in other States. Accordingly, it is provided that, "until the qualification of the electors of members of the House of Representatives becomes uniform throughout the Commonwealth, only one half the electors voting for and against the proposed law shall be counted in any State, in which adult suffrage prevails.'

Section 128, so far as we have considered it, provides facilities for amendment not to be found in any other federal constitution. But this facility has to be paid for by the reservation of certain matters, for which an additional consent is required. By Article V. of the Constitution of the United States, "no State, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate." As in the amendment of the Commonwealth Constitution, the States have conceded more to the national principle than have the States in America, the Constitution reserves more matters for the special approval of the electors of the State concerned. It provides, that "no alteration diminishing the proportionate representation of any State in either House of The Parliament, or the minimum number of representatives of a State in the House of Representatives, or increasing, diminishing, or otherwise altering the limits of the State, or in any manner affecting the provisions of the Constitution in relation thereto, shall become law, unless the majority of the electors voting in that State approve the proposed law."

There is no definition of an "alteration of the Constitution," but it is reasonable to conclude, that the term "alteration" was used in preference to the more familiar "amendment," in order to denote the widest power of change, including the unlimited power of addition to the instrument. Broadly, the powers of the Commonwealth, as organized behind the Parliament, may be compared with the powers of constitutional amendment possessed by the representative legislatures of the colonies. All constitutional alteration, like all ordinary legislation, must be "for the Commonwealth," and no alteration of the Constitution may be repugnant to any Imperial Act in operation in

the Commonwealth, unless, expressly, or by implication, power over such Act has been given by the Imperial Parliament.

One Imperial Act, operating in the Commonwealth, over which the Commonwealth has no power, is the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act itself, from the beginning to the introductory words of section ix.: “The Constitution of the Commonwealth shall be as follows." Some of these sections are spent, but others remain in force. The Commonwealth is established in virtue of this part of the Act, and it would appear to be dissoluble only by Imperial Act-so far as the preamble may throw light on the Act, it supports this view. The name of the Commonwealth, and the operation of the Constitution, and the laws of the Commonwealth throughout the Commonwealth, are also fixed. "States" and "Original States" are defined, and in as much as the Act speaks of union in a "Federal Commonwealth," some doubt may be entertained, whether anything may be done which destroys the federal character. But the descriptive "Federal Commonwealth" is too vague, it is submitted, to be available as a limitation of power; and, indeed, the Constitution itself, by section 111 and chapter vi., provides means whereby the dual system may be virtually extinguished, by dealings between the Parliament and all the States, without any resort to the provisions of section 128.

No part of "The Constitution" is withdrawn from the power of the Commonwealth. Indeed, there is no doubt, that the whole Constitution could be repealed under section 128, and that without any provision being made to substitute anything for it. A few years ago, the Home Rule proposals of Mr. Gladstone gave great interest to the effect of surrenders of power by a sovereign body. It seems an irresistible conclusion, that, as Professor Dicey (Law of the Constitution, 5th edition, p. 65) says, "The impossibility

1 See article by Sir William Anson and Professor Dicey in the Law Quarterly Review, vol. 2, and the speeches of Sir Henry James and Mr. James Bryce, Hansard's Debates, vol. 305.

of placing a limit on the exercise of sovereignty does not in any way prohibit, either logically, or in matter of fact, the abdication of sovereignty."

The special provision, protecting the representation and the territory of the States, presents some difficulties. Might not the clause itself be repealed by the ordinary process of constitutional alteration, thus leaving the road open for a further alteration, diminishing the representation or the territory? To prevent such a course, from which-if we might adopt the principles applicable to the Articles of Companies and other Associations-the character of the Constitution, as a compact, would not protect it, are added the words," or in any other manner affecting the provisions of the Constitution relating thereto," the effect of which appears to be to put the clause itself under the protection, which is afforded by requiring the assent of the electors of all the States affected.

It is to be observed, that the last clause of section 128 relates only to alterations of the Constitution. It is obvious, that the "proportionate representation" of States, in one sense of the term, will be affected by the operation of the Constitution itself. Thus, every admission of a new State with representatives in the Parliament diminishes the proportion of the whole numbers of members returned by any particular State to Senate and House. Again, the natural increase of population will serve to increase the representation of some States in the House, and diminish that of others; so that the "proportionate representation" of a State, whether we regard that term as describing a relation to the whole number, or a relation to the other States, will be affected. But such a result is in accordance with the Constitution, and it is only the mode by which this adjustment is effected (section 24), which is protected by the last clause of section 128.

Similar observations apply to the provisions concerning the limits of States. We have seen, that the Constitution confers several powers of affecting the States' limits. These require the assent, or the action, of the State Parliament,

and, in one case, the Electors of the State (section 123); and there was some apprehension, that the integrity of States territory might be invaded by an alteration of the Constitution repealing the requirement of the consent of the State. Accordingly, it is provided, that any such alteration of the Constitution is valid, only with the consent of the State to be affected.

CHAPTER XXI.

CONCLUSION.

THE Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia contains few evidences of that experimentalism, for which the politics of the Colonies have become famous. Far from disdaining precedent, the founders of the Constitution availed themselves to the full of the opportunities, offered by modern literature, for a comparison of existing Constitutions; and the Constitutions throughout bear the impress of this study. The absence of any obvious cause imperatively calling for immediate union, such as has in every other instance of federal union determined action, allowed her a singular freedom of choice in working from her models.

The natural model for the union of a group of British Colonies would have been the Dominion of Canada, which, in its preamble, recites the desire of the Provinces to be united into one Dominion "with a Constitution similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom." But the form of Canadian union was determined by special circumstances, both internal and external, very different from any which exist in regard to Australia. In the first place the fundamental character of the Dominion-the possession of the residuary power by the Dominion Legislature, and the subordination of the Provinces to the Dominion Government was the natural outcome of the existing consolidation of the Provinces of Upper and Lower Canada. Just in