an adverse claim was initiated before the defendant resumed work in good faith, such initiative claim would take precedence over the prior located claim upon which the necessary annual labor had not been done. Neither the original declaratory statement of the vigilant claim which was filed in 1898, nor the first amended declaratory statement filed in 1901, complied, even substantially, with the requirements of the statute then in force. Purdum v. Laddin, 23 Mont. 387, 59 Pac. 153; Dolan v. Passmore, 34 Mont. 277, 85 Pac. 1034. The second amended declaratory statement, which apparently meets the requirements of the law fully, was not filed until 1907. But the initiation of an adverse claim is not sufficient to prevent the original locator from resuming work and saving his claim. The only injunction laid upon him by section 2324 U. S. Rev. St., above, is that he shall resume work upon his claim in good faith before a location thereof is made by some one else. The location of a mining claim does not consist alone of discovery and posting notice of location. "The law contemplates that the location of a mining claim shall consist of a number of distinct acts which are independent of each other. The last that may be done does not relate back to the first, and all must be performed before a legal location exists." Gonu v. Russell, 3 Mont. 358; McKay v. McDougall, 25 Mont. 258, 64 Pac. 669, 87 Am. St. Rep. 395. În Butte Con. Min. Co. v. Barker, 35 Mont. 327, 89 Pac. 302, this court said: "In order to make a valid quartz lode mining location, our Political Code (sections 3610, 3611, and 3612) *** requires (1) the discovery of a vein or lode; (2) the posting of a notice of location at the point of discovery containing the matters designated by section 3610; (3) the marking of the boundaries on the ground, and the doing of certain development work, designated in section 3611; and (4) the filing for record of a declaratory statement containing the matters mentioned in section 3612." Since the plaintiffs did not complete their location until the filing of the second amended declaratory statement in 1907, it would seem that the court's finding that defendant forfeited his claim must be erroneous, for, before that date, the defendant had resumed work on the Little Spring claim, and had expended in work and improvements some $900 or $1,000, and this apparently in perfect good faith. But it is suggested that in order for defendant to comply with section 2324, Rev. St. U. S., above, it was necessary for him to do the work delinquent in 1897, but with this we do not agree. The government or a subsequent locator is the only one who can complain of a failure on the part of a locator to do the necessary annual work, and the subsequent locator is not in a position to make complaint until he has completed a valid location, and, if prior to the completion of such valid subsequent location the original locator has resumed work upon his claim in good faith, his previous delinquency is not a matter of consequence. Temescal Oil Min. & D. Co. v. Salcido, 137 Cal. 211, 69 Pac. 1010. Forfeitures are so odious to the law that the rule is quite uniform that every reasonable doubt will be resolved in favor of the validity of the mining claim as against the assertion of a forfeiture. 27 Cyc. 600. Viewed in the light of this rule, we think the defendant showed such a resumption of work on his claim before plaintiffs' location was perfected, as saved it from the charge of being forfeited. The judgment and order are reversed, and the cause is remanded to the district court, with direction to enter judgment for the defendant for the territory in dispute. Reversed and remanded.3° 30 For a criticism of the doctrine of this case, see Costigan, Mining Law, 290-291, 318. It has recently been held that under the Alaska statute resumption of work will not prevent a relocation. Thatcher v. Brown, 190 Fed. 708. But query? 2107041599 CHAPTER VII. SUB-SURFACE RIGHTS. FEDERAL STATUTES. SEC. 2320. Mining claims upon veins or lodes of quartz or other rock in place bearing gold, silver, cinnabar, lead, tin, copper, or other valuable deposits, heretofore located, shall be governed as to length along the vein or lode by the customs, regulations, and laws in force at the date of their location. A mining claim located after the tenth day of May, eighteen hundred and seventy-two, whether located by one or more persons, may equal, but shall not exceed, one thousand five hundred feet in length along the vein or lode; but no location of a mining claim shall be made until the discovery of the vein or lode within the limits of the claim located. No claim shall extend more than three hundred feet on each side of the middle of the vein at the surface, nor shall any claim be limited by any mining regulation to less than twenty-five feet on each side of the middle of the vein at the surface, except where adverse rights existing on the tenth day of May, eighteen hundred and seventy-two, render such limitation necessary. The end lines of each claim shall be parallel to each other. Rev. St. U. S., § 2320. SEC. 2322. The locators of all mining locations heretofore made or which shall hereafter be made, on any mineral vein, lode, or ledge, situated on the public domain, their heirs and assigns, where no adverse claim exists on the tenth day of May, eighteen hundred and seventy-two, so long as they comply with the laws of the United States, and with State, Territorial, and local regulations not in conflict with the laws of the United States governing their possessory title, shall have the exclusive right of possession and enjoyment of all the surface included within the lines of their locations, and of all veins, lodes, and ledges throughout their entire depth, the top or apex of which lies inside of such surface lines extended downward vertically, although such veins, lodes, or ledges may so far depart from a perpendicular in their course downward as to extend outside the vertical side lines of such surface locations. But their right of possession to such outside parts of such veins or ledges shall be confined to such portions thereof as lie between vertical planes drawn downward as above described, through the end lines of their locations, so continued in their own direction that such planes will intersect such exterior parts of such veins or ledges. And nothing in this section shall authorize the locator or possessor of a vein or lode which extends in its downward course beyond the vertical lines of his claim to enter upon the surface of a claim owned or possessed by another. Rev. St. U. S., § 2322. Section 1.-Vein Essentials for Extralateral Right Purposes. DUGGAN v. DAVEY. (See ante, p. 25, for a report of the case.) SUB-SURFACE RIGHTS. TABOR v. DEXLER. (See ante, p. 40, for a report of the case.) 7/h cen off. 341-431 ... 4/12.38,2032 161 P. 862. 1716 96811351 355.C.P.574 GRAND CENTRAL MIN. CO. v. MAMMOTH MIN. CO. (See ante, p. 41, for a report of the case.) GOLDEN v. MURPHY ET AL. (See post, p. 622, for a report of the case.) Section 2.-Intralimital Rights. REYNOLDS AND ANOTHER V. IRON SILVER MIN. CO. 1886. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. MILLER, J.-This is a writ of error to circuit court for the district of Colorado, which brings here for review a judgment of that court in an action to recover possession of a part of a vein or lode of mineral deposit. The plaintiff below, the Iron Silver Mining Company, alleged that it was the owner of 193.43 acres of land, conveyed by the United States by patent to its grantors, and seeks to recover of defendants a part of the land thus patented. It is described in the petition as mining land and a mining claim. The patent under which plaintiff claims, which was introduced in evidence, purports to be for placer mines, and it takes two pages of printed matter to describe the courses, distances, and corners. As the law does not permit any one claim to cover more than 20 acres in locating placer mining claims, it is obvious that under the ruling of this court in Smelting Co. v. Kemp, 104 U. S. 636, a number of these claims, amounting at least to 10, have been consolidated into one patent, which was issued to Wells and Moyer, the patentees. The defendants asserted a right to the vein or deposit in which they were working under lode claims called the "Crown Point" and "Pinnacle" claims, which were older than that of plaintiff. Defend 'Parts of the opinion are omitted. ants also set out another defense in the following language: "That at the time of the survey, entry, and patenting of the said Wells and Moyer placer claim, a certain lode, vein, or deposit of quartz or other rock in place, carrying carbonates of lead and silver-bearing ore, and of great value, called the 'Pinnacle Lode,' and a certain lode, vein, or deposit carrying like minerals of great value, were known and claimed to exist within the boundaries and underneath the surface of said placer claim, survey lot No. 281; and that the fact that such vein or veins were claimed to exist and did exist as aforesaid within said premises was known to the patentees of said claim at all times hereinbefore mentioned; and that in the application for patent for said placer claim the said vein or veins so known to exist were not included, and were, in the patent issued upon such application, expressly excluded therefrom. And, further, in the said patent it was expressly and in terms reserved that the premises in and by such patent conveyed might, by the proprietor of any such vein or lode of quartz or other rock in place bearing mineral or ore as aforesaid, be entered for the purpose of extracting and removing the ore from such lode, vein, or deposit, should the same, or any part thereof, be found to penetrate, intersect, pass through, or dip into the premises by such patent granted." The case was tried by a jury, and a verdict rendered for plaintiff, under a charge from the court which required such a verdict at their hands. * * *. The conflict in principle between the instructions asked and refused and those given by the court is marked and easily discerned, and presents the only question in the case. Its primary form is presented by the fourth of the defndant's requests, namely, "that plaintiff must recover on the strength of his own title." This is the fundamental principle on which all actions of ejectment or actions to recover possession of real estate rest. Even where the plaintiff recovers on proof of priority of possession, it is because in the absence of any title in any one else this is evidence of a title in plaintiff. If there is any exception to the rule that in an action. to recover possession of land the plaintiff must recover on the strength of his own title; and that the defendant in possession can lawfully say: "Until you show some title, you have no right to disturb me," it has not been pointed out to us. The remainder of this fourth prayer was a further statement of the same rule as applied to the case in hand: "If the vein is not conveyed to plaintiffs by the placer patent under which they claim, then it makes no difference whether defendants have any title or not; the plaintiffs cannot recover on the weakness of defendants' title." There is not in the record any pretense or claim of title in plaintiff, except that growing out of the placer patent to Wells and Moyer. If that gave no title to the vein in controversy, plaintiffs had none. There is no assertion by them of prior possession, discovery, or claim |