of truce,* was attacked near Philadelphia by a large force of infantry, cavalry and artillery. After a severe fight of several hours, having inflicted a greater loss upon the enemy in killed and wounded than he had himself suffered, Colonel Wolford retreated to Loudon, leaving in the hands of the enemy six small howitzers, with thirty-eight wagons and between three hundred and four hundred prisoners. Our cavalry afterwards took the offensive, and drove the enemy back beyond Philadelphia, capturing from him a considerable number of prisoners. But it soon became evident that there was a force of the enemy in support of this movement which was really formidable in numbers and organization. Indeed, subsequent events proved that the affair at Philadelphia was the initiative of a desperate attempt to retake East Tennessee from our troops and drive them back into Kentucky. At the same time, some threatening demonstrations were made from Virginia, which were promptly met by General Willcox, in command at Greeneville.

The main attack, however, was to come from the forces now confronting us across the Tennessee river near Loudon. General Burnside had put General Sanders, a very brave and promising young officer, in command upon his right flank, where he and his forces performed many gallant and conspicuous services. He now withdrew his troops to the north bank of the Tennessee and occupied the heights above and opposite Loudon. Constant skirmishing occurred from day to day between the pickets of the hostile forces, with small losses upon either side. It was thought that the enemy's crossing might be prevented. But it was made manifest, before many days, that that portion of the rebel army which was operating in this direction was too strong for us successfully to oppose, except from a well fortified position. It was hoped by General Burnside, that a show of resistance might attract General Longstreet's forces sufficiently far away from General Bragg's main body to enable

Captain Pell, of General Burnside's staff, was engaged in these negotiations, and was detained as prisoner by the enemy for a short time.

General Grant at Chatanooga to make a decisive attack upon his opponent. The situation was interesting enough to demand the personal presence of General Burnside, and on the 28th of October, headquarters were removed from Knoxville to the heights opposite Loudon, and the enemy's advance awaited. But the emergency for that time passed, and on the 31st General Burnside returned to Knoxville, preparing himself and his army for any further action which might become necessary.

Nothing of any great importance, however, took place until the 10th of November, when the attack came from another direction. A portion of the enemy's force, that had been threatening our left flank from Virginia, came down upon our garrison at Rogersville under Colonel Garrard, and succeeded in driving it out and back to Morristown, with a loss of about five hundred prisoners, four pieces of artillery, and thirty-six wagons. It was a severe demonstration upon our lines in that quarter, but beyond the single shock thus given, it was of little advantage to the enemy, as our posts were again immediately and fully secured. Our communications with Kentucky in that direction were undisturbed, and the balance of prisoners, besides those captured at Cumberland Gap, was still largely in our favor. The only two reverses which General Burnside's command suffered in its entire campaign in East Tennessee, were those at Philadelphia and Rogersville, and they were of comparatively little importance as affecting the result of the chief operations in the department.

An active campaign seemed about to open. Our troops near Loudon had prepared for winter quarters. They were somewhat rudely disturbed. General Grant became anxious. in relation to the affairs of his military division, and was desirous of taking the offensive still more decidedly than he had already done, and of dealing a blow to the rebel army in his front, which should send it reeling back from its threatening position at Lookout Mountain. General Sherman was doing a good work on his right, engaged in clearing that flank of the combined armies. The presence of the enemy in large force

below Loudon was thought to be troublesome. General Grant appeared at first to believe that it was desirable to evacuate. the position at Knoxville and concentrate General Burnside's forces at Kingston in order that close communication might be made with our troops at Chattanooga. General Burnside was naturally unwilling to relinquish his hold upon the enemy's line of communication through Tennessee, and to abandon the people whom he had delivered to the renewed severities of the enemy's rule. He therefore preferred Knoxville to Kingston as the point of concentration. He also thought that General Grant would be materially aided by the withdrawal of General Longstreet from the main army of the enemy. If this detached force could be occupied in the neighborhood of Knoxville, General Grant would be able to inflict a very severe injury upon the enemy in his front. Knoxville moreover was partially fortified. General Burnside's chief engineer, Captain O. M. Poe, had inaugurated a system of defences at Knoxville as early as the 15th of September. Two earthworks had been erected near the town, and it was thought that these could be strengthened sufficiently to resist an attack and possibly to endure a siege. The communications with Cumberland Gap were secure, by which a retreat might be made in case of disaster. General Burnside laid these considerations before General Grant with the hope of his approval.

It happened that Mr. Chas. A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War was visiting the West at the time to consult with the military authorities upon the character of the situation. He was then at General Grant's headquarters. In company with Colonel Wilson of General Grant's staff Mr. Dana visited Knoxville. The two gentlemen arrived on the 13th, and had an interview with General Burnside at which the questions involved in his operations were fully discussed. After hearing the reasons which General Burnside adduced to support his plans, they immediately telegraphed them in detail to General Grant. The information thus conveyed served to allay what

ever anxiety existed in the mind of the commander of our armies in that quarter.

Meanwhile the enemy was making certain movements which confirmed the opinions that General Burnside had formed, and eventually proved them to be the best that could be followed in the existing circumstances. During the progress of the consultation at Knoxville, intelligence was received from the front which hastened the departure of Mr. Dana and Colonel Wilson. On Saturday morning, November 14th, General Longstreet with twenty thousand men threw his advance across the Tennessee river at Hough's Ferry, six miles below Loudon. By this manœuvre our position on the heights was turned. General Sanders had been previously relieved from the command at this point and was now operating with his cavalry on the south side of the Holston. Brigadier General Julius White with one division of the twenty-third corps was now holding the position, supported by General Potter with the Ninth Corps at Lenoir's. General White, upon learning the enemy's movement, sent the 23d Michigan infantry and a section of artillery to observe the enemy and if possible dispute his crossing. These troops were soon ordered back, and General White withdrew his command to Lenoir's. Intelligence of these movements broke up the council. General Burnside's guests immediately departed. The General himself went to the front, and on hearing the details which General White had to communicate decided to take charge of the movement of his troops in person. Entrusting General Parke with the command of Knoxville, he speedily arranged his plans for holding the enemy in check, until our troops could deliver battle successfully or securely withdraw. The first point was to harass the crossing at Hough's Ferry or, if that had been effected, to attack the advancing party. He ordered General White, supported by General Ferrero's division of the Ninth Corps, to assume the offensive. The odds were greatly against us. But General White, with the spirit of a true soldier, was ready and even eager for the combat. At

four o'clock in the afternoon Colonel Chapin's brigade came in contact with the enemy's van-guard which had crossed the river. These troops were comparatively raw, but they charged upon Longstreet's veterans with the greatest gallantry, and supported by their comrades of the twenty-third corps they fairly forced the enemy's lines, and, pressing vigorously upon him, drove him for two miles back to the river. The night came on thick, rainy and very dark, and put an end to the engagement. The fight reflected great honor upon General White and his officers and men. The enemy had been checked in his advance. General Burnside contemplated another attack on the following morning, but the receipt of a despatch from General Grant was decisive in regard to the withdrawal of the troops. This despatch was received late at night. The officers of General Burnside's staff were gathered at his headquarters and the contents of the despatch naturally became a subject of conversation. "I shall withdraw my command to Knoxville," said General Burnside. "Why so?" said one of the young gentlemen, "you can easily beat the enemy as he is at present situated and drive him across the river. If we start we are lost. He will bring his entire force against us and we shall be defeated and ruined." "That may be true," replied the General; "but it will benefit General Grant if we can draw Longstreet away from his front more than it will injure us. If General Grant can destroy Bragg it is of no great consequence what becomes of ourselves. Order the troops to be ready to march in the morning."

At daylight the next morning, therefore, General Burnside retired his troops to Lenoir's,-Colonel Morrison's brigade of General Ferrero's division bringing up the rear-drawing off his artillery and trains in safety, with the exception of a single caisson, which became mired and had to be abandoned. The command was put in position at Lenoir's without molestation. Later in the afternoon, the enemy's skirmishers appeared in force, and were promptly scattered by a few welldirected shells from Captain Henshaw's battery of the twenty