ganized; an attempt to organize thereunder; and actual user of the corporate franchise." As we have seen, there is a general law pursuant to which the consolidation might be effected. There was an attempt to consolidate the two cities thereunder, the success of which, in accordance with the statutory provisions, was, notwithstanding appellant's claim of irregularities in the election held, recognized and declared by the officers primarily charged with the duty of determining the result, and, upon the asserted claim and assumption that they have fully complied with all requirements of law, the city of Sawtelle has as an incorporated city ceased its functions, which, in the exercise of the franchise, the city of Los Angeles, as to such territory and its inhabitants, has assumed governmental control as a part of said last-named city. The question involved is one of a purely political nature (People v. City of Los Angeles, 154 Cal. 220, [97 Pac. 311]), and not affecting the private rights of plaintiff, in which capacity he may not challenge the asserted right to exercise jurisdiction in the matter. If such a case can be maintained by a private citizen, it may be brought at any time within the statutory limitation and must necessarily lead to uncertainty and interminable confusion. Many cases have arisen in this state involving the validity of proceedings for the organization of protective, reclamation, and irrigation districts, wherein, upon the ground that such organizations were at least de facto corporations, it was declared that inquiry into the validity of their organization was restricted to quo warranto at the suit of the state and not subject to attack by private individuals. (Keech v. Joplin, 157 Cal. 1, [106 Pac. 222]; Jaques v. Board of Supervisors, 24 Cal. App. 381, [141 Pac. 404]; Reclamation District No. 765 v. McPhee, 13 Cal. App. 383, [109 Pac. 1106]; Williams v. Board of Supervisors, 65 Cal. 160, [3 Pac. 667].) In the case of People ex rel. Warren v. York, 247 Ill. 591, [93 N. E. 400], it is said, quoting from the syllabus: "The legality of proceedings by which additional territory is added to a municipality cannot be questioned, except by direct proceeding by quo warranto, and will not be determined upon a bill in equity, or by objection to a tax." Numerous cases may be cited to the same effect.

[1] Our conclusion is that, conceding, as claimed by appellant, illegal ballots were cast and counted at the elec42 Cal. App.-31

tion without which the consolidation would not have been effected, nevertheless, since it appears that the city of Los Angeles as to the annexed territory is a de facto corporation, any attack upon its exercise of the franchise must be by quo warranto proceedings at the instance of the state. The judgment is affirmed.

Conrey, P. J., and James J., concurred.

A petition to have the cause heard in the supreme court, after judgment in the district court of appeal, was denied by the supreme court on September 25, 1919.

All the Justices concurred.

[Civ. No. 2929. Second Appellate District, Division Two.-July 29, 1919.].

GEORGE W. BROWN, Appellant, v. E. E. RIVES et al., Respondents.

[1] NOTARY PUBLIC-FORGED DEED-USE OF ASSUMED NAME—ACKNOWLEDGMENT LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES-A notary public and the sureties on his official bond are not liable for damages for taking the acknowledgment of a person under an assumed name, such person having theretofore forged both the signatures of the owners of the property to a deed to himself under such assumed name and the acknowledgment of the notary thereto, where such person signed and acknowledged the deed in question under such assumed name as the grantor, and he actually appeared before and was introduced to the notary public as such person by another with whom the notary public was well acquainted, since, under such circumstances, the certificate of acknowledgment spoke the truth. A notary public and his bondsmen are in no sense insurers of title.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Pat. R. Parker, Judge Presiding. Affirmed.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

1. Proof of identity upon which officer certifying to an acknowledgment is justified in acting, note, 10 A. L. R. 871.

Goodwin & Morgrage for Appellant.

Bicksler, Smith & Parke, Walter F. Dunn and John P. Dunn for Respondents.

THOMAS, J.-This is an action against a notary public and his sureties for damages alleged to have resulted from the negligence of the notary.

The facts in regard to this case, as we get them from the record here, are as follows:

On May 26, 1916, Martin L. Kelsey and Anna B. Kelsey, his wife, were, and for many years prior thereto had been, and now are, the owners of lots 15, 16, and 17, in block 9, of Van Ness Square, in Los Angeles City, and such ownership was then shown in the proper records of Los Angeles County. Prior to said May 26, 1914, one Leonard C. Canfield conceived a felonious scheme to obtain money by forging the names of Kelsey and his wife, and the notarial certificate of their acknowledgments to a deed purporting to convey said property to a fictitious person as grantee, and placing such forged deed of record; and then, assuming the name of such fictitious grantee, to sell said property to such person as he might be able to victimize. In furtherance of this scheme said Canfield forged the names of Kelsey and his wife to a deed purporting to grant said property to a fictitious grantee designated as Helmer E. Rabild, and attached thereto a forged certificate of acknowledgment of the execution of said deed before W. B. Julian, a notary public of Los Angeles County. This forged deed was recorded in the recorder's office of Los Angeles County on May 27, 1914.

On or about June 10, 1914, said Canfield called plaintiff on the telephone and stated to plaintiff that the person speaking was Helmer E. Rabild, and offered to sell and convey said three lots to plaintiff for $4,750, subject to taxes for the current year. In the same conversation he stated that he would furnish certificates of title issued by the Title Insurance and Trust Company, showing title to said property vested in plaintiff, free from all encumbrances, except taxes and certain building restrictions. Plaintiff accepted this proposition over the telephone, and in the same conversation stated that he would instruct the Title Insurance and

Trust Company to pay $4,750 when it could issue its certificates that title to said property appeared from the records of Los Angeles County vested in plaintiff. In furtherance of said scheme Canfield prepared a deed of said property, in which the name of Helmer E. Rabild appeared as grantor and Geo. W. Brown as grantee, and prevailed upon the assistant cashier of a Monrovia bank to introduce him to defendant E. E. Rives as Helmer E. Rabild; and thereupon defendant Rives, without further evidence or knowledge that the person so introduced was in fact Helmer E. Rabild, attached to said deed a certificate signed by him as notary public of Los Angeles County, and impressed with his notarial seal, reciting that "On this twelfth day of June, 1912, before me, E. E. Rives, a notary public in and for said county, personally appeared Helmer E. Rabild, known to me to be the person whose name is subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged that he executed the same," and returned said deed, with the above certificate attached, to said Canfield. Canfield then delivered the deed to the Title Insurance and Trust Company, with instructions to record the same, and when it issued its certificates showing title to all of said property to be of record in plaintiff, subject to certain taxes, restrictions, and easements, to send its check, drawn in favor of Helmer E. Rabild, to postoffice box No. 615, Monrovia, California. The Title Insurance and Trust Company filed said deed for record with the county recorder of Los Angeles County, and it was recorded June 24, 1914. Upon the same day said Title Company issued its certificates of title that the official records of Los Angeles County showed title to each of said lots vested in George W. Brown on June 24, 1914, subject to said taxes, restrictions, and easements, and thereafter, but on the same day, issued its check in favor of Helmer E. Rabild; for $4,750, and sent the same by mail, addressed to Helmer E. Rabild, box No. 615, Monrovia, California. Said check was thereafter paid by the bank upon which it was drawn, and returned to said Title Company, indorsed "Helmer E. Ribald." Before said check was drawn by said Title Company, plaintiff had deposited with it $4,750, with instructions to pay said sum to Helmer E. Rabild when the records of the county of Los Angeles showed the title of each of said lots to be vested in George W. Brown, and it issued

its certificates of title to that effect; and the check drawn by said Title Company and mailed to Helmer E. Rabild, as above stated, represented the $4,750 delivered to it by plaintiff. Neither plaintiff nor the Title Company ever saw Canfield during the negotiations consummated by the pretended sale, and all communications with him were by telephone or by mail. The lots in question were of the reasonable value of two thousand five hundred dollars each.

When satisfied that the deed recorded May 27, 1914, was a forgery, plaintiff commenced this action to recover from the notary, Rives, and his bondsman, $4,750; resting his claim for damages upon the contention that the certificate of the notary attached to the deed of June 12, 1914, was false in fact, and its falsity the proximate cause of plaintiff's loss. The court found the facts to be substantially as above stated, but concluded therefrom that the certificate complained of was not the proximate cause of the loss, and entered judgment dismissing the action with costs to defendants. Plaintiff appeals from the judgment on the judgment-roll alone.

[1] The findings in this case are very clear and specific. Among other things, the court found as follows: "The court further finds . . . that at all of the times herein mentioned there existed no such person as Helmer E. Rabild. That the name Helmer E. Rabild was used and designed by the said Leonard C. Canfield to identify some fictitious person who did not exist, but under whose assumed personality he, the said Leonard C. Canfield, would conduct his negotiations with reference to the sale and transfer of this property to the plaintiff; and that such secret intention on the part of the said Canfield was not known to the defendant Rives. That Helmer E. Rabild was at all times herein mentioned the name assumed by and used by the said Leonard C. Canfield, and by him alone, and that at the time of the execution of the deed to the plaintiff herein, and the acknowledgment thereof before the defendant notary, E. E. Rives, Helmer E. Rabild, in so far as there was any Helmer E. Rabild, did, in the person of said Leonard C. Canfield, appear before the said notary and acknowledge the execution of the instrument as in the notarial certificate stated, and that the certificate of the said notary did truthfully so set forth the fact that Helmer E. Rabild had executed the said instrument." It therefore conclusively appears that the very