of whatsoever kind or nature sustained or incurred by reason of its executing such bonds and undertakings, which agreement appellant claims covered and included the bond so given by it for the release of the property of the Standard Lumber & Wrecking Company levied upon by writ of attachment issued in the action brought against it by the Pacific Lumber Company.

It is clear, we think, that the agreement sued upon has reference solely and alone to bonds executed by plaintiff at the request of the applicant therefor and named therein; and it is likewise clear that the applicant was the Standard Lumber & Wrecking Company, Inc., W. W. Wilcox, and Dan Johnston. The writing given by these parties was in the nature of a blanket agreement to indemnify plaintiff for losses sustained by reason of executing certain specific bonds, viz., those requested, not by the Standard Lumber & Wrecking Company, but by those designated in the agreement as constituting the applicant, the effect of which was that defendants Wilcox and Johnston incurred no liability to plaintiff under said agreement, unless it was made to appear that they joined with the Standard Lumber & Wrecking Company in a request for such bond. It is neither alleged, proved, nor claimed by plaintiff that either of these defendants ever requested it to issue the bond in the suit brought by the Pacific Lumber Company against the Standard Lumber & Wrecking Company, but that it was executed at the request of the latter company alone and without defendant's knowledge. Defendants' covenant was to indemnify plaintiff for loss sustained upon bonds executed upon their request. They did not request the issuance of the bond in question and knew nothing about it. Hence it is one not covered by the agreement to indemnify plaintiff and imposes no obligation upon defendants to answer for any loss resulting from its execution.

Our conclusion renders it unnecessary to discuss other alleged errors, since, if we are correct, they could in no event affect the determination of the case.

The judgment is affirmed.

Conrey, P. J., and James, J., concurred.

[Civ. No. 2346. Second Appellate District, Division One.-July 31, 1919.]

B. V. COLLINS, Respondent, v. JOHN ROBERTS COMPANY (a Corporation), Appellants.

[1] APPEAL FAILURE TO FILE BRIEF OR ORALLY ARGUE-Judgment.--Where the appellants file no points and authorities in support of their appeal and do not appear at the calling of the calendar to make oral argument, the judgment will be affirmed.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Curtis D. Wilbur, Judge. Affirmed.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Jones & Weller for Appellants.

Kemp, Mitchell & Silberberg for Respondent.

THE COURT.-In this case there was an appeal taken by the defendants from the judgment. A transcript was filed in this court in April, 1917. The appellants filed no points and authorities in support of their appeal and did not appear at the calling of the calendar to make oral argument. No cause is therefore shown why the judgment appealed from should be held erroneous.

The judgment is affirmed.

[Civ. No. 2908. First Appellate District, Division Two.-August 4, 1919.]

OTTO BURMESTER et al., Respondents, v. GEORGE P. McNEAR, as Executor, etc., et al., Appellants.

[1] PLEADING DEATH OF DEFENDANT-SUBSTITUTION OF REPRESENTATIVES-PRESENTATION OF CLAIM-SUFFICIENCY OF OBJECTION ΤΟ COMPLAINT. In an action against the executor and executrix of the last will and testament of a decedent substituted in lieu of said decedent, an objection to the sufficiency of the complaint in that it fails to allege a presentation of a claim, as provided by

section 1502 of the Code of Civil Procedure, must be sufficiently specific to call to the attention of the plaintiffs the precise point upon which such objection rests. A general objection "That no proper or any foundation has been laid either for the suit or the cause of action or the testimony or the evidence" is insufficient. [2] ID.-FAILURE TO OBJECT IN TRIAL COURT APPEAL-WAIVER.— Where proper objection to the insufficiency of such complaint was not made in the trial court, such objection may not be made for the first time upon appeal.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sonoma County. Emmet Seawell, Judge. Affirmed.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

F. A. Meyer for Appellants.

G. P. Hall and E. J. Dole for Respondents.

LANGDON, P. J.-This action was originally commenced against John W. Horn, defendants' testator. Plaintiffs sought to obtain a judgment for $1,646, the amount alleged to have been paid to Horn by them under a contract of purchase of real and personal property, the possession of which was later taken from plaintiffs in breach of their contract of purchase, and also for one thousand dollars damages suffered by them by reason of the breach of the said contract by Horn. Judgment was rendered by the superior court for the county of Sonoma against the plaintiffs herein, from which judgment an appeal was taken. Upon the appeal the judgment was reversed. In the meantime, the defendant Horn had died and the superior court, on February 18, 1918, made its order of substitution of parties defendant, ordering that the present defendants be substituted as executor and executrix, respectively, of the last will of J. W. Horn, deceased. Upon the retrial judgment was rendered for the plaintiff in the sum of $1,365.80.

[1] The defendant appeals, and presents but one question, namely: Does the amended complaint state a cause of action? The argument upon this point is that as the amended complaint contains no allegation that plaintiffs, or either of them, has filed a claim with the clerk or presented such a claim to the executors for allowance or re

jection, it does not meet the requirements of section 1502 of the Code of Civil Procedure, declaring that "no recovery shall be had in the action unless proof be made of such filing or presentation." One of the cases relied upon by appellant is the case of Falkner v. Hendy, 107 Cal. 49, [40 Pac. 21, 386], but that case expressly states that a judgment would not be void although the fact of presentation of the claim to the executor was neither alleged nor proven; that such judgment would merely be erroneous and would not be reversed on appeal unless the objection was first made in the trial court. To the same effect are the cases of Bank of Stockton v. Howland, 42 Cal. 129, 134; Drake v. Foster, 52 Cal. 225. In the case of Bank of Stockton v. Howland, supra, it is said that the purpose of the rule requiring objection to be made in the trial court is to give the claimant an opportunity of supplying the requisite pleading or proof, as the case may require.

The objection made by the appellant in the trial court, and which he relies upon now to meet this rule, was: "That no proper or any foundation has been laid either for the suit or the cause of action or the testimony or the evidence." While this broad general objection might include a number of specific objections, we think it was the duty of the defendants to have made their objection specific so as to call to the attention of the plaintiffs the precise point upon which they are now relying on appeal. As was said in the case of Martin v. Travers, 12 Cal. 243-245: "The party should have laid, as the authorities say, his finger on the point at the time." (Mott v. Smith, 16 Cal. 533, 555.) In the case of Cochran v. O'Keefe, 34 Cal. 554, 556, the court, in considering a similar objection that a proper foundation had not been laid for the introduction. of a deed in evidence, said that such an objection failed to specify the point upon which it rests; that had the point been specified when objection was made on the trial, plaintiffs might have entirely obviated the objection by preliminary or subsequent evidence.

So in the present case, if the objection had been specifically made so as to call the matter to the attention of the plaintiffs, presentation could have been made, because the action was brought within the time allowed for presentation of claims, and a supplemental complaint could have

42 Cal. App.-34

been filed alleging presentation, which has been held to be the proper method of procedure. (Falkner v. Hendy, supra.) [2] We are, therefore, of the opinion that proper objection was not made in the trial court, and under the authorities herein cited, such objection may not be made for the first time upon appeal.

The judgment is affirmed.

Brittain, J., and Haven, J., concurred.

[Civ. No. 1961. Third Appellate District.-August 4, 1919.] HARVEY J. SARTER, Appellant, v. SISKIYOU COUNTY, Respondent.

[1] PUBLIC OFFICERS COMPENSATION STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.Acts relating to the fees and compensation of public officers are to be strictly construed, and such officers are only entitled to what is clearly given them by law.

[2] ID.-RIGHT TO COMPENSATION STATUTORY-POWER TO INCREASE.— The right of a public officer to be compensated for his services as such is a statutory right or of statutory origin. A public officer, therefore, can receive for his services as such only such compensation as the legislative body competent under the constitution to prescribe the salaries or compensation of such officers shall or may fix, and when this is done, neither the courts, in any case, nor the board of supervisors, in the case of any county officer, has the power or right to increase the compensation so fixed.

[3] ID. INCREASE OF COMPENSATION DURING TERM OFFICERS PAID FEES-CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION APPLICABLE.-The constitutional provision that the compensation allowed by law to a county officer cannot be increased during the term for which he has been elected applies as well to those county officers whose compensation consists of fees as to those whose compensation consists of specified salaries.

[4] ID.-COMPENSATION OF COUNTY OFFICERS-AUTHORITY TO FIX.The legislature alone is authorized under the constitution to fix the compensation of county officers, and any attempted delegation of that power to boards of supervisors is wholly nugatory and of no force or effect.