated in a public declaration, a year or two later, that the war was a failure. The disloyal press of the country, in its greed for everything that .would make against the Administration and the conduct of the war, seized upon the existence of this feeling in the army as an occasion for using expressions, which had for their object the diminution of confidence in the commander of the Army of the Potomac. Every quarrel was nursed, every difference of opinion was exaggerated, every conflict of feeling was fostered.

It required all General Grant's military genius and the strength of his silent, persistent, inflexible will, to control the discordant elements, and not until he exercised a personal supervision over the command was the Army of the Potomac able to perform its proper work. General Hooker, at Chan