side of the Tennessee river, and consequently that you ought to march on the north side. Rosecrans has now telegraphed to you, that it is not necessary to join him at Chattanooga, but only to move down to such a position that you can go to his assistance should he require it. You are in direct communication with Rosecrans and can learn his conditions and wants sooner than I can. Distant expeditions into Georgia are not now contemplated. The object is to hold East Tennessee, by forcing the enemy south of the mountains and closing the passes against his return."

There was apparently some working at cross purposes in relation to affairs in East Tennessee. General Halleck, with a good theoretical knowledge of the art of war, had had but a very limited experience of the actual movements of large armies in the field. The only march that he made during the entire war was from Pittsburg landing to Corinth, to occupy a position which the enemy evacuated without loss. He fought no battle, and his conduct of an army was distinguished by no important incident. Confined to such a narrow practical knowledge of operations in the field of actual warfare, it was no matter of surprise, that he did not understand the precise character of the situation in East Tennessee. His orders were contradictory and his plans confused. They required General Burnside to divide his forces into two weak divisions, place them nearly two hundred miles apart, and do impossibilities with both. At one time East Tennessee was to be held, at another it was to be given up, and all the troops crowded within the narrow limits of the post at Chattanooga, where supplies were already short, and animals and men nearly at the point of starvation. At one time General Burnside's men were to be scattered, and before they had reached their points of destination, they were to be concentrated, without losing their hold upon the territory which they had freed from the enemy. Again, the loyal people of East Tennessee were to be left to their fate, and the country, with the enemy's line of communication, to be once more ccupied by the rebel forces. In

A

the midst of these harassing circumstances, and these conflicting despatches and dispositions, General Burnside not only had to check the enemy in his threatening demonstrations from Virginia and Northern Georgia, but he had also to quiet the alarm, caused among the people by an apprehension of the return of the despotism, which had so long oppressed them. If General Burnside should now leave them, to whom could they turn for safety? If, by any inconsiderate action or order of the General in Chief, the valley of the Holston should be abandoned and the enemy's troops again return, the people might well fear that the very worst consequences would ensue. few thousand arms had indeed been distributed among the loyal Tennesseeans, but what could three or four hastily organized regiments accomplish against the veteran soldiers of the rebel army? A feeling of despondency began to prevail, as though the government of the United States was about to relinquish the territory after having once extended over it a beneficent rule. The President endeavored to rectify the mistakes of the General in Chief, but hardly succeeded in his well meant efforts. The defeat at Chickamauga emboldened the enemy, who was disposed at all times to profit by any error upon our part. General Burnside's position was most difficult. The President had the fullest confidence in him, and did the best he could to make the situation agreeable and the duty easy. The people looked up to him as their deliverer and depended upon him with a grateful trust. He had the fullest faith, that East Tennessee could be held against the enemy's most determined attacks, and he was resolved to retain his conquest and make it productive of good results.

The plan which General Burnside proposed to General Halleck had been well considered. The third proposition in his despatch of September 30th, may not have been practicable then, and with the small force which he contemplated employing upon such perilous service. But the careful reader, studying the successful and grand campaign of General Sherman, 'a year or more subsequent to that time, can perceive that the

germ of such a movement was contained in the less conspicuous plan of General Burnside. General Sherman proved that the "Southern Confederacy" was a hollow shell. Whether the Autumn of 1863 or that of 1864 was the proper time to break it, is of course a matter of question. The latter time had indeed a condition which the former did not possess:the fact, namely, that General Grant was then General in Chief. It had a further condition that General Grant is a thorough and accomplished soldier, and confides in the good judgment and skill of his subordinates.

General Rosecrans was disposed to favor the first of the plans submitted to General Halleck and desired that it might be adopted. But the state of affairs at Chattanooga rendered it impracticable. By some disarrangement of forces, the Quartermaster's department had been unable fully to supply the army which General Rosecrans already had under his command. The depots of provisions and supplies at Chattanooga, and along the line through Bridgeport and Stevenson, were very poorly provided, and great difficulties of transportation existed. Already the horses and other animals required for the artillery, cavalry and wagon trains were dying in large numbers for want of forage, and the army itself was on halfrations.* The addition of General Burnside's forces to those already occupying the half-starved camps around Chattanooga would have increased the complications of the case, and would have compelled the men of both armies to endure great sufferings.

There was another circumstance to be considered when speaking of such concentration. It would have been the complete loss of East Tennessee. The entire valley of the Holston would have been laid open to the inroads of the rebel troops from Virginia, the people would have been subjected to a renewal of the cruelties from which they had been happily freed, the position at Chattanooga itself would have been pres

General Halleck's Report for 1863.

sed in front and on both flanks to an evacuation, and the Summer's operations would have been frustrated. While General Burnside held Knoxville and the upper valley, keeping free the roads through Cumberland and Big Creek Gaps, ample lines of retreat lay open in case of disaster. But, with with both armies at Chattanooga, short of supplies and confronted and flanked by a superior force of the enemy, defeat was almost certain. The reüniting of the enemy's broken line of communication would enable him to send large bodies of his troops from Virginia and give him every advantage. Only one line of retreat lay open for our forces towards Nashville, and the enemy, crossing the Cumberland Mountains, could fall upon the rear of our troops and drive them in inglorious rout to the line of the Cumberland river. Kentucky would again lie at the mercy of the rebels, and the entire North West would have been threatened. The occupation of Knoxville and the upper valley was necessary for the prevention of such calamities. While our forces were thus disposed, the further reënforcement of General Bragg from Virginia was difficult; while, on the other hand, General Rosecrans was comparatively safe from attack. What would have been the consequences, if this great avenue of communication had been given up to the enemy, it is very easy to perceive. Happily for the Federal government, General Burnside understood precisely what to do in the premises, and persisted in doing it. He securely held the railroad and the line through Cumberland Gap. He protected the left flank of General Rosecrans, and completely foiled the rebel plans in that quarter.

The month of October was not prolific of great events on either side. The rebel General Wheeler attempted a raid upon the communications of General Rosecrans, reached McMinnsville and burnt a few wagons and some stores. But the cavalry of General Rosecrans succeeded in intercepting and driving off the enemy. General Burnside's cavalry passing farther down the river, made our lines secure from subsequent

Jones again became active. A large force of the enemy from Virginia was threatening our communications with Cumberland Gap, and demonstrating upon the south side of the Holston and Watauga rivers. Since the concentration of our own troops at Knoxville, the enemy had assumed a decidedly hostile attitude, and it became necessary to clear our left flank from his encroachments.

The Ninth Corps, under General Potter, and a considerable body of cavalry, under General Shackleford, were sent up the valley during the first week of October, and, on the 8th, were joined by General Willcox's division, reënforced by Colonel Hoskins's brigade, at Bull's Gap. General Burnside himself left Knoxville on the 9th, and advanced from Bull's Gap on the 10th, with the entire command. The enemy was found strongly posted at Blue Springs, and disposed to receive battle. Colonel Foster's brigade of cavalry was sent around to the rear of the enemy's position, with directions to occupy the road upon which the enemy must retreat, at a point near Rheatown. The main attack was to be made at the time when Colonel Foster was supposed to be in proper position, and meanwhile the attention of the enemy was occupied by our skirmishers. A desultory engagement was thus kept up till about half-past three o'clock in the afternoon, when General Potter was ordered to move up the Ninth Corps, attack, and, if possible, break through the enemy's lines. At five o'clock, General Ferrero's division, which had been selected for the attack, moved gallantly forward against the enemy, and by a bold push pierced his first line, and heavily pressed back his troops upon the reserves. Night coming on put an end to the conflict, and our forces were disposed to resume the battle upon the following day.

The enemy, finding his rear threatened by Colonel Foster's movement, decided to withdraw during the night, leaving his dead upon the field and many of his wounded in our hands. Colonel Foster was delayed by the roughness of the roads and other causes, and did not succeed in reaching his assigned posi