General Ayres, who commanded a division in the fifth corps, and General Miles, who commanded a brigade in the second corps. These gentlemen were officers in the supporting corps on the day of battle. Colonel Schriver, inspector general at General Meade's headquarters, was the judge advocate of the court. This body convened on the 6th of August, and continued in session, at different times, until the 9th of September. General Hancock presided at its deliberations, and is understood to have objected to the character of its composition. General Burnside made a formal protest to the Secretary of War against the constitution of the court, on the ground that the officers composing it held commands in the supporting columns, which were not brought into action on the 30th of July, and that the judge advocate was a member of General Meade's staff. He felt that he had a right to ask that, if an investigation were made, it should be by officers who did not belong to the Army of the Potomac, and were not selected by General Meade. He did not shrink from investigation, but desired that it should be removed from even a suspicion of partiality. Mr. Stanton did not perceive the force of the objection, and assured General Burnside that he might feel entire confidence in the fairness and justice of the President in reviewing the case. "The action of the board of inquiry," said Mr. Stanton, "will be merely to collect facts for the President's information." The court, in accordance with the order, proceeded to investigate the matter, and on the seventeenth day of its session, delivered its decision. It becomes necessary to examine the "finding" and "opinion" which were expressed, and the testimony upon which they were based.

The court declared the causes of failure to be "the injudicious formation of the troops in going forward, the movement being mainly by flank instead of extended front;" "the halting of the troops in the crater instead of going forward to the crest;""no proper employment of engineer officers and working parties and of materials for their use ;" an improper direction of some parts of the assaulting columns, and "the want

of a competent common head at the scene of the assault, to direct affairs as occurrences should demand." The opinion of the court was, that the "following named officers were answerable for the want of success: Major General A. E. Burnside, Brigadier General J. H. Ledlie, Brigadier General Edward Ferrero, Colonel Z. R. Bliss, and Brigadier General O. B. Willcox." General Burnside was answerable because he failed to obey the orders of the commanding general. "1. In not giving such formation to his assaulting columns as to insure a reasonable prospect of success; 2. In not preparing his parapets and abatis for the passage of the columns of assault; 3. In not employing engineer officers, who reported to him, to lead the assaulting columns with working parties, and not causing to be provided proper materials necessary for crowning the crest; 4. In neglecting to execute Major General Meade's orders, respecting the prompt advance of General Ledlie's troops from the crater to the crest; or, in default of accomplishing that, not causing those troops to fall back and give place to others, instead of delaying until the opportunity passed away." General Ledlie was answerable because he "failed to push forward his division promptly, according to orders, thereby blocking up the avenue which was designed for the passage of" the supporting troops; and also because, instead of being with his division in the crater, "he was most of the time in a bomb proof ten rods in the rear of the main line of the Ninth Corps." General Ferrero was answerable because his troops were not ready for the attack at the prescribed time, because he did not go with them to the attack, and because he was "habitually in a bomb proof." Colonel Bliss was answerable because he remained behind with the only regiment of his brigade which did not go forward according to the orders and occupied a position where he could not see what was going on." General Willcox was answerable because he did not exercise sufficient energy in causing his troops to go forward to Cemetery Hill. The court also expressed the opinion in language, the severity of which is but partially disguised in its softness,

that "explicit orders should have been given, assigning one officer to the command of all the troops intended to engage in the assault, when the commanding general was not present in person to witness the operations."

To support this finding and opinion, the court examined Generals Grant, Meade, Burnside, Warren, Humphreys, Ord, Hunt, Potter, Willcox, Ferrero, Griffin, Hartranft, Mott, Ames, Ayres, and a number of other inferior officers. But no officers on General Burnside's staff were brought before the court to testify in the case.* It is singular to observe how inconclusively the opinion of the court follows from the testimony adduced.

General Meade, testifying in his own behalf, was strangely inconsistent with himself in the evidence which he offered. He submitted to the court his orders on the day of battle, some of which have already been quoted, and by which it distinctly appears that he directed every moment that was made. The substance of his testimony in other respects was, that he disapproved of the location of the mine and General Burnside's plan of attack; that he had one or more staff officers at General Burnside's headquarters in the front; that he learned, before eight o'clock in the morning, that General Griffin had made an attack on the right of the crater and had been repulsed; that the first positive information which he received that there was any enemy in front or " present was not before nine o'clock in the morning; that he had ordered the troops withdrawn whenever that could be done with security; that, subsequently to the battle, he remained in "total ignorance of any further transactions until about six or seven o'clock in the evening;" that he did not go forward to the front to witness the action at any time; and that, in fine, he had "been groping in the dark since the commencement of the attack." Comment upon such testimony is wholly needless.

* It was stated at the time that the staff officers expected to testify were ill. But they were ready to go before the court previous to its final adjournment.

The testimony of General Burnside and that of his division and brigade commanders, is positive in relation to the fidelity that was manifested by the commander of the Ninth Corps, in his endeavors to execute the commands of General Meade. The formation of his assaulting column must have been determined by the officers having the immediate direction of the attack, and must have been influenced by the condition of the ground. That the troops marched by the flank, instead of an extended front, must have been due to other causes than the failure of General Burnside to obey the orders of General Meade. General Burnside's battle order to his division officers, through whom alone it could be executed, was as clear as General Meade's order to him. Surely, General Burnside was not responsible for the failure of any subordinate officer to obey his orders, any more than General Meade would have been, in case of neglect on the part of any of his corps commanders. A comparison of the two battle orders shows that General Burnside did all that was possible to carry out the wishes of his chief. Indeed, the formation was not altogether by the flank. General Hartranft testified that he "formed his command, which was immediately in rear of the first division, in one or two regiments front." He "put two small regiments together." General Hartranft was a capital officer, and it was General Burnside's misfortune that as good an officer was not in command of the first division.

The second point which the court made, in regard to the preparation for the passage of the assaulting columns, was not well taken. The testimony shows that there was no particular necessity for the leveling of the parapets. The abatis was so much cut up by the enemy's fire as to offer but little obstruction to the advance. General Willcox declared that "what was left of it when his division passed over was no obstacle whatever." The evidence is positive upon that point, and the delay of the troops in passing out of the lines was very brief. Captain Farquhar, the chief engineer of the eighteenth corps, testified that "there seemed to be room enough at "his "sali

ent to pass over, certainly in regimental front," but the passage was not practicable for artillery. Moreover, a greater number of troops passed out of the lines than could be handled upon the ground which they occupied. It is also to be considered that the attack was to be of the nature of a surprise; that the enemy was immediately in the front, distant but a few hundred feet, and that nothing was to be done before the assault which would give him any intimation of our intentions.

The third point which the Court made against General Burnside in "not causing to be provided the necessary materials for crowning the crest," is entirely discrepant with the testimony. General Burnside testified, that an engineer regiment was detailed for each division of his corps, fully equipped with the necessary tools for intrenching. General Potter testified, that his regiment of engineers was immediately in the neighborhood of the breastwork, prepared with proper tools to level the works for the passage of field batteries, in case the forward movement was successful; that axes, spades and picks were provided, and the chevaux de frise on the enemy's lines for two or three hundred yards was broken down. General Griffin testified, that he had in his brigade a pioneer corps with the proper tools. Major Randall testified, that he thought he saw the 25th Massachusetts near the crater, equipped with shovels and spades. The testimony which it is presumed the Court relied upon for its opinion, was indecisive in its character. The witnesses were Major Duane and Lieutenant Beuyaurd. To the question, whether any working parties accompanied the troops Major Duane answered, that he did not know; neither did he know, whether or not any arrangements were made "for facilitating the debouch of the troops from our lines, and their passage over the enemy's parapets." Lieutenant Beuyaurd was equally ignorant. He did not know that there were working parties for the assaulting columns, nor that there were any preparations made in the way of collecting gabions, picks, shovels, axes or other tools. These wholly inconclusive statements were allowed to outweigh the positive testimony offered on the other