ceasing labor in most perilous positions. Armies are not mere machines. They are composed of ordinary flesh and blood. General Burnside wished to use his freshest troops.

On the 24th, General Grant again desired that an attempt should be made to assault the enemy's lines at some point, but was finally persuaded by General Meade to wait for a few days for a more favorable opportunity. On the 26th General Burnside's plan of attack was presented. By this time General Meade had come to the conclusion that larger results were to be expected from the mine than he had at first supposed. Now he had cause to think, "that the explosion of the mine and the subsequent assault on the crest would be successful, and would be followed by results, which would have consisted in the сарture of the whole of the enemy's artillery and a greater part of his infantry."* All that was necessary for him to do therefore was, to approve General Burnside's plan of attack, to order the cooperation of the other corps, to repair to the front to take command of the entire army in person, and reap the harvest of glory, which his subordinates had so carefully prepared for his ingathering. Yet he did not approve General Burnside's plan, or choose to adopt this plain course. Why he did not it is impossible to say. Was it because he did not wish that the anticipated success might be the result of another's combinations, but rather desired that it should come from some original design of his own? Or did he have some prejudice against the capacity of colored troops? Or was he determined not to allow General Burnside any discretion in the matter, but to make manifest the supreme authority of the commanding general of an army? The reason which General Meade gave before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, for his rejection of General Burnside's plan, was that "as this was an operation which I knew beforehand was one requiring the very best troops, I thought it impolitic to trust it to a division of whose reliability we had no evidence." The commander of an army

*General Meade's Testimony before Committee on Conduct of War, in Attack on Petersburg, p. 52.

must of necessity judge of the reliability of his troops. If he does not consider them able or trustworthy, it is his duty to keep them out of action. Yet the immediate commander of a corps or of a division is presumed to know the capabilities of his soldiers better than an officer further removed from them. If General Burnside was willing to trust his colored division, it would seem like a reflection upon his good judgment to disapprove his opinion. Whatever might have been the motives of General Meade, the fact remains that he did not agree with General Burnside's views upon the subject, and changed the entire plan of operations at so late an hour as to make a remedy for its derangement almost wholly impracticable.

On the 28th General Meade had an interview with General Burnside, in which the whole subject was discussed. General Meade urged that the colored troops were not so reliable for such an assault as was contemplated, as the white troops of the Ninth Corps. The operation was to be a coup de main, the assaulting column was to be as a forlorn hope, such as are put in breaches, and the assault ought to be made with the best troops. General Burnside argued-in accordance with what has already been stated-that his white troops were not in proper condition to head an attack of the kind. They had been exposed for forty days to a ceaseless fire and had acquired the habit of sheltering themselves from the enemy's missiles. Moreover, they were worn down by excessive labor, watchings and cares. Their officers had not expected to make an assaultknowing that the colored division had been selected for that purpose and had not examined the ground. The colored troops on the contrary were fresh and strong, their ranks full, their morale unexceptionable, and their spirits elated by the thought of the approaching conflict. They had been drilled with especial reference to this very movement, and their officers were conversant with all its details, the ground to be traversed, and the work to be done. General Meade could not be turned from his purpose of changing the order of assault, but finally agreed to submit the matter to General Grant. That officer

concurred with General Meade, having had no opportunity of hearing the other side of the case presented by General Burnside in person.* *

The colored troops were ruled out-very much to the disappointment of themselves, their own commander, and General Burnside. The decision was made known to General Burnside not far from noon on the 29th. General Meade at the same time called at General Burnside's headquarters, where he met the three commanders of the white divisions of the Ninth Corps. On the day previous, he had told General Burnside at an interview which the two officers had at General Meade's headquarters, that he did not approve the order of the formation of the attacking column, "because," as General Burnside testifies, "he was satisfied that we would not be able, in the face of the enemy, to make the movements which were contemplated, to the right and left; and that he was of the opinion that the troops should move directly to the crest without attempting these side movements." On the occasion of the interview with the division commanders on the 29th, General Meade declared, that "there were two things to be done, namely, that we should go up promptly and take the crest." General Meade seemed to have but one plan of action. That was to "rush for the crest." These words he repeated in more than one order on the day of battle. "Don't lose time in making formations," he said, "but rush for the crest."

There seems to have been a little discrepancy in General Meade's recollection of the discussion which took place respecting General Burnside's formation of the assaulting column. As

*General Grant in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War had the frankness to say, that "General Burnside wanted to put his colored division in front, and I believe if he had done so it would have been a success. Still, I agreed with General Meade in his objection to that plan. General Meade said, that if we put the colored troops in front, and it should prove a failure, it would then be said, and very properly, that we were shoving those people ahead to get killed because we did not care anything about them. But that could not be said, if we put white troops in front." It is to be observed, however, that General Meade gave a different reason from that to the Committee, when he was stating why he disapproved General Burnside's plan of attack.

to General Burnside's "tactical formation," he testified before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, "and what he was to do with his troops, I made no objection." "The only objection I intended to make to" his "plan was to the use of the colored troops in advance."* But before the Court of inquiry which, after the battle investigated the whole affair, General Meade testified as follows: "I saw Potter, Ledlie and Willcox and I referred in the presence of those gentlemen to the tactical manœuvres to be made between that crater and the crest that the only thing to be done was to rush for the crest, and take it immediately after the explosion had taken place; and that they might rest assured that any attempt to take time to form their troops would result in a repulse."† No other conclusion can be reached than that General Meade did object to General Burnside's "tactical formation," and that the entire plan of attack, which had been carefully prepared, was disapproved in all its details. In this situation General Burnside and his division commanders found themselves on the afternoon of the 29th of July.

The decision of General Meade, unexpected as it was, caused no little embarrassment to the officers of the Ninth Corps. The mine was to be exploded at an early hour on the following morning. The colored troops were not to be used in the advance. What division should be selected to take their place? So far as the men were concerned there was little choice between them. There were no special reasons for selecting one in preference to another. Each was as brave as the other. All had been about equally engaged in the very arduous service of the campaign and the siege. General Burnside said to his division commanders: "Gentlemen, there are certain reasons why either one of you should lead the attack. Your division, General Willcox, and yours, General Potter, are both near the point of assault, and it will require less time to put either of them into position, than to bring up General Ledlie's division.

*Attack on Petersburg, p. 44. Attack on Petersburg, pp. 57, 143.