construct, restore, and reconvey to the plaintiff the ditch mentioned in the amended complaint; that the plaintiff should release to the defendant all claims for possible damages; and, that if the defendant should fulfill the preceding terms of the stipulation, the action should be dismissed, otherwise that the plaintiff should not be bound by any of the stipulations, and might proceed to trial of the cause in the same manner as if the stipulation had never been made. Following the stipulation in the appellant's opening brief are numerous statements of fact referring to pages of the reporter's typewritten transcript. From the brief it appears there were supplemental pleadings of some sort, but from nothing contained in the brief can it be ascertained what the original, amended, or supplemental pleadings were. The statement is made that the court, without the introduction of any evidence and without any proceedings other than certain admissions of both parties in open court, proceeded to enter judgment. There is no statement in the brief concerning the admissions which were made, nor what the appellant's claims are in regard to them. The opening brief wholly fails to meet the requirements of section 953c of the Code of Civil Procedure and rule VIII of the supreme court (176 Pac. ix). Because of the failure of the appellant's opening brief to show those parts of the record upon which he relied, the argument presented in the brief is of academic interest only. The appellant failed to show error on the part of the trial court, without which showing the judgment must necessarily be affirmed. [1] "We are bound to assume, in the absence of satisfactory showing to the contrary, that the judgment of the trial court was correct." (Lutz v. Merchants' Nat. Bank of San Diego, 179 Cal. 401, [177 Pac. 158].) [2] The respondent rests on the failure of the appellant to comply with section 953c of the Code of Civil Procedure and rule VIII of the supreme court, and in his brief no argument is presented upon the merits of the cause. In the appellant's closing brief the claim is made that section 953c of the Code of Civil Procedure does not expressly require that the portions of the record referred to be incorporated in the opening brief, and, therefore, it is stated that the portions of the record on which the appellant relics are printed in the closing brief. The rules of the court provide for the appellant to file an opening brief to be answered by the respondent, and for one further brief to be filed by the appellant, the purpose of which is to enable the appellant to so answer new matter in the respondent's brief. If it were permissible for the appellant to disclose a part only of his case in his opening brief, and, after its insufficiency had been pointed out by the respondent, to set up his entire case in his closing brief, common fairness would require that the respondent be permitted to file another brief, which in turn would be replied to by the appellant, so that five or perhaps more briefs would be filed instead of the necessary three. The law does not permit this piecemeal presentation of the appellant's case. It is a familiar rule that appellate courts ordinarily will not consider new points. made in the appellant's closing brief. (Wong Ah Sure v. Ty Fook, 37 Cal. App. 465, [174 Pac. 64, 65].) The same reasoning applies to a new record presented in the closing brief. It is to inform the respondent quite as much as it is to inform the court that the statute requires the appellant in his opening brief to set up the parts of the record upon which he relies. "The purpose of the statute requiring the matters relied upon to be printed in the brief is not only for the benefit of the appellate court, but also for the benefit of the respondent." (Pasadena Realty Co. v. Clune, 34 Cal. App. 33, 34, [166 Pac. 1025, 1026].) The matters set forth in the closing brief are too incomplete to inform the court with regard to the relationship of the findings and judgment to the pleadings and what in the appellant's brief are designated as "minor stipulations." "Numerous references are made to the pages of the transcript filed, but it has been repeatedly held that the appellate courts will not examine the transcript documents in order to determine whether there is merit in the contentions made by the appellant. Many opinions of this court and the supreme court reiterate the rule. A collection of the cases so holding will be found grouped in the case of Barker Bros. v. Joos et al., 36 Cal. App. 311, [171 Pac. 1085]. Not having properly before us sufficient of the record to illustrate the various contentions made on behalf of the appellant, we are compelled to hold that no (Borba v. De error is shown as against the judgment. Langdon, P. J., and Brittain, J., concurred. [Civ. No. 2853. Second Appellate District, Division One.-July 3, 1919.] SCHULTHEISS BROS. COMPANY, Plaintiff and Respondent; STEINBERG, RICHARDSON & FISHER COMPANY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. E. P. HUNZIKER et al., Defendants; WILL J. THAYER et al., Defendants, Appellants and Respondents. [1] APPEAL-ALTERNATIVE METHOD INSUFFICIENT BRIEFS.-Where an appeal is taken under the alternative method, the appellate court will not refer to any portions of the record which are merely indicated as by page of the transcript. [2] MECHANICS' LIENS FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH LAW-LIABILITY OF OWNER.-The owner of a building who has failed to comply with the provisions of the mechanic's lien law may be required to respond to a lien claim which, when added to the other payments made, will exceed the total contract price. [3] ID. NOTICE OF LIEN-TERMS OF PAYMENT VARIANCE.-A notice of lien of a materialman stating "that payment shall be made on or before thirty days from deliveries" is insufficient where the statement in the proposal which resulted in the contract was that the materials were "subject to two per cent cash discount, payments to be made on or before the 10th of the month following deliveries." APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County. W. A. Sloane, Judge. Affirmed. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. Watt, Thornton & Watt for Plaintiff and Respondent. Hoff & Chatterson for Plaintiff and Appellant. Will J. Thayer, in pro. per., for Defendants, Appellants and Respondents. JAMES, J.-Several actions brought to enforce liens for labor and material furnished in the erection of a building in the city of San Diego, of which defendant Thayer was the owner, were consolidated and tried together. Certain of the lien claims were allowed and judgment entered thereon and certain of them were disallowed. Defendant Thayer, the owner of the building, appealed from the judgment entered in favor of Schultheiss Bros. Company. Other appeals were taken by various of the lien claimants who were denied relief, as well as by the defendant Bonding & Surety Company, but dismissals were made by several of the appellants and the only remaining appeals appear to be those of Steinberg, Richardson & Fisher Company, and Thayer, the owner. No argument was presented on behalf of or against Steinberg, and there is, therefore, nothing before the court from which it can be determined that the judgment as to him was in any wise erroneous. [1] Attention may be now called to the fact that the appeal is under the alternative method, which requires the parties to print in their briefs such portions of the record as they desire to call to the attention of the court. In examining the matter the court will not, therefore, refer to any portions of the record which are merely indicated as by page of the transcript. [2] We will first consider the appeal of the owner Thayer. He states, as evidently was the fact, that as to the judgment in favor of Schultheiss Bros. Company, the court allowed recovery for an amount which, added to other payments made, exceeded the total contract price. He insists that by so doing the constitutional guaranty against the impairment of the obligation of contract was violated. In elaboration of this contention he argues that our supreme court, prior to the time of the making of this contract, had held that the legislature could not legally require the owner of a building to respond to a lien claim in an amount exceeding the contract price. He concedes that by comparatively recent decision the supreme court has held that an owner may be required to so respond without there being violated any constitutional right, but insists that the contract was made while the law was as established by the former decisions, and that such adjudications became a part of the law of the state under which the rights of such a contracting owner should be measured. He admits that while there was a written contract and a bond given, neither the contract nor bond was filed with the county recorder, as section 1183 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires. The adverse decision to which he refers is that of Roystone Co. v. Darling, 171 Cal. 526, [154 Pac. 15]. At the time of the rendering of that decision the lien law was, in comparative particulars, as it was at the time of the making of the contract by the owner here. In Roystone Co. v. Darling, Mr. Justice Shaw makes a very careful review of all of the former decisions, and his determination seems to be that those decisions are not inconsistent with the holding finally announced at the conclusion of the Roystone appeal. He points out that while it had been said that the legislature could not directly provide that a lien claimant could recover from an owner an amount in excess of the original contract price, that those decisions in nowise denied to the legislature the right to regulate the making of a contract as to its form, as to its being filed, and as to security by bond being required to be taken and filed that such regulations were reasonable, and that as a penalty for their nonobservance the owner might be required to suffer judgment to be had against him for an amount exceeding the total sum which he had agreed to pay to the original contractor. We think the case last referred to is determinative of the question presented on the appeal of Thayer, and that the judgment of Schultheiss Bros. Company should be affirmed. [3] The appeal of Richardson & Fisher Company presents a question as to the sufficiency of the notice of lien. which was filed by the claimant. The superior court held that the notice was insufficient in that there was a variance between the contract of the claimant as made with the original contractor and the statement of the terms of that contract as contained in the notice of lien; this particularly as to the time and terms of payment. The notice of lien stated, referring to the matter of payment, "that payment shall be made on or before thirty days from deliveries." The statement in the proposal which resulted in the contract was that the materials were "subject to two per cent cash discount, payments to be made on or before the 10th of the month following deliveries." Under the proposal or |