neously stricken therefrom had remained in, states a cause of action, and that it is good as against respondent's general demurrer.

Nor do we think the complaint vulnerable under the attack by the special demurrer. It is true it is not a model pleading, stating in ordinary and concise language the facts constituting the cause of action. Still it is not fatally uncertain in any of the particulars pointed to by the special demurrer. We readily can see from the facts pleaded, that, by more direct allegations of certain facts that seem clearly inferable from the facts alleged, as well as from the facts disclosed by the terms of the contract of purchase, appellants easily might have avoided any attack on the ground of uncertainty. [7] However, we think the complaint sufficient if its allegations be liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice, as is required by section 452 of the Code of Civil Procedure, whereby the old common-law rule that a pleading must be construed most strongly against the pleader has been abrogated and superseded by the more liberal rule of the statute. (Estate of Wickersham, 153 Cal. 603, 96 Pac. 311].) In recent years great changes have been wrought by the code in the rules for the construction of pleadings. For sufficiency of the facts pleaded, courts look to substance, not to form. The basic principle of the code procedure is that the administration of justice should not be embarrassed by technicalities, strict rules of construction, or useless forms. This liberal spirit has even been carried into the constitution. (Const., sec. 412, art. VI.) The code requires not only a liberal construction, with a view to substantial justice between the parties, but also that the court shall disregard any defect in the pleadings which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties. (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 475.) Construing the complaint in the light of these liberal provisions, we think it impregnable to the attack made upon it by this demurrer.

[8] Many of the particulars as to which the demurrer charges uncertainty are matters that lie peculiarly within respondent's or her testator's knowledge, as, for instance, the facts immediately connected with the secret side agreement between MacDonald and Oxnam, also the facts connected with the time within which appellants' verified

claim should have been presented. As to such facts respondent cannot be heard to complain that appellants have not alleged them with sufficient certainty.

Nor do we think the court was justified in granting respondent's motion to strike out certain parts of the complaint. Many of the allegations stricken out were relevant and material. For example, the allegations that the secret side agreement was entered into "in anticipation of" the execution of the contract of purchase and that it was entered into "in consideration of plaintiffs signing the contract of purchase," were certainly material. The allegation that the secret side agreement was entered into "in anticipation of" the execution of the contract of purchase tends to show the connection between the two agreements, and that Oxnam and MacDonald were conspiring to bring about the execution of the contract of purchase by using MacDonald as a decoy. So, also, the allegation that the execution of the contract of purchase was the "consideration" for the secret side agreement tends to show the use of MacDonald as a decoy to induce appellants to enter into a contract that otherwise they possibly would not have made.

The judgment is reversed, and the court below directed to overrule the demurrer to the complaint with leave to defendant to answer.

Sloane, J., and Thomas, J., concurred.

[Civ. No. 2143. Second Appellate District, Division Two.-July 5,

1919.]

S. A. BRUNER, etc., Respondent, v. GABOR HEGYI,

Appellant.

[1] CONTRACTS - - PERFORMANCE TO SATISFACTION OF PROMISEE - REFUSAL TO ACCEPT-GOOD FAITH.-Where a contract requires cer tain work to be done to the satisfaction of the person contracting for it, and the work is of a kind that involves fancy, taste, sensibility or judgment, and no benefit passes under the contract unless the work be accepted, the promisee's refusal to pay for the work cannot be called in question, provided only that his refusal is in 42 Cal. App.-7

good faith and not from mere caprice. In cases of that character, the question is not whether the one complaining of the work ought to be satisfied, but solely as to the good faith of the dissatisfaction alleged.

[2] ID. PERFORMANCE OF WORK GOING INTO BUILDING RETENTION OF BENEFITS-MEASURE OF SATISFACTION.-Where the work contracted for goes into a building, the fruits of the labor of the contractor being retained by the owner, a stipulation in the contract to perform to the satisfaction of the owner calls for only such performance as is satisfactory to a reasonable person. It is sufficient if the contractor completes his work in accordance with the contract in such a manner that the owner, as a reasonable man, ought to be satisfied with it.

[3] ID.-MODIFICATION BY PAROL.-The terms of a written agreement may not be varied or modified by proof of a prior oral agreement.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Lester T. Price, Judge Presiding. Affirmed.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Frederick A. Preston for Appellant.

Hollzer & Greenberg, Charles Greenberg, Owen C. Emery and Albert M. Norton for Respondent.

FINLAYSON, P. J.-This is an appeal from a judgment in favor of plaintiff for $810, and interest, for work performed and materials supplied in setting in place the tile work for defendant's residence.

The agreement, which was in writing, executed by defendant and plaintiff, provides that the "work must be satisfactory to the owner."

The court found that the tile furnished by plaintiff was of the best quality, and that the work was done in a good workmanlike manner. It seems, however, that after the tile was set in place and through no defect in the workmanship or material, but probably because, as was intimated by one of the witnesses, the building contracted and expanded, the tile cracked or checked-became what is known to the trade as "crazed." For this reason the work was

3. General rule that parol evidence is not admissible to vary, add to, or alter a written contract, notes, 6 L. R. A. 38; 17 L. B. A. 270.

not performed to defendant's satisfaction. The court found, however, that it is the nature of all tile to craze; that the crazing of the tile on this job was not caused by any defects in the material or by any fault in workmanship; and that, though the work was not performed to defendant's satisfaction, it nevertheless was performed "reasonably satisfactorily," and was "a satisfactory piece of work.

Each of the court's findings is supported by evidence amply sufficient for the purpose.

[1] There are cases that hold that where the contract requires the work to be done to the satisfaction of the person contracting for it, and the work is of a kind that involves fancy, taste, sensibility, or judgment, and no benefit passes under the contract unless the work be accepted, as where, for illustration, a portrait is to be painted, the promisee's refusal to pay for the work cannot be called in question, provided only that his refusal is in good faith and not from mere caprice. In cases of that character, the question is not whether the one complaining of the work ought to be satisfied, but solely as to the good faith of the dissatisfaction alleged. [2] Where, however, as in this case, the work contracted for goes into a building, the fruits of the labor of the contractor being retained by the owner, the rule is that a stipulation in the contract to perform to the satisfaction of the owner calls for only such performance as is satisfactory to a reasonable person. It is sufficient if the contractor completes his work in accordance with the contract in such a manner that the owner, as a reasonable man, ought to be satisfied with it. (Gladding etc. Co. v. Montgomery, 20 Cal. App. 276, 279, [128 Pac. 790]; Bryar, Elevator Co. v. Law, 31 Cal. App. 204, [160 Pac. 170]; Erickson v. Ward, 266 Ill. 259, [Ann. Cas. 1916B, 497, 107 N. E. 593]; Doll v. Noble, 116 N. Y. 230, [15 Am. St. Rep. 398, 5 L. R. A. 554, 22 N. E. 406]; Handy v. Bliss, 204 Mass. 513, [134 Am. St. Rep. 673, 90 N. E. 864].)

[3] The claim of a prior oral agreement that the tile should be according to sample furnished by plaintiff was clearly an attempt to vary and modify by parol the terms of a written contract. This, of course, is not permissible. (Gladding etc. Co. v. Montgomery, supra.) Moreover, the

court found that the tile furnished by plaintiff actually was according to the sample furnished.

We find no error in the record, and think the judgment should be affirmed. It is so ordered.

Sloane, J., and Thomas, J., concurred.

[Civ. No. 2897. First Appellate District, Division Two.-July 7, 1919.]

MANUEL AVERY, Appellant, v. FRANKLIN L. AVERY et al., Respondents.

[1] DEEDS-Delivery-InfeRENCES--FINDING. In an action to quiet title to certain real property claimed by the defendants under deeds alleged by plaintiff not to have been delivered, if the evidence upon the question of delivery is such that different inferences might reasonably be drawn therefrom, the finding of the trial court is conclusive.

[2] ID. RECORDATION DELAYED DELIVERY NOT AFFECTED.-The fact that a grantor requests that the deeds should not be recorded until the happening of some future event will have no effect upon their delivery.

[3] ID.-JUDGMENT OF INSANITY

EVIDENCE.-A judgment that a given person is insane establishes the mental condition of such person only as of the date of the judgment, and is not proof of insanity at a time prior to the date stated therein.

[4] ID. CERTIFICATE OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS EVIDENCE.-A certifi cate of the medical examiners attached to such judgment stating, among other things, that the "present attack began one and onehalf months ago," is not conclusive of the fact as against persons not parties to the proceeding.

[5] ID. DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY TEST OF CAPACITY. It is not every symptom or indication of insanity which will render one incompetent to dispose of his property. If one is able to understand and carry in mind the nature and situation of his property, and his relations to his relatives and those around him, with clear remembrance as to those in whom and those things in which he has been mostly interested, and is capable of understanding the act he is doing and the relation in which he stands to the objects of

5. Capacity to make contract as affected by mental condition, note, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 174; to make deed, note, 19 L. R. A. 489.