PRACTICAL POINTS. Questions from Annual Subscribers only are answered; these must be typewritten, and should be in duplicate, the name and address of the subscriber being stated. Owing to the large number of questions received, a proportion only can be published in this Column, answers to questions not selected for publication being sent to the subscriber by post. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS. 1. Highways.—Obstruction—Corner or Bend in RoadAlteration of Height of Wall and Removal of Trees-Roads Improvement Act, 1925, sec. 4 (1) (a). A. is the owner and occupier of a large house standing at the corner of a highway and a private road on the outskirts of a town. The house has been erected about 70 years, and the garden or pleasure ground, containing large trees, is enclosed by a substantial stone wall about 7 ft. in height, which abuts on the public highway. A notice has been served by the local authority on the owner under sec. 4 of the Roads Improvement Act, 1925, requiring him to pull down this wall between certain points, and reduce it to 3 ft. in height, and to remove the trees, which are very large and about 70 years old, on the ground that it is a danger to and obstructs the view of persons using the highway. The owner has sent objections on the ground that the proposal is an unnecessary interference with his property, and that the wall is necessary as a boundary to his house, and, as such, forms part of the structure of a permanent edifice-and is therefore protected by sec. 4 (a) of the Act. Can you refer me to any decisions bearing on this point, and will you let me have your opinion as to whether the objection can be sustained? ANSWER. The objection that the boundary wall forms part of the structure of a permanent edifice does not seem well-founded. A wall entirely separate from a house cannot be said to be part of the structure of the house. There appears to be no decision bearing on the point raised. As to the trees, their entire removal is not covered by the terms of sec. 4 (1) (a) of the Act. They may be required to be reduced in height, and perhaps lopped if necessary, but not to be removed entirely. See definition of "hedge " in sec. 11. A. C. 2.-Intestacy.-Prior to 1926.-Sale by Administratrix. A., who owned some real property, died intestate in 1924, leaving a widow and one son, his heir at law. The widow took out letters of administration and the administration of the estate was completed before the end of the year 1925. No conveyance of the real property was made by the administratrix to the heir at law, nor was her dower set out by metes and bounds. In 1926 the heir at law became bankrupt. Would a purchaser taking a conveyance from the trustee in bankruptcy with the widow joining to release her dower interest obtain a good title, and could a purchaser be forced to accept such a title ? ANSWER. The legal estate is either vested in the widow as personal representative under the Land Transfer Act, 1897, or in the heir at law (subject to dower) under the Law of Property Act, Sch. I, Part II, para 3. This would depend, apparently, on whether the administration of the estate was completed, and as there might be a question as to this, I think that it would be safer if the widow sold as administratrix. In any case, if the trustee in bankruptcy and the widow convey as suggested in the question, a purchaser would obtain a good title under the Law of Property Act, 1925, sec. 63, and a subsequent purchaser could not object to it. G. E. ANSWER. Where the provisions A parish council has no such power. of the Towns Improvement Clauses Act, 1847, with respect to the numbering of houses (see Public Health Act, 1875, sec. 160) have been put in force in a rural district by an order of the Minister of Health (or Local Government Board), under sec. 276 of the Act of 1875, the rural district council shall from time to time cause the houses and buildings in all or any of the streets to be marked with numbers as they think fit (Act of 1847, sec. 64). The occupiers "shall mark their houses with such numbers as the [Council] approve of" (ibid, sec. 65). There is no distinct authority for charging the expense of numbering upon the rates. A. C. 66 4. Masonic Temple.-Sports Club-Conveyance of Land for. It is proposed to vest land in trustees for: (a) a Masonic Lodge; (b) a voluntary organisation supported by members subscriptions and gifts from outsiders, the intention being to use the land in this case for the benefit of the sports clubs controlled by the organisation. In each case the transaction will take the form of a conveyance to trustees upon trust for sale, and there will be a separate declaration of the trusts of the proceeds of the sale and of the use of the land until sale. Is either of these transactions within the Mortmain and Charitable Uses Act, 1888, as amended by sec. 29 of the Settled Land Act, 1925 ? ANSWER. If the conveyence takes the form of a trust for sale, the Mortmain and Charitable Uses Acts, 1888 and 1891, would not apply (Halsbury's Law of England, vol. 4, p. 125), but if the conveyance is in a form similar to Precedent 29 in the Encyclopædia of Forms, vol. 3, p. 160, the deed must be sent to the Charity Commissioners to be recorded as provided by the Settled Land Act, 1925, sec. 29 (4). (a) As to a Masonic Lodge, the case of re Porter, Porter v. Porter [1925] (1 Ch. 746) should be consulted. (b) As to the sports club, see re Nottage Jones v. Palmer [1895] (2 Ch. 649 C.A.) and the Encyclopædia of Forms, vol. 3, p. 624. G. E. It is quite clear that an authority are protected by the Act, if action is not "commenced within six months next after the act, neglect, or default complained of." Compare Carey v. Bermondsey Borough Council (1903), 67 J.P. ill; Freeborn v. Leeming [1926], 1 K.B. 160; 90 J.P. 53. It is immaterial that the authority have admitted liability and negotiations are proceeding or that negotiations are proceeding without any admission of liability. The position in both instances is the same as regards the operation of the Act. In Fletcher v. Jubb [1920], 1 K.B. 275, a solicitor was held liable to compensate his clients for the loss sustained by them because, an authority having made an offer in settlement of a claim for negligence, he did not inform his clients that they must make up their mind to act before the expiration of the six months. A. C. 6.-Public Health.-Housing Act, 1925- Improvement Scheme.-Property Included but alleged not to be insanitary-Local Enquiry Procedure My firm is acting for the owner of licensed premises which are included in a proposed improvement scheme under Part 2 of this Act. The property is coloured red (i.e., as insanitary) on the plans, and the recent case of Northwood v. L.C.C. (T.L.R.. Vol. 42, p. 508) decided that, if the scheme is confirmed in its present form the owner will only be entitled to compensation for the bare site value of the land, and get nothing for the buildings or licence. The property is not, in fact, insanitary, and I wish to know what steps should be taken whereby it may be coloured blue (i.e., as included only for the purpose of making the scheme efficient) on the plans-in which case the owner would get compensation for the buildings and licence. The local inquiry has not yet been held. Has the Ministry of Health's representative at the inquiry power to alter the colouring of the plans if he is satisfied by evidence given at the inquiry that they are wronglycoloured? The usual notice of dissent to the scheme has been lodged, but I should be glad to know whether there are any other steps which should now be taken to ensure that the owner may get compensation for the buildings and loss of licence. Does sec. 47 of the Act in any way concern our client ? ANSWER. The person holding the local inquiry has no authority to alter the colouring of the plans. He can only report to the Ministry of Health, and the Minister may, under sec. 406 of the Housing Act, 1925, confirm the scheme either absolutely or subject to conditions or modifications. All that can be done is to convice the person holding the inquiry, and, if necessary, communicate with the Minister of Health, so that the Minister may be disposed to make the alteration desired. Sec. 47 does not affect the matter. A. C. 7.-Rate. Mortgaged House Let at Rent inclusive of RatesAppointment by Mortgagor of Receiver-Liability of Receiver for Rates. X. mortgaged a house to Y. in 1922. X. then occupied the house. Early this year X. let the house to Z. at a rent inclusive of rates. The rates are not compounded. X. has failed to pay this and last year's rates. Y. has now appointed a receiver under the Law of Property Act, 1925. The rates are consolidated and collected by the local authority. Can the local authority (a) make the receiver pay the rates which were leviable against X. whilst X. was in occupation, and (b) can the tenant, if he pay this year's rates to the local authority, either make the receiver reimburse him or else deduct from his rent a proportionate part of the rates from the commencement of the rate year to the date of the appointment of the receiver? It is presumed that a proportionate part of the rates from the date of the appointment to the end of the rate year are payable by the receiver. If the rates were compounded, would this make any difference either in case (a) or case (b)? ANSWER. X. was rated as occupier. When Z. became occupier, he became liable to the rating authority for payment of the rates assuming that they took the proper steps for entering his name in the rate book. The receiver (not being occupier) was not liable to the rating authority for payment of the rates. The local authority (a) cannot therefore make the receiver pay any rates. The tenant (b) can make the receiver reimburse him the rates only from the time of the appointment of the receiver or deduct rates only from rent paid by him which covers the period for which the rates accrued. If, for instance, he owes a quarter's rent due Lady Day last, he could deduct the rates due from him up to March 31. If the rates had been compounded, it seems that the receiver could not be made to pay the rates which would have been assessed on X., as there is no provision applying to owners like the provision applying to successive occupiers in sec. 16 of the Poor Rate Assessment and Collection Act, 1869. It is assumed that there is no local Act provision as to the consolidated rate which would affect the position. A. C. 8. Settled Land.-Death of Tenant for Life Procedure. A. died in 1919, leaving land by her will to trustees X. and Y. under trust for M. for life, and afterwards to sell and divide. M. is now dead. No vesting instrument was executed on the advent of the new legislation. X. and Y. propose to take out letters of administration so far as the settled estate is concerned as special representatives of M. When that is done, they will assent to themselves (being also executors and trustees of the will of A.) and sell the land to my client. Is there a flaw in the title? Should not X. and Y., as trustees, execute a vesting instrument to themselves as special personal representatives, or is the grant of letters of administration sufficient to cover the point? ANSWER. If the trustees of the settlement obtain à grant of letters of administration to the deceased tenant for life, limited to the settled land, and then execute an assent to themselves as trustees for sale under A.'s will, no further vesting instrument appears to be necessary. G. E. 9.—Trusts and Trustees.-Trust for Sale-Release by one Trustee to a Co-trustee who is also Beneficially Entitled. (1) M.E.B. died in January, 1891, having made her will whereby she appointed two executors and trustees and gave all her estate to them in trust for her sister, S.A.W., for life, and after her decease to sell her estate and to stand possessed of the proceeds upon trust (in the events which happened) for O.C. and J.E.S. (2) Various appointments of new trustees were made, the last being dated 1901, whereby A.B. and the said J.E.S. became trustees. (3) The tenant for life died in October, 1910. Thereupon a collector on behalf of the beneficiaries collected the rents, paid the outgoings, and periodically divided the balance between O.C. and J.E.S. equally. (4) The beneficiaries received the rents and profits of testatrix's leasehold property from 1910 to 1926, but the legal estate was outstanding in the trustees. One of the beneficiaries (O.C.) sold and assigned her share of the reversionary estate under the will to the other one (J.E.S.) in February, 1926. (5) On February 12 the one trustee (A.B.) assigned and released to the other (J.E.S., who was trustee and sole beneficiary) the testatrix's estate, then consisting of two leasehold properties. This assignment contains recitals (1) that "the said A.B. and J.E.S. are the present trustees of the said will, and in them as such trustees the legal estate in the said leasehold properties is now vested,” and (2) that "the said J.E.S. has become absolutely and beneficially entitled to the proceeds of sale of the leasehold properties and had elected to take them in the present state, instead of the proceeds of sale," and a request for their assignment to him. The assignment and release is by A.B., as trustee to the said J.E.S., discharged from all trusts, powers and provisions of M.E.B.'s will. 66 Answers to the following questions are requested :— (1) Is a vesting deed necessary in the above circumstances? (2) Is the assignment in proper form, or should both the said A.B. and J.E.S. have assigned to J.E.S. alone? ANSWER. (1) A vesting deed was unnecessary as there was an immediate binding trust for sale existing on January 1 last. (2) I think that the assignment and release by A.B. only is sufficient, because the two trustees were joint tenants of the legal estate. G. E. 10.-Trusts and Trustees.-Religious Institution—Appointment of Trustees. Certain leasehold premises are held by six trustees for the benefit of a religious institution. The original lease and the original declaration of trust are enrolled in the Court of Chancery. When a vacancy occurs a new trustee is appointed by the committee which regulates the affairs of the institution. At the present time the six trustees to whom the property was last assigned are all dead. It is desired to transfer the property into the names of the present trustees. Can this be done by means of an assignment from the personal representative of the last surviving trustee, or are any other formalities necessary under the new Law of Property Act? ANSWER. I think that there should be an appointment of trustees under the Trustee Appointment Acts, and that an assignment is not necessary. Reference should be made to the Encyclopædia of Forms, vol. 2, p. 728. G. E. 11.-Trusts and Trustees.-Conveyance to a Trustee who Purchases under an Express Power. In the LAW JOURNAL of July 10, with respect to Question 11 under " Practical Points," we think that you have overlooked the fact in your answer that it is necessary for there to be two trustees to give a receipt for the purchase money. Surely in this case, instead of a new trustee being appointed, two new trustees should be appointed, and then we agree entirely that Precedent 228 in the Encyclopædia of Forms, vol. 15, p. 866, can be adapted. We have practically the same case to consider, except that in our case the trustee with the option to purchase is not the sole surviving trustee, but is one of the original trustees and his co-trustee is still alive. difficulty is how to get a receipt for the purchase money without an appointment of a new trustee unless it is contended that the purchasing trustee and his co-trustee can give a receipt to the purchasing trustee for the purchase money. The Precedent appears to indicate that only the vendor trustees give the receipt. ANSWER. Our I do not consider that it is necessary to appoint two additional trustees, although it may be desirable to do so under the circumstances. The Trustee Act, 1925, sec. 14, does not require that the trustees giving the receipt should be different persons from the purchaser. G. E. 12.-Trusts and Trustees.-Trust for Sale-Special Representation. A. died intestate in 1903, leaving freehold house property and a widow and children. The widow was entitled to dower and the eldest son became heir-at-law. She and the heir-atlaw in 1904 conveyed (by way of family settlement) the property to C.D., " to the use of the widow for life," and after her death to the use of C.D. in fee simple upon trust for sale, and for division of the proceeds amongst all the children. The widow died in February, 1926, and a second trustee has been appointed of the settlement and the trustees now propose to sell. Is it necessary for " special representation " to be taken out to the widow's estate and for a vesting assent to be executed in favour of the trustees by such representatives before they can sell ? It appears as if this were so, as under the settlement the land does not appear to have been subject to a trust for sale " as defined by the Trustee Act, and in that case the amending sec. 1 in the Schedule to the Law of Property Amendment Act, 1926, does not appear to assist or be applicable and the land seems to be "settled land." Alternatively, would it be sufficient for the trustees of the settlement to execute a vesting assent in themselves under sec. 7 (5) of the Settled Land Act, 1925, without special representation "being taken out? 66 ANSWER. 66 Doubts have been expressed as to whether it is necessary to take out special representation to a deceased tenant for life (see the LAW JOURNAL, May 22, 1926, page 430, and July 3, 1926, page 18), but the safer course seems to be to apply for a special grant (see re Dalley [1926] W.N. 232). The Settled Land Act, 1925, sec. 7 (1) provides for the case where the land remains settled land, and in the case stated the land ceased to be settled land on the death of the tenant for life and became subject to a trust for sale. The amendment to sec. 3 of the principal Act made by the Law of Property Amendment Act, 1926 (Schedule) excludes land held upon trust for sale. The legal estate on the death of the tenant for life vests in her personal representatives (Administration of Estates Act, 1925, sec. 1 (1) and sec. 3 (1) (ii)), and I think that such representatives should execute an assent to the trustees for sale. The alternative course suggested does not appear to be applicable. G. E. 13.-Will.-Settlement Trustees-Proving Executors—Vesting Trust Property. A.B. died before 1925. He appointed B.B. his wife, C.B. his brother, and D.E. executors and trustees, and trustees for the purposes of the Settled Land Act, 1882-1890. The testator gave all to his wife for life, and after her death made a specific devise of certain properties, and the residue he gave among his children. Will was proved by widow B.B. and brother C.B., power being reserved to D.E. to prove. The widow received purchase money of property agreed to be sold in testator's life-time, and also proceeds of sale of real property less expenses, and these amounts were paid into a bank in the name of B.B. and C.B., and part of the money subsequently invested in war stock, etc., but in the name of the widow only. C.B. is now dead, and the widow desires that the estate, consisting of real property, shares, furniture and the investments above referred to in widow's name only, should now be transferred to the name of herself and D.E. who has not renounced and is willing to act. If D.E. took out double probate would that be sufficient to enable me to get the estate transferred to the joint names of the widow and D.E., or is it necessary that the widow should first execute a declaration of trust in respect of the investment in her name only. All the other shares have been registered in the names of B.B. and C.B., or would it be cheaper for the widow to appoint some one other than D.E. as a trustee to act with her? ANSWER. The fact that D.E. has not proved the will does not affect his appointment as trustee, and there is no necessity for him to take a grant of double probate. So far as the real estate is concerned, the directions of paragraph 2 of Sch. 2 of the Settled Land Act, 1925, should be carried out. See form No. 5 in Sch. I. The shares registered in the names of B.B. and C.B. can be transferred by B.B. into the names of B.B. and D.E. on proof of C.B.'s death being given to the companies concerned. The stocks, etc., standing in B.B.'s name alone can be transferred by her to the names of B.B. and D.E. R. THE LAW SOCIETY'S PROVINCIAL MEETING. [We give below an abridged report of the final paper read at the Meeting.] BILLS OF COST. BY EDWARD A. BELL. AT Common Law neither the plaintiff nor the defendant could recover costs against the other until the Statute of Gloucester (6 Edward I) inaugurated a sort of principle that costs were recoverable by the successful party. From thence, gradually, costs de incremento became part and parcel of the damages recovered; and the successive ingenuity of the forerunners of our trade gradually evolved the pernicious system of Bills of Cost. In the year 1731 law pleadings were by statute required to be in English. This included Bills of Cost, which till then had been in Latin. It is a humiliating reflection that the language employed in Bills of Cost is still the same now as it was centuries ago. Produced are some original Bills of Cost delivered in the year 1732; and if the President be complacently minded enough to glance at same he may observe the old foolish rigmarolish phrases, even the catalogue prices of the current Legal Price List (Appendix N.). Can it not be said that there is no other trade or profession which grotesquely exhibits such ludicrous charges. Let us compare a washerwoman's with a solicitor's Bill of Costs, and the logic is all in favour of the washerwoman. She does not give particulars of the amount of soap and water used, or the length or breadth of the clothes upon which she exercises the nature and importance of her craft. To some of us it might be a professional pastime to peruse Serjeant Hullock's Law of Costs—an entertaining volume of a sort, which appeared in 1792 under the patronage of the immortal Tidd. The old serjeant's book is forgotten, unless one have observed in the Georgian pictures of attorney's offices how often amongst a scanty library there is protrusively portrayed the names of Hullock and Tidd. Enshrined in Hullock are to be found reports of solemn decisions which went far to enucleate the present unconglomerate system. Prothonotaries, the Taxing Masters of those days, seemed to be uncompassionately inclined. An attorney and his clerk who concocted a false Bill of Costs were duly committed for contempt. There appears in the early days to have been much wavering in opinion as to whether the attorney whose bill was reduced by more than one-sixth should be required to bear the cost of taxation. Howbeit, it was solemnly decided that if the attorney died in the process of taxation-a not unlikely event even nowadays-the one-sixth rule did not apply. 66 66 At the present hour of grace-remembering always that costs are a British Institution!"-there is a very exhilarating legend in the Practice Notes on Taxation, which gratefully kindles the inventive instincts of present-day practitioners : Appendix N. does not contain all the allowances which may be made to a solicitor." It is with humble piety that we permit ourselves to believe that this propitiatory pronunciamento flowed from the fountain pen of a learned Master. whose valuable treatise on Costs compels us to indulge in the hope that we shall have a new edition. If it be not overtaxing the author, one may also hope he will be able to give the reference "At the Sign of the Lyre," or other more sober situation, whence he quaffed Austin Dobson's consoling couplet : "Whoever heard plain truth relate "Its throbbing thought in six-and-eight ? Can it not be reasonably urged that the method of computation of solicitors' costs is basically unsound? It may be asked, How could Solicitors' fees be assessed at a lump sum without details ? But the question is illusory. Professional services should not be measured by a yard stick or pounds avoirdupois rather indeed by cubic capacity. How do other professions fix their fees? Does the operatic singer charge by note and tone? Or the doctor by the length of his prescription? Or an accountant by the number of his calculations ? Or an actor by the extent of his speeches? If the learned Master were seized of all the facts (not chimera), and he has checked and/or connoted all the disbursements with his experience of the deeps and shallows of our trade-could he not expeditiously assess lawyers' fees? As, with items, so daily happens " on each glance of thought Knowing, as most of us do, the skill, ability and experience of the Taxing Masters, it is not a disingenuous belief that, given a short resumé of the matter at issue, together with production of documents and vouchers for payments, the Taxing Master could arrive at approximately the same conclusion as to the quantum due for passive and/or active services rendered, as he would if he were to grind out the increment item by brackish item. It has long been tepidly recognised by the Legislature that the catalogued descriptions of "Attendances, letters, perusals," and the rambling rest are entirely unnecessary. Most solicitor and client bills are the result of bargains made beforehand ; and if the bargain be made, then it is submitted, in the absence of fraud, that a solicitor should not be required (as the law at present stands) to deliver details. By all means let the agreement be referred to the Taxing Master for determination and judicial assimilation. If a Taxing Master had the powers of a judge under Order 65, rule 23, after hearing the parties, he could utilise this Order, now so infrequently exercised, and "direct payment of a sum in lieu of taxed costs." Possibly such a relenting relaxation might induce assessment of solicitors' costs. The matter would then terminate, as at present, to the satisfaction of at least one of the parties concerned. The trouble is that in contentious business, where costs are recovered, there is a party chargeable. This party chargeable, it is submitted, should not be in a position capriciously to insist upon detailed items if the solicitor for the other side prefer to have his costs assessed. Possibly the quantum might be less than that which, with the impetus of massed items, a solicitor who does not believe in time economy could recover if he delivered a list of those niggling details, that mildewy mincemeat murrain, which constitute the ingredients of our present customary Bills of Cost. injustice would be done by assessment of our fees. The public would not be damnified; and professional time would be saved which is now irretrievably lost by the tedious effort required in the preparation and ceaseless copying of items, and subsequent internment with the Taxing Master during investigations! 66 No In pre-Victorian days Attorneys were staatenlos." The Law Society, by a slow but sure process of stratification, has enhanced the position of attorneys, or, as we are now termed, solicitors possibly because our duties are supposed to solace. Thanks to the Law Society, solicitors have attained a definite and distinct status-and each relies upon the other to maintain the honourable level of that status-to intensify our esprit de corps. May it not be asked whether it be reasonable that solicitors should be required in the present high pressure of existence, before they can legally demand payment of their fees, to deliver a practically interminable list of more rather than less negligible items which by the Solicitors Acts they are enjoined to render to the party chargeable? Whatever be the experience or other professional attainment of a solicitor, his itemed fees are fixed and standardised by common law-and it is believed equity follows the lawjust as a baker's are by statute. In fact, Whitaker's Almanack of men, matters, things and advertisements, foreshadows "scale," in its columns of direction. After advising its consultants that solicitors' charges are usually regulated by the 1881 Act and the scale thereunder, Whitaker explains : "We say usually, because the Act allows an option to the solicitor of declining to adopt it. In practice most solicitors (although some old-established firms are found to prefer the old system) are willing to adopt the scale." Yet further! Once the assessed system became established, most of us would appreciate its benefits when confronted with the recurrent question "What will this litigation cost me?" With a stabilised assessed fee practice the solicitor could with reasonable certainty inform his client what his own fee would be. Counsel's fees and disbursements are seemingly arbitrary amounts easily and/or telephonically ascertainable. Indeed, a consensus of opinion may be hazarded that in contentious matters the cost of each stage of litigation should be upon a fixed scale, sliding according to the nature and importance of the case, the interest of the parties, and the amount and responsibilities involved. The assessed fee system has been recognised by statute: agreements fixing gross or lump sums (bluff legal expressions) by the Attorneys Act, 1843; and scale fees by the Solicitors' Remuneration Act, 1881. Then there are fixed sums in the County Courts, Summary Jurisdiction Courts-in fact, by the Criminal Justice (Amendment) Act, 1926, costs in certain cases have been actually fixed at the maximum of 251. May it not be surely asserted that if there were a stabilised certainty 66 66 Many people even nowadays agree with "Crab" in the play who, when urged to litigation by Latitat his Attorney, replied: The law is an oracular idol, nor should any of my private concerns make me bow to your beastly Baal. I had rather lose a cause than contest it." Bills of Cost are not so much" creations of fancy " as linked avarice long drawn out, enforced by rusty custom. The majority of bills are compulsory exercises-almost impositions. How many read them? These legal legends are written, not to be read, but to be taxed. It is often wondered what regard the copyists entertain of this, their sphere of usefulness. One almost hazards the opinion that they do not regard law typing as an engrossing pastime. When one comes to analyse Bills of Cost, one finds a constant succession of doing the same thing over and over again; and surely it would save the time of a solicitor and his clerks if he could adopt the musical expression and write the words da capo, and thus effect a possible soothing of the client's savage breast. The serried array of merciless items to be found in party and party costs, payable by the unsuccessful party, is regarded as an indemnity-the penalty for the false claim or defence. To an appreciable extent the principle of an inclusive fee has crept into the scheme of party and party costs-the result of Re Snell, in which case the then Master of the Rolls (Sir George Jessel) expressed an extempore abhorrence at an assessed item charged for journeys to the U.S.A. and Paris. An enlightened Court of Appeal reversed this opinion, and therefrom slowly evolved the omnibus item "Instructions for Brief." The impetus of this case towards lump-sum fees was decelerated by Re Slingsby, decided in 1918. Now again the pendulum was swung back by the great good favour of the Solicitors' Remuneration Rules, 1920, although opportunity is given to parties who nurse lurking grievance to compel the -it is to be hoped, unoffending-solicitor to express his claim in fruity details. The paper concluded with a parody, "The Bills," of Poe's well-known poem "The Bells." THE first meeting of the session 1926-27 took place on the 11th inst. in the Middle Temple Common Room, Mr. L. F. Stemp in the chair. The subject for debate was as follows: "A. who had been addressing a political meeting had reason to fear that he would be assaulted by some roughs on leaving the building. To minimise the risk, instead of wearing his own hat and coat he deliberately took from the cloakroom (without B'.s permission) the hat and coat of B., and with their help got away unscathed. B., not being able to find another hat and coat assumed those abandoned by A., and in consequence was mistaken for A. and seriously assaulted. The hats and coats have since been returned to their true owners. B. is now suing A. for damages. Will he succeed ? ” Mr. C. Willoughby Williams moved that A. would succeed. Mr. S. E. Redfern opposed. There also spoke Messrs. F. B. Guedella, G. W. Tookey, F. W. Yates, H. W. Pritchard, W. G. Galbraith and J. MacMillan. The opener having replied, the motion was put to the meeting but was lost by 4 votes. UNION SOCIETY OF LONDON. THE ninety-first session of the Union Society of London was opened on Wednesday, October 13, at 8 p.m., by a motion moved by Mr. W. A. Fearnley-Whittingstall, "That this House condemns the policy of the Miners' Leaders in regard to the Coal Strike." After a vigorous speech by the opener, Mr. D. F. Brundrit replied in a thoughtful and reasoned manner. Messrs. Salter Nicholls, Braithwait, Eddy and Thorne supported the opener, and Messrs. Ingram, Morden, Symmons, O'Connor and Sandilands supported the opposer. On a division of the house, the motion was declared lost by 11 votes to 4. The house adjourned at 10.45 p.m. until Wednesday, October 20. Debates are held in the Middle Temple Common Room every Wednesday during the Law Terms. Gentlemen wishing to become members of the Society should apply to Mr. J. M. Symmons, hon. secretary, 4, Essex Court, Temple, E.C.4. Visitors are invited to attend. COUNCIL OF LEGAL EDUCATION. A COURSE of six lectures will be delivered by Ralph Sutton, Esq., at the Inner Temple, in Lecture Room A. under the Library, on Monday afternoons, commencing October 18, at 5 p.m. The subject will be "The Old Procedure in Personal Actions." SYLLABUS OF LECTURES.-First Lecture, October 18: Introduction-Practical importance at the present day of a knowledge of the old procedure—The original writs and their tenor The Statute of Westminster 2 and the writ in consimili casu-The influence of the original writ on English Jurisprudence. Second Lecture, October 25: The Courts of Common Law-Their separate jurisdictions-The Court of Common Pleas and actions between subjects-Proceedings in the King's Bench and Exchequer by Bill-Use of this procedure to give them cognisance of personal actions originally cognisable only by the Court of Common Pleas The personal actions. Third Lecture, November 1: The system of pleading -Its origin and development The production of the issueThe demurrer and the issue in law-The proceedings on demurrer. Fourth Lecture, November 8 : The issue of factThe proceedings at Nisi Prius-The verdict-The proceedings before the Court in Banc after the verdict-The entry of judgment-Proceedings in error. Fifth Lecture, November 15: Consideration of the more important rules of pleading— The declaration-The plea-Dilatory pleas and pleas in barThe general issue-Traverse-Confession and avoidance-The replication and subsequent pleadings. Sixth Lecture, Novem ber 22: The reforms of the 19th Century-The Common Law Procedure Acts. At the first lecture, to be delivered on Monday, October 18, at 5 p.m., the Rt. Hon. Lord Justice Atkin, chairman of the Council of Legal Education, will preside. The lectures will be open to all members of the Inns of Court free, and to non-members on payment of a fee of one guinea for the course. Tickets for non-members to be obtained at the office of the Council. CORRESPONDENCE. COUNTY COURT JURISDICTION. SIR, While hesitating to differ from the views expressed by your contributor on County Court Jurisdiction, I should deem it a favour if you could find room in your Journal for this my answer to the suggestion (made at p. 233, ante) that I did not treat the authorities in their chronological order in my letter (ante, p. 226). In the first place, sec. 18 of the Judicature Act, 1884, has been repealed, and sec. 203 of the Judicature Act, 1925, has taken its place. Sub-sec. 2 (c) of that section enacts :— "The jurisdiction of an inferior court in cases of counterclaim shall not be excluded by reason that the counterclaim is for an amount of money exceeding the jurisdiction of the Court unless the plaintiff, within the prescribed time, objects in writing to relief being given by the Court in excess of the relief which the Court would, before the 24th day of October, 1884, have had jurisdiction to administer." With respect to the learned author of the article under discussion, I would suggest that as soon as a plaintiff has exercised his right under this section it is abundantly clear that the jurisdiction of the Court is cut down to that which it had before October, 1884, i.e., before the passing of the Judicature Act, 1884. It follows, therefore, that that Act, in so far as it extends the jurisdiction of the Court to hear a counterclaim, does not come into operation if notice of objection is filed and one is thrown back to Davis' Case for the authority as to the procedure applicable to the case. It is clear that (as "R. D." points out) a case decided in 1877 is no authority as to the interpretation of an Act passed in 1884; but my contention is that the Act of 1884 is of no assistance in deciding whether the Court has jurisdiction to try a counterclaim after objection thereto by a plaintiff ; that Act (and sec. 203 of the 1925 Act which takes its place) expressly cuts down the powers of the Court, in such a case, to those which it had before the Act was passed. for In conclusion, I pray in aid of my contention the note to Order X, r. 3, of the Annual County Courts Practice, 1926, where the learned author writes: "The notice of objection will cut down the jurisdiction to a point at which it stood prior to the Act above cited, i.e., the judge will not be able to give effect to the counterclaim for any purpose other than that of defeating the plaintiff's claim (15 and 16 Geo. V, c. 49, s. 203 ; Davis v. Flagstaff Co. (1877) 3 C.P.D. 228).” 1, Dr. Johnson's Buildings, Temple, E.C.4. October 11, 1926. PERCY C. LAMB. This sort of thing has become a very frequent occurrence in the United States, and one of the ways of handling the situation is to sell the so-called " Co-operative" block of flats to a corporation created for that purpose, and a share of stock therein is acquired by each prospective purchaser, each share representing one of the flats. If I can be of any help to your correspondent in getting these forms I shall be very glad. BARNETT HOLLANDER. Bush House, Aldwych, London, W.C.2. October 8, 1926. |