Ferry, and from that point report. As, however, up to the 12th of April it had failed to reach Harper's Ferry, I telegraphed a request that it be ordered to move by the most direct and shortest road to Moorefield, this arrangement suiting best my plans as up to the time developed. Brigadier-General Rosecrans, who in the mean time had been placed in temporary command to conduct the division, was accordingly instructed to the above effect. Next to the want of troops within my department in numbers sufficient or available for extended operations had been, as it continued to be, the absolute and pressing need of transportation. As early as the beginning of April no less than five batteries in the field were found to be without horses, and the case represented to the War Department. From lack of horses also to get forward guns at least one opportunity had been lost in the Cheat Mountain District to pursue and capture a retreating rebel force. The Sixth Ohio Cavalry, an excellent regiment, eager for service, was kept unmounted, and by consequence inactive, for the sole reason that animals could not be obtained to supply it. Requisitions reported made by my predecessor in command as early as February for cavalry and artillery horses, mules, wagons, &c., had not been met. Requisitions made direct by myself, under special permission, lingered in unknown channels, and that which was asked for was but partially obtained. My earnest and repeated requests for authority to order the purchase of animals needed without delay and in the open market were not acceded to. It was replied that the mode of supply, through requisitions in the ordinary form, was "sufficient for all purposes, and the only mode consistent with a proper regard for public expenditure." Delays suffered were certainly remarkable, inasmuch as the Secretary of War constantly and kindly assured me that transportation had been or would be speedily ordered through the proper department. The frequent and earnest dispatches of General Rosecrans also showed that the troops ordered to re enforce my department were even worse off than my own, and difficulties in the way of rapid and efficient operations, at a distance from main points of supply, were increased instead of being diminished. Over forty horses were demanded by General Rosecrans to get the batteries of the Blenker division out of Martinsburg. Thirty-six ambulances and teams were also called for. Forage was scarce, and animals already on hand were reported "starving." In addition, it appeared, as late as April 19, that so illy provided in other respects were the coming re-enforcements that thirty-eight days had been passed by them without tents or other shelter, and this during the inclemencies of a spring seldom paralleled for severity in the history of the Virginia Valley. To obviate a delay in payments and an issue of clothing expected to be made I directed the troops as fast as cared for to be sent forward by regiments or other sufficient bodies to Moorefield. After much correspondence I had begun to think the difficulties of the Blenker division at length removed, and was looking for their immediate appearance in the department, when finally I was informed that the men were too badly in want of shoes to march. With things at this ebb, a dispatch from the Secretary of War, bearing date of April 21, stated the desire of the President to know at what time I purposed moving against Knoxville and by what route.* In reply I had the honor to submit for consideration, through my chief of staff, dispatched to Washington for the purpose, the two separate plans which are set out in the following letter: *See "Correspondence, etc.," Part III, p. 96. HEADQUARTERS MOUNTAIN Department, To His Excellency ABRAHAM LINCOLN, President of the United States : SIR: In answer to a telegram from the Secretary of War, desiring me to submit to the President my proposed plan of operations for the occupation of Knoxville, I beg leave to state that my first intention was, after guarding the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and the loyal inhabitants of the department with a force of about 10,000, to transport 25,000 men by railroad and the Ohio to Maysville, Covington, and Louisville, Ky.; thence, partly by rail and partly by turnpike, to Nicholasville, and from that point march directly upon Knoxville, turning the enemy's position at Cumberland Gap. The difficulties, however, in the way of obtaining the requisite number of troops have led to a change of my plan, which is as follows: The first base of operations being the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, the division of General Blenker, which, from the best information I can obtain, numbers about 9,000 men, will take position at Moorefield. At this point or at Franklin it will unite with the troops now under command of General Schenck, numbering about 3,000. With these, acting in conjunction with General Banks, I propose to move up the valley of Virginia by a course which you will see on the accompanying map, over roads which are as dry and as good at all seasons of the year as any in Virginia, and through a country where forage is easily obtained. At Monterey I shall be joined by the troops under General Milroy, numbering 3,500 effective men, and can then strike the railroad at or near Salem, while General Cox with his 7,000 men takes possession of Newbern, or can first effect a junction with General Cox, and seize the railroad with a force thus increased to about 22,000. The base of operations will then be changed to Gauley. To this place, by the Ohio and Kanawha Rivers, abundant supplies for the army can be transported with the means now on hand and being prepared. Having thus destroyed the connection between Knoxville and the army in Eastern Virginia, and perhaps seized some rolling stock, we can advance rapidly along the railroad toward Knoxville, turning the position a: Cumberland Gap. The forces now under General Kelley and the Virginia troops will be left as we proceed to guard the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and to protect the loyal inhabitants of the State from guerrillas. The latter is to be effected by the establishment of a few posts strongly held, from which sudden and frequent attacks can be made upon any organizations existing or forming in the department. Knoxville taken, a third base of operations can be made upon Nicholasville, from which place supplies can be easily obtained and transported over level and good roads. The army will thus be in a position to co-operate in any way in the general plan of operations for the prosecution of the war. The original plan above mentioned possesses the advantages of rapidity in execution, the throwing us forward immediately into the heart of the enemy's country, the striking of the enemy's railroad in the first instance at the most important point, and a base of operations in a friendly country, through which provisions can be drawn with comparative safety. The second has been suggested only because it enables us to collect the troops now scattered throughout the department, and thus increase the small force sent. Respectfully, J. C. FREMONT, Major-General, Commanding. The proposed plan of operations up the valley of Virginia was approved by the President and Secretary of War, but, as subsequently indicated in telegrams from the War Department, it was adopted in view of the ultimate closing in of my columns toward Richmond, rather than Knoxville.* On the 3d of May I moved with my staff to New Creek, on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, my proposed depot of main supply for operations in the field. On the 4th of May I was apprised by the Secretary of War of the evacuation of Yorktown by the rebel forces. Foreseeing by this event and the release of so large a body in the east that the enemy would be enabled to augment westwardly his force along my front, I judged it desirable to get forward and concentrate at an early moment my strongest available supports. Leaving New Copy of Frémont's letter and of the instructions given him were furnished to McDowell by the Secretary of War, under date of April 25, 1862. Creek on the 5th, and taking with me upon the route the Sixtieth Ohio, a portion of the Eighth Virginia, a company of Indiana cavalry, and a body of men sent forward with baggage from Blenker's division, I proceeded toward Petersburg, arriving on the evening of the 7th. General Schenck, who had been ordered early in April to advance from Romney and Moorefield, to operate on the road leading by Elkhorn to Franklin, in connection with movements with General Banks up the Shenandoah Valley, was already well in advance. Overcoming many obstacles in the form of swollen streams and difficult roads, he had by the 6th of May reached Franklin. Farther to the front, and occupying McDowell, a small village about 12 miles east from Monterey, was General Milroy. General Cox, in the district of the Kanawha also, under orders previously given, was moving in force in the direction of Lewisburg and Peterstown. The command of General Kelley, posted to guard the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, as well as to watch and punish guerrillas, was necessarily left in rear. A small portion of his force, however, from the Potomac Home Brigade subsequently reported to me at Petersburg, under Lieutenant-Colonel Downey. The Blenker division, though ordered on the ist of April, had not so much as entered within the limits of my department until the 4th or 5th of May. Taking into view their ill-provided condition, as reported and set forth in the foregoing, their delay upon the route was less a matter of surprise with myself than had been expressed to me in dispatches from the War Department. Upon the 7th the brigade of General Stahel being reported at Romney and still in need of shoes, a supply was ordered from New Creek. The issue was made while the men were upon the road, companies halting for the moment to receive what could be spared them. On the 9th of May the advance of General Blenker's division joined me at my camp near Petersburg, and by the 11th his whole command had arrived. The division was composed of three brigades, commanded respectively by Generals Stahel and Bohlen and Colonel Steinwehr. Assuming the data as then sent in, General Blenker stated his effective force at over 8,000. Subsequent investigation placed the number of men and officers actually present and fit for duty at considerably below 7,000. The condition of the men, as exhibited upon review, was not such as could have been desired. They were worn and exhausted by hardships scarcely credible, and in spite of efforts by myself and others to supply their wants, a large proportion were without articles of first necessity for service in the field. Of shoes, blankets, and overcoats there was especially great need. Wagon and artillery teams, brought forward by the several batteries and regiments, were found on inspection to be very much jaded and weak from the long march and want of forage. The horses of a portion of the cavalry were so nearly starved and broken down as to be well-nigh useless. The number of wagons was much be low the standard for supply on any lengthened route. By report of my medical director, afterward sent in, but about one-fifth of the necessary ambulances had been brought along. One regiment had none. In the important matter of arms there was great deficiency, Belgian or Austrian muskets of old and indifferent patterns being carried by many of the regiments. Having fortunately at hand a superior lot of Enfield rifles, I was enabled to rearm the corps most needing them. Ammunition was also supplied as far as resources would then permit. A pontoon train having been previously ordered from Pittsburgh upon my personal responsibility, though the Government afterward sanctioned the contract, and being already well upon its way to Petersburg, it was of less moment that none was found attached to my re-enforcing column. Restrictions upon my chief quartermaster at Wheeling having been at this time in a technical form removed, it was reported in encouragement that team and cavalry horses were coming freely in. These, together with wagons, harness, and other equipage, would be promptly forwarded. The Sixth Ohio Cavalry, having now the opportunity, procured their mount, joining by companies according as they were furnished and equipped. A battery of mountain howitzers for one of the companies heretofore alluded to as specially authorized had also arrived at New Creek. Being brought forward as packed, with carriages, implements, harness, &c., they were, on the last night of my stay at Petersburg, mounted and made ready for the field. With a view to future service a brigade of light troops was made up at Petersburg, consisting of the Sixtieth Ohio, Colonel Trimble, and the Eighth Virginia, under Major Oley. Colonel Cluseret, of my staff, a French officer of experience, and especially so in the tactics of skirmishers, was assigned to the command. In the mean time General Banks had been withdrawn from his advanced position near Staunton, and my left became dangerously exposed. Seeing his advantage, the enemy was not slow to profit by it. Turning promptly to the west, and uniting with his own the forces of Johnson and Ewell, the rebel leader Jackson, upon the 7th of May, attacked the outposts of General Milroy. The simultaneousness of his onset indeed, with the retirement of Banks, argues strongly that, by whatever means obtained, the rebel general had early information of the projected movement. On the 8th of May, with an aggregate of upward of 14,000 men and thirty pieces of artillery, Jackson advanced upon the main body of General Milroy's force at McDowell. Pushing forward in a march of 34 miles in twenty-four hours General Schenck arrived from Franklin in time to unite with and support General Milroy. An obstinate engagement took place. Official reports of the action were at the time sent in by me to the War Department. Under the leadership of their gallant commander the men of Milroy's brigade repeatedly attacked and charged a greatly superior force, exhibiting a courage and tenacity worthy the highest praise. The Ohio troops behaved with equal gallantry and suffered severely. After several hours of fighting, however, our troops, outnumbered at every point, reluctantly yielded portions of the field to the odds flowing in against them. The enemy's loss was over 40 killed and between 200 and 300 wounded. Our loss was 31 killed and missing and 217 wounded. Finding his position at McDowell untenable, and looking to the chances of a night attack, General Schenck, now in command, decided to withdraw toward Franklin. The retrograde was executed with skill and address, and bringing safely off his trains, artillery, and wounded, General Schenck re-entered the above-named town on the 10th of May. Here, uisposing his troops to guard against farther advance of the enemy, he awaited the approach of re-enforcements from Petersburg. Less than twenty-four hours' rest had been given to portions of the command arriving with General Blenker, but deeming the situation of increased importance I determined to move at once to the relief of General Schenck. I was unable to carry forward with me necessary supplies, owing to the still entirely inadequate transportation, but was obliged to rely upon renewed efforts at the rear to get forward in time whatever should be most needed to sustain my troops. At 4 o'clock on the morning of the 12th my advance had forded the Shenandoah at Petersburg, and on the forenoon of the 14th, after a camp of one night upon the route, I reached Franklin. Preferring to avoid any immediate encounter with my force as concentrated, Jackson, leaving temporarily a thin curtain of his people to disguise the movement, began an early retreat. By sundown of the 15th he had disappeared in a southeasterly direction from my front, taking the road toward the Shenandoah Mountain. Although hitherto crippled for want of transportation, and needing more than ever supplies of every description, I had reason to expect that with economy in the camp as well as just effort on the part of agencies elsewhere deficiencies would yet be made good. Accordingly for the ten days next following upon my arrival at Franklin I addressed myself to the task of getting into order and condition my troops, as well as to details of the movements projected against Knoxville and the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad. While thus occupied I received from the Secretary of War the following urgent dispatch, which made me still more deeply regret the embarrassments of my situation: Major-General FREMONT, Franklin : WASHINGTON, May 16, 1862. The President desires to know whether you design to move on to the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad, and break it between Newbern and Salem, according to the plan you proposed and he approved; and also whether, having reached and broken that road, you cannot move forward rapidly upon Richmond by that route, and by what time you can reach the railroad, and how long it will take you from there to reach Richmond. Please answer immediately.* EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War. In the mean time the campaign was being well carried forward. In execution of the plan upon my right the operations of General Cox were resulting in brilliant success. Moving forward as directed, with a view to reach and sever the railroad, his forces were attacked at Lewisburg, May 23, by a body of the enemy over 3,000 strong, under the rebel leader Heth. After an engagement of several hours the enemy were routed and fled in disorder from the field. Four pieces of artillery were captured by General Cox's troops, 200 stand of small-arms, and over 100 prisoners. Our loss was 10 killed and about 40 wounded. In this brilliant affair the conduct of Colonel Crook's brigade, bearing the brunt of the attack, cannot be too highly praised. The rebel loss in killed and wounded in the action was also severe. But events were now taking place in another direction which had the effect to terminate suddenly my proposed campaign and divert my column intended for Knoxville upon a line of march entirely new. The rebel General Jackson, quitting my front and turning abruptly to the north into the Shenandoah Valley, had, with his customary impetuosity, attacked General Banks at Front Royal, pressing him backward toward Strasburg and Winchester, and threatening the whole valley of the Potomac. With the intelligence of these events dispatched to me under date of May 24 came also an order from the President directing me to break camp and march against Jackson at Harrisonburg. As stated in the order, the objects of the movements were, first to relieve General Banks, secondly to cut off and capture Jackson and his force in the valley of the Shenandoah. It was the seventh or eighth day of a * see i remont to damon, same date, in "Correspondence, etc.," Part III, p. 197. |