movements were hampered by their crowded condition. He thought that a diversion should be made upon the right or left. General Burnside, receiving the direct order of General Meade to push forward to the crest, at once transmitted it to General Potter. General Potter in his turn was pressing his division forward and attempted to gain the crest. It was impossible. The enemy's fire was very severe, and told fearfully among our troops. The mortar batteries had now secured the range of our position and were dropping shells into the crater with great accuracy and execution. To send more men in seemed like sending them to certain destruction.

But General Meade's order of six o'clock contemplated no discretion on the part of the commander of the Ninth Corps. Nothing could be more clear. Nothing could be more imperative. "Our chance is now; push your men forward, white and black." Such were the terms. They could not be evaded. General Burnside accordingly directed General Ferrero to put in his division. Lieutenant Colonel Loring, who was standing by General Ferrero at the time the order was received, took the liberty as the senior staff-officer present to countermand the order, until he could consult General Burnside in regard to the matter. But General Burnside had no option but to obey. The order was accordingly repeated, and General Ferrero's division advanced to the attack.

The colored troops charged forward cheering and with great enthusiasm and gallantry. Colonel J. K. Sigfried, commanding the first brigade, led the attacking column. The command moved out in rear of Colonel Humphrey's brigade of the third division, Colonel Sigfried, passing Colonel Humphrey by the flank, crossed the field immediately in front, went down into the crater and attempted to go through. The passage was exceedingly difficult, but, after great exertions, the.brigade made its way through the crowded masses in a somewhat broken and disorganized condition, and advanced towards the crest. The 43d United States colored troops moved over the lip of the crater towards the right, made an attack upon the

enemy's line of intrenchments and won the chief success of the day-capturing a number of prisoners and a stand of rebel colors, and recapturing a stand of national colors. The other regiments of the brigade were unable to get up on account of white troops in advance of them crowding the line.* The second brigade under the command of Colonel H. G. Thomas, followed the first with equal enthusiasm. The men rushed forward, descended into the crater and attempted to pass through. Colonel Thomas's intention was to go to the right and attack the enemy's rifle pits. He partially succeeded in doing so. But his brigade was much broken up when it came under the enemy's fire. The gallant brigade commander endeavored in person to rally his command and at last formed a storming column of portions of the 29th, 28th, 23d and 19th regiments. These troops made a spirited attack, but lost heavily in officers and became somewhat disheartened. Lieutenant Colonel Bross of the 29th, with the colors in his hand led the charge, was the first man to leap upon the enemy's works, and was instantly killed. Lieutenant Pennell seized the colors, but was shot down riddled through and through. Major Theodore H. Rockwood of the 19th sprang upon the parapet and fell while cheering on his regiment to the attack.f The conduct of these officers and their associates was indeed magnificent. No troops were ever better led to an assault. Had they been allowed the advance at the outset, before the enemy had recovered from his first surprise, General Grant's belief, that their charge "would have been a success," would doubtless have been verified. But it was now too late. The fire to which they were exposed was very hot and very destructive. It came from front and flank. It poured into the faces of the men. It enfiladed their lines. The enemy's rage against the colored troops had its bloody opportunity.

While these movements were making in front, despatches were passing between Generals Burnside and Meade which did

*Colonel Sigfried's Report. Colonel Thomas's Report.

not augur well for the issue of the attack. At twenty minutes past seven o'clock General Burnside sent the following telegram to General Meade: "I am doing all in my power to push the troops forward and if possible we will carry the crest. It is hard work, but we hope to accomplish it. I am fully alive to the importance of it." General Meade at half past seven replied with the following ill-tempered effusion: "What do you mean by hard work to take the crest? I understand not a man has advanced beyond the enemy's line which you occupied immediately after exploding the mine. Do you mean to say your officers and men will not obey your orders to advance? If not, what is the obstacle? I wish to know the truth and desire an immediate answer."

This despatch was carried to General Burnside by Captain Jay, General Meade's aide de camp. Immediately upon its receipt, General Burnside replied: "Your despatch by Captain Jay received. The main body of General Potter's division is beyond the crater. I do not mean to say that my officers and men will not obey my orders to advance. I mean to say that it is very hard to advance to the crest. I have never in any report said anything different from what I conceived to be the truth. Were it not insubordinate, I would say that the latter remark of your note was unofficer-like and ungentlemanly." General Burnside was frank to confess, when examined before the Committee of Congress, that his language was unfortunate. But he felt at the time that General Meade was impugning his veracity, and replied, as a high spirited and truthloving man would be most likely to do under such aggravating circumstances. General Meade, impatient and petulant before, did not improve in temper on the receipt of this message. His orders became more positive, if possible, than before.

At the extreme front, the condition of affairs did not appear favorable. The colored troops had gone in to the fight manfully. They had lost severely, and their organization was much broken. Colonel Sigfried's brigade had suffered very badly in its loss of officers. Colonel Delavan Bates of the 30th regiment

fell shot in the face. Major James C. Lake of the same regiment was severely wounded in the breast. Lieutenant Colonel H. Seymour Hall of the 43d lost his right arm. Lieutenant Colonel Charles J. Wright of the 27th was shot twice and badly wounded. There were no wounds in the back among these brave officers. But all their endeavors and sacrifices did not avail. The work upon which they had been sent could not be accomplished. Colonel Sigfried, in bearing witness to the bravery of his command, believed that "had it not been for the almost impassable crowd of troops in the crater and intrenchments, Cemetery Hill would have been ours without a falter upon the part of my brigade." The attack failed. "A white color bearer with his colors crossed the works in retreat. The troops gave way and sought shelter in the crater where was concentrated a terrific fire."* A panic took place. Many of the men white and black ran to the rear. The enemy gathered about the edge of the crater and along the line of the commanding works, and, with his men in good range and good position, made havoc among our devoted troops. His artillery swept the intervening space between the crater and our line of works, and to retreat was as hazardous as to remain.

Time passes rapidly amid such exciting scenes. At nine o'clock, General Burnside sought an order from General Meade directing General Warren to make an attack upon the enemy in his front. The hostile lines were almost bare of defenders on either flank of the point immediately assailed, and the supporting corps, if they were now to attack, would not only relieve the Ninth Corps, but would also gain a decisive advantage. General Warren commanding the fifth telegraphed to General Meade and suggested that he should come to the front and see for himself the state of the battle. General Meade declined doing so. But at the same time he was unwilling to allow General Burnside any opportunity to exercise command over the corps in his immediate neighborhood. By General Meade's

*Colonel Sigfried's Report.

peremptory order, all the troops belonging to the Ninth Corps had been sent into the battle. General Meade now declined to relieve them by ordering an attack to be made by the corps on either side of the position of the Ninth. A marked difference is to be observed, between the character of the orders given to General Burnside and that of those to the other corps commanders. General Burnside was permitted no discretion. Not an order through the entire action was conditional. To Generals Warren, Hancock and Ord obedience to the orders given was to be determined by circumstances. If there was "apparently an opportunity to carry the enemy's works,” General Warren was to "take advantage of it and push forward" his troops. When General Warren found the opportunity and was disposed to improve it, he was informed by General Meade that the attack was "suspended." General Hancock was to have his "troops well up to the front prepared to move" as he might be called upon at any moment. "If the enemy are in force and prepared," says General Meade, "you will have to await developments; but if you have reason to believe their condition is such that an effort to dislodge them would be successful, I would like to have it made." General Ord was directed at six o'clock to move forward "independently of General Burnside's troops and make a lodgement" on the crest.* But at eight o'clock, General Ord reported that the topography of the ground was such as to prevent such an attack as General Meade had ordered. Yet notwithstanding this long delay, the commanding general had no word of censure and no reiteration of command. The difference in the orders is so striking as at once to arrest attention.

The men in the crater began to feel that no support was to be given them. Instead of attempting to relieve them by occupying the enemy upon the flank of the crater, General Meade was ordering more men into the confused masses of troops already in the over-crowded position. He had put in the entire

*General Meade's orders in Attack on Petersburg, p. 58 and following.