therefore, need to be mobile and consist largely of cavalry; engineers are also useful for demolitions; advancing troops may need rear guards in hostile territory; these march behind the trains. See ADVANCE GUARDS.

REARHORSE. See MANTIS.

REARICK, Peter Anton, American naval officer: b. Maryland, 12 Nov. 1838; d. Washington, D. C., 9 Feb. 1901. He entered the navy in 1860, was appointed third assistant engineer and served through the Civil War with promotion, becoming first assistant engineer in 1864. After the war he was on duty with the Pacific squadron on the north and south Atlantic, on European and Asiatic stations, at various navy yards and as a member of the steel inspection board. In 1874 he was made chief engineer and served in that capacity until 1900, when he was retired with rank of rearadmiral.

REASONING, or INFERENCE, is the mental process in which we advance from some known fact or principle to the truth of some other fact which is different from the starting-point. The basis for the transition is always found in the knowledge from which we set out. This is taken or assumed to be real, and in it is found the ground and justification for the advance to something else. The differentia of reasoning thus appears to be mediation; when we reason we infer that something is true because something else is true. Knowledge derived from reasoning may, therefore, be termed mediate, as opposed to the immediate knowledge obtained from sense perception and memory. The question at once arises how any mental content can justify an advance to something different from itself? How are we ever warranted in passing from the known to the unknown? This is not merely the question that Mill raised as to whether all syllogistic reasoning — all advance from premises to conclusion-was not a petitio principii, but it concerns all reasoning, inductive and deductive alike. The dilemma is that if the result is not contained in the startingpoint the advance does not seem to be justified; if it is already present, the reasoning shows nothing new. The view of Leibnitz was that all reasoning is analysis, a drawing out and fuller explication of the original datum of the mind. Kant pointed out that thinking involves also synthesis, new constructions and additions to the material from which it starts, and he takes as the fundamental problem of his 'Critique of Pure Reason' the question how such synthetic judgments are possible. His answer is essentially identical with that which Aristotle gave, namely, that the mind or reason (νούς)

itself enters into the process as a premise or, in other words, that it is through the creative activity of the mind that the new truth is reached. Whether or not one can connect one fact with another in a logical way depends upon one's intellectual ability to discover points of essential resemblance or identity between facts. The good reasoner is he who can look beneath the surface and detect identities that are not at once obvious, as Newton, for example, did when he reasoned from the fall of the apple to the movements of the heavenly bodies. Reasoning, then, may be de

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fined as the process of discovering essential resemblances or points of identity between things.

It follows from what has been said that reasoning is not a process or function of mind that can go on apart from experience. The thinkers of the modern period down almost to the end of the 18th century continued to believe that reason was a kind of special organ or faculty that could yield truth of the highest order of certainty quite apart from ordinary experience. It was Kant who first clearly and incontestably showed the impossibility of deriving knowledge from reason taken in abstraction from ordinary sense experience. Kant, however, uses the term "Understanding" (Verstand) for the thinking faculties as employed in interpreting experience, and reserves the name "Reason" (Vernunft) for the vain and illusory attempt of thought to operate in independence of any given material of experience. Apart from this terminology, however, which has not been generally followed, the result of Kant's teaching was to exhibit the close and essential connection that exists between thinking and sense-perception: on the one hand, thought is empty apart from the material of sense-perception, and, on the other, what we call ordinary perceptive experience is constantly interwoven with more or less explicit processes of reasoning. Reasoning does not go on in a vacuum, nor is it a separate and distinct function of mind that in some mysterious way spins truth out of itself. But reason is on one side a universal function of receptivity; it receives its material from every channel of experience, and is itself just the unifying, co-ordinating and systematizing life of experience. Deduction and induction are often spoken of as if they were distinct species of reasoning. Reasoning, however, is always one and the same process. It consists, as we have seen, in connecting parts of experience by the discovery of some identical element in them. This identity, as present in various particulars, we may speak of as a universal, or general, principle, and, therefore, say that when we reason we unite particulars through a general law or principle. Now, the difference between deduction and induction is a difference in the starting-point and in the direction in which we proceed. If we are already in possession of the general law, and set out to apply it to particular cases, we are using deduction. If, however, our starting-point is the particular instances, then we reason inductively to discover the universal law of connection. In both cases the structure of the completed inference is the same, and consists in the connection of particulars, in virtue of our insight into the universal law or principle expressed in them.

In this reference to a universal principle, we have also that which distinguishes reasoning from the transition from idea to idea of the associative process. In a large part of the conscious life that usually is described as thinking, one idea by its very presence seems to call up another, without the apprehension of any universal or essential law of connection. But this is mere drifting on the part of the mind. In reasoning, the mind is fully awake; it sets a definite purpose before it, and proceeds by active attention and analysis to discover essential and necessary points of connection. It thus uses association for its own purposes; so that if

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we define reasoning as a process of association, we must add that it is association guided and controlled at every step by the purposes of thought itself. How conscious and explicit must this direction be before we can call the process reasoning? Can animals properly be said to reason? These questions do not admit of any off-hand answer. The conscious direction of the mind, the clearness with which it apprehends the universal in the particular, is a matter of degree. We may say that some direction on the part of the mind there must be, as well as some apprehension of the terms as universal, if reasoning is to occur, without attempting to determine just when these conditions are fulfilled in any individual mind or in any species. What we call conscious reasoning is doubtless continuous with associative and instinctive mental processes that seem entirely mechanical and irrational, and the connection between the two extremes may be mediated by actually observable processes. This continuity, however, gives no justification for refusing to regard the differences as important, or for explaining either extreme of the process in terms of the other. See DEDUCTION; INDUCTION; LOGIC.

Consult Bosanquet, Logic' (Vol. II, London 1888); James, The Principles of Psychology (Chap. xxii, New York 1890); Creighton, 'An Introductory Logic) (3rd edition, Part III, New York 1908); Stout, Analytic Psychology (London 1896); Baldwin, 'On Selective Thinking (in Psychol. Review, Vol. V 1898); see also the bibliography under LOGIC.

J. E. CREIGHTON, Professor of Logic and Metaphysics, Cornell University.

He

RÉAUMUR, rã-ō-mür, René Antoine Ferchault de, French physicist: b. La Rochelle, 28 Feb. 1683; d. La Bermondiere, Me., 17 Oct. 1757. He studied under the Jesuits at Poitiers, and afterward at Bourges, and went to Paris in 1703. His relative, the president, Hénault, introduced him to the savants of the metropolis, and in 1708 he was chosen a member of the Academy of Sciences, to which he had presented some memoirs on geometry. For nearly 50 years he continued to be one of its most active members, his labors embracing the arts, natural philosophy and natural history. was appointed to assist in the 'Description des Divers Arts et Métiers,' published by the Academy, and in executing his part of the undertaking pointed out the way to various improvements by the application of the principles of physics and natural history. He made important observations on the formation of pearls and discovered that the "turquoises" of Languedoc consisted of the fossil teeth of extinct animals; but among his most useful researches must be reckoned those of which he gave an account in his Traité sur l'Art de Convertir le Fer en Acier, et d'Adoucir le Fer Fondu' (1722), in which he first made known in France the process of manufacturing steel. He received therefor a pension of 12,000 livres (about $2,400). As a natural philosopher he is principally celebrated for the invention of an improved thermometer, which he made known in 1731. (See THERMOMETER). The fabrication of porcelain also occupied much of his attention, and led him to the discovery of a kind of enamel, called the porcelain of Réaumur, in

1739. His 'Mémoires pour Servir à l'Histoire des Insects' (1734-49) places him in the first rank of modern naturalists. In it he demonstrated, among various things, the correctness of Peysonnel's assumption that corals are not plants, but animals. He bequeathed his priceless collections of minerals, plants and manuscripts to the Academy of Sciences.

REAVIS, James Bradly, American lawyer and jurist: b. Boone County, Mo., 1848. He entered Kentucky University, but did not complete the course, was admitted to the bar in Hannibal, Mo., in 1872, and for two years was editor of the Monroe City Appeal. In 1874 he removed to the West, and in 1880 settled in Washington Territory, where he established a law practice. He was a member of the upper house of the Territorial council in 1888 and a regent of the Territorial University, until Washington became a State. In 1889 he was an unsuccessful candidate for supreme judge, and from 1896 to 1902 was chief justice of the Washington Supreme Court.

REBAPTIZERS, those who taught that the repetition of baptism was under certain circumstances imperative. The term is specifically used of the Baptists who enforce rebaptism in the case of all who have not been baptized by immersion. Views with regard to rebaptism have been varied. Many early Christians declared it unnecessary even for one who had been baptized by an unbeliever or by a child in play. In doubtful cases the hypothetical or conditional form was enjoined, as in the Book of Common Prayer, and in accordance with the decretal of Alexander III (1159-81).

REBEC, or REBECK, a stringed musical instrument of the violin kind, said to have been introduced by the Moors into Spain. It soon became popular all over the Continent, being the favorite instrument of minstrels and of village musicians, and up till the end of the 17th century playing the same important part at fairs, rustic games and weddings as does the violin at the present day. It was somewhat larger than the latter instrument, but had only three strings, which were tuned in fifths, and rubbed with a bow. The earliest known representation of the instrument, however, taken by the Abbé Gerbert from a manuscript of the 9th century, gives it but one string. The neck of the rebec terminated in a more or less grotesque representation of a human head. Milton in his 'L'Allegro' alludes to the instrument as the "jocund rebec." The minstrels of the Middle Ages used four classes of rebecs, the treble, alto, tenor and bass.

REBECCA, a character in Scott's 'Ivanhoe,' daughter of the Jew, Isaac of York. She falls in love with Ivanhoe and nurses him after the tournament of Ashby, and he in turn saves her life by appearing as her champion in the lists after she has been convicted of sorcery and condemned to be burned at the stake. She leaves England with her father to live in Spain.

REBECCAITES, or REBEKAH'S DAUGHTERS, a singular association formed in South Wales, in 1839, for the destruction of turnpike-gates and tollhouses. The rioters were generally dressed in women's clothes, under a leader in the same guise, and made their attacks by night on horseback. The curious ap

pellation by which they designated themselves was derived from the scriptural passage regarding Rebekah - "Let thy seed possess the gate of those who hate them." Successful for a time they were emboldened to greater lawlessness and were attacked and dispersed by the military.

REBEKAH LODGES. See ODD FELLOW. REBEL YELL, the cry of the Confederate troops as they rushed to battle in the Civil War, although as a matter of fact they frequently shouted the names of their States, as "On Virginia!" "On North Carolina!" and so forth. It is difficult to interpret the rebel yell in written language. It was very different from the fulltoned hurrah" of the North, being more like a shriek. Near the crisis of a charge the men would change from a double-quick to a mad rush, wildly yelling "Y-Yo Yo Wo-Wo," for the triple purpose of encouraging each other and confusing and terrorizing the enemy.

REBELLION, an uprising with force and arms against established authority. A rebellion may be an armed outbreak for the purpose of obtaining the redress of a grievance or preventing the enforcement of an obnoxious law; Shays' Rebellion in Massachusetts having been an example of the former, and the Pennsylvania Whisky Insurrection of the latter. Rebellion of a more formidable character is that which attempts to establish a new and independent organization in place of the existing government. Such was the American Revolution and such also was the unsuccessful attempt to perpetuate the Southern Confederacy. Old World rebellions have been chiefly dynastic, at least up to the 19th century- that is, wars between reigning families and others, usually akin to them, which claimed the right to rule. The rebellion against Charles I of England was of a different character, being prompted by aspirations for civil liberty and religious reform. The expulsion of James II was of a similar motive and the American Revolution was a struggle for the inalienable rights of man.

In former ages and up to a very recent period conquered rebels were treated with great severity, being put to death, maimed or enslaved. In partly civilized countries such as China, rebels are treated now with the greatest cruelty. The more advanced nations, however, while retaining on their statute books the Draconic code of times gone by, treat beaten insurgents with leniency. After the downfall of the Southern Confederacy the only penalty inflicted was the disfranchisement for a time of the leaders of the rebellion, all being eventually admitted to the full rights of citizenship. British subjects who took sides with the Boers in the late South African War were, when convicted, imprisoned for short terms and disfranchised, although most of them probably escaped all punishment.

With the extension of suffrage came a consequent ability of the people to secure redress of wrongs without resort to violence. The causes which provoked rebellion in olden times are disappearing, while, apart from Carlist insurrections in Spain, there were no dynastic rebellions in Europe until after the opening of the World War in 1914, when the most notable ones were in Russia, where the Romanoff dynasty was displaced, Tsar Nicholas an

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nouncing the abdication of himself and his son, the immediate heir, 17 March 1917; and in Greece, where King Constantine abdicated 12 June 1917, on the demand of the protecting Powers, following a rebellion centring in Crete under the leadership of former Premier Venizelos.

REBELLION, War of. See CIVIL WAR IN

AMERICA.

REBER, rā'běr, Franz von, German arthistorian: b. Cham, Bavaria, 10 Nov. 1834. He studied in Munich, Berlin and Rome, became a lecturer at the University of Munich in 1858, was appointed professor at the Polytechnicum there in 1863 and in 1869 occupied the chair of history of art in that institution. In 1873 he became director of the Royal Gallery. He has translated Vitruvius' 'Architecture) (1865) and Rooses' 'History of the Antwerp School of Painting (1880), and has written Geschichte der Baukunst im Altertum' (1864–67); Kunstgeschichte des Mittelalters' (1886); Geschichte der Malerei vom Anfang des 14. bis zum Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts' (1894); 'Die phrygischen Felsendenkmäler) (1897), etc.

REBER, rā-bār, Napoleon Henry, French composer: b. Muhlhausen, Alsace, 21 Oct. 1807; d. Paris, 24 Nov. 1880. After studying with Reicha and Le Sueur, he wrote chamber music of remarkable merit and in 1851 was appointed professor in the Conservatory, and succeeded Halévy in the chair of composition 1862. Among his works are 'Le Diable Amoureux' (1840), a ballet; 'Le Nuit de Noël' (1848); Le Père Gaillard' (1852); 'Les Papillotes de M. Benoist (1853), and Les Dames Capitaines (1857), all four comic operas. He also produced some instrumental work of a high order four symphonies, one overture, one series for the orchestra, three stringed quartets, one stringed quintet, one pianoforte quartet, seven pianoforte trios and miscellaneous pieces. His Traité d'Harmonie' (1862) is a standard work.

REBISSO, Louis T., American sculptor: b. Italy, 1837; d. Norwood, near Cincinnati, Ohio, 3 May 1899. At 20 he joined in Mazzini's attempt to establish an Italian republic (see MAZZINI, G.), and was obliged to leave Italy. Taking refuge in the United States he settled in Boston, Mass., where he worked for several years in monumental yards. Subsequently he went to Cincinnati, Ohio, where his fame as an artist developed. He had studied in Italy with the sculptor Rubalto and in the Art Academy under Professor Varni, and in Cincinnati he worked with T. D. Jones. His leading works are the equestrian statues of General McPherson in Washington, D. C.; of General Grant in Lincoln Park, Chicago, and of Gen. W. H. Harrison in Cincinnati.

REBOUND CHECKS, devices attached to the running-gear of automobiles and designed to check the rapid reaction of a spring which has been suddenly compressed, and thus prevent the bouncing movement of a car, which is induced by the extreme resiliency of modern springs. This reaction causes a bouncing movement, which affects the steering, and by its lifting action tends temporarily to diminish the grip of the driving wheels on the road. It is also calculated to produce side-slip, sets up a