the editors, Sir Cecil Hurst, K.C., the legal adviser to the Foreign Office, and Professor A. Pearce Higgins, K.C., coupled with those of the editorial committee, which include Dr. H. H. L. Bellot, the well-known secretary of the International Law Association, and Professor J. L. Brierly, of Oxford University, are sufficient guarantee that the work will include the opinions of the best brains in this country on a subject which the activities of the Permanent Court at The Hague are bringing more and more into public prominence. Apart from the articles, one of the most important features of the Year Book is the section which puts in a nutshell the decisions, opinions and awards of International Tribunals commencing with those of the Hague Court, and not omitting British judgments bearing on points of International Law. Sir Frederick Pollock, K.C., and Dr. Arnold McNair have written on the Hague Court, Professor Pearce Higgins on the right of visit and search of merchant shipping by a belligerent in warfare, and Sir Cecil Hurst explains in a remarkably illuminating and well-documented article the practice as to claims brought by a citizen against a foreign State such as are usually submitted to arbitration. "MEWS." MEWS' DIGEST OF ENGLISH CASE LAW. Containing the Reported Decisions of the Superior Courts and a Selection from those of the Scottish and Irish Courts to the end of 1924. Second Edition. Under the General Editorship of SIR ALEXANDER WOOD RENTON, K.C.M.G., K.C., S. E. WILLIAMS, and WYNDHAM A. BEWES, Barristersat-Law. Vol. XVII. SWEET AND MAXWELL: STEVENS AND SONS: SOLICITORS' LAW STATIONERY SOCIETY. Of the titles covered in the latest volume of the new "Mews the more important are: “Receiver "; "Sale of Goods"-running to nearly four hundred columns; Setoff"; "Settled Land "-nearly four hundred columns ; "Sewers and Drains"; and "Sheriff.” BOOKS AND PUBLICATIONS RECEIVED. THE HANDY BOOK OF SOLICITORS' COSTS. By A. C. DAYES. Fifth Edition, by members of the Solicitors' Managing Clerks' Association. SWEET & MAXWELL, LTD., 2 and 3, Chancery Lane, W.C.2. 15s. THE DEATH DUTIES, comprising Estate, Legacy and Succession Duties, the Law and Practice and the Text of the Statutes. By ROBERT DYMOND, assisted by G. M. GREEN. Fifth Edition. SOLICITORS' LAW STATIONERY SOCIETY, LTD. 21s. PERSONS IN RECEIPT OF POOR-LAW RELIEF (England and Wales). H.M.S.O. 1s. 3d. STEELE'S GUIDE TO SELF-PREPARATION FOR THE FINAL AND HONOURS EXAMINATION OF THE LAW SOCIETY. Second Edition. By E. A. STEELE and G. R. J. DUCKWORTH. SWEET & MAXWELL, LTD., 2 and 3, Chancery Lane, W.C.2. 58. Students preparing for the Law Society's Examination will find this little volume invaluable. We note that Mr. Steele does not "think that the current regulations (as to the Solicitors' Final and Honours Examinations) will be permanent," and he rightly lays emphasis on the importance of the study of recent case law by the would-be solicitor. The text of the section of the Solicitors Act of 1922 relating to attendances at Law Schools is given in an appendix, as are, also, the questions set at the Solicitors' Final Examination in March last. JOURNAL OF THE INSTITUTE OF ARBITRATORS (INCORPORATED). October. Published quarterly by the Institute, 28, Bedford Square. W.C.1. 18. ELLIOTT ON WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION. Ninth Edition. By MONTAGUE BERRYMAN. SWEET & MAXWELL, LTD., 2 and 3, Chancery Lane, W.C.2. 21. 2s. THE BANKRUPTCY (AMENDMENT) ACT, 1926 (16 and17, Geo. V, c. 7), and the BANKRUPTCY RULES, 1926. With Explanatory Notes by W. N. STABLE. Being a supplement to the thirteenth edition of Williams on Bankruptcy. STEVENS AND SONS, LTD., 119-120, Chancery Lane; SWEET & MAXWELL, LTD., 2 and 3, Chancery Lane. 28. FIFTY YEARS OF PARLIAMENT. By the EARL OF Oxford AND ASQUITH. In two volumes. CASSELL & Co., LTD. 21. 10s. JUSTICE OF THE PEACE. October 30th. The current issue of the Justice of the Peace marks a notable innovation—a special weekly section in which will be dealt with in detail all the more important changes in the principles and machinery of Rating and Valuation consequent on the Act of 1925. Thse ection will be conducted by Mr. A. H. Peacock, M.A., A.S.A.A., Rate Superintendent of the County Borough of West Ham, and articles by eminent counsel and leading Rating and Valuation experts will appear from time to time . . . should be noted, too, that the current issue contains a most topical article on Chief Constables and Apprehended Dis turbances." 66 It NOTES OF CASES. (ases of special importance will be reported later on in full in the LAW JOURNAL REPORTS. DIGEST AND NOTER-UP FOR HALSBURY'S 'LAWS OF ENGLAND.' HUSBAND AND WIFE.-Divorce-Damages-Assessment Without Jury.-BEDFORD v. Bedford & POWDRILL (p. 306). HELD that under rules 2-6 of the R.S.C. and rule 30 (13) of the Matrimonial Causes Rules, there is jurisdiction to order that an undefended suit for divorce shall be heard before the Court itself, notwithstanding that damages are claimed. As to claims for damages in suits for divorce: See HALSBURY, vol. 16, TITLE "HUSBAND AND WIFE," Part XI, Sec. 7, Para. 1101. MASTER AND SERVANT.-Workmen's CompensationInjury before but Death after January 1, 1924-Compensation.CLEMENT v. DAVIS & SONS (p. 304). HELD that s. 24 (2) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, which provides that the amount payable to the dependants of a deceased workman shall not be reduced below £200 by deductions in respect of any weekly payments made under the principal Act, does not apply where the accident took place before January 1, 1924. 66 As to the deduction of sums paid to workmen from sums payable to dependants: See HALSBURY, vol. 20, TITLE MASTER AND SERVANT," Part IX, Sec. 3, Para. 417. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE.-Action against Committee of Unregistered and Unincorporated Society-Claim for payment against trustees of property of the Society.-IDEAL FILMS, LTD. T. RICHARDS and OTHERS (p. 305). HELD in an action in respect of goods supplied to an unregistered and unincorporated society, in which the defendants, were the committee of the society and the trustees of its property, that the trustees were properly made defendants, and that a claim for an order directing them to pay what should be found to be due was correctly framed. As to representative parties in actions: See HALSBURY, vol. 23, TITLE" PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE," Part I, Sec. 1, Para. 182. SETTLEMENTS.-Settled Land-Appropriation for Annuities -Settled Land Act Trustees.-BIRD in re; WATSON v. NUNES (p. 305). HELD, where under a will lands had been appropriated to meet annuities and other land was held in trust for certain persons for an estate in fee simple contingent on the happening of various events, that all the land was settled land and that there being no person having the powers of a tenant for life, the trustees were entitled to exercise such powers. As to persons having powers of a tenant for life: See HALSBURY, vol. 25, TITLE SETTLEMENTS," Part IX, Sec. 1, Para. 1100 et seq. WORK AND LABOUR.-Master and Servant-Deductions from Wages-Minimum Wage-Age of Servant.-JONES v. HARRIS (p. 306). HELD that, under the Agricultural Wages (Regulation)| Act, 1924, and an Order made thereunder, no deduction could be made for board and lodging in calculating wages payable to an agricultural labourer. As to rates of wages for agricultural workers: See HALSBURY. vol. 28, TITLE "WORK AND LABOUR," Part II, Sec. 2, Para. 1552, supplement for 1926, p. 2233. HOUSE OF LORDS. Ocr. 28. HOUSE OF LORDS. CLEMENT v. DAVIS & SONS. Workmen's Compensation-Injury by Accident before January 1, 1924—Death from Injury after January 1, 1924– Compensation Paid during Incapacity-Right to Deduct Amount so Paid from Sum Claimed by Dependants on Death of Workman--Statutory Minimum of 200!.—Not Applicable to Cases in which Accident Occurred before Act of 1923 came into Operation-Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (13) and 14 Geo. 5, c. 42), sec. 24, sub-sec. 2. APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of Appeal (Lord Hanworth, M.R., Scrutton, L.J., and Sargant, L.J.), affirming an award of a County Court judge sitting as arbitrator under the Workmen's Compensation Acts. The appellant was the widow of George Clement, who was employed by the respondents as a collier. On November 28, 1918, he was injured by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, and the respondents admitted their liability to pay compensation, and paid it up to the date of his death, which happened on January 24, 1925, in consequence of the injuries received in the accident. The compensation paid amounted in all to 533l. 15s. 5d. After the death of her husband the appellant filed a request for arbitration, claiming the sum of 2001. The respondents did not admit that any sum was due, as the sum already paid to the deceased man as compensation exceeded 2007., and might, under the provisions of the Act of 1906, be deducted from the amount otherwise payable to his dependants on his death. The appellant relied on sec. 24, sub-sec. 2, of the Act of 1923, which provides that the amount payable to the dependants of a deceased workman should not be reduced below 2001. by deductions in respect of any weekly payments made under the principal Act. The County Court judge held that the sub-section did not apply when the accident had taken place before January 1, 1924, when the Act of 1923 came into operation, and his decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal, who held that the case could not be distinguished from that of Moakes v. Blackwell Colliery Co. [1925], (94 L.J., K.B. 725: [1925] 2 K.B. 64), in which they had held, under similar circumstances, that the section of the Act of 1923 had not a retrospective effect, and did not apply to cases in which the accident took place before that Act came into operation. Mrs. Clement appealed to the House of Lords. W. H. Upjohn, K.C., and A. T. James for the appellants; E. W. Cave, K.C., and J. Victor Evans for the respondents. THE HOUSE OF LORDS (Lord Dunedin, Lord Shaw, Lord Sumner, Lord Wrenbury and Lord Blanesburgh) affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal. Appeal dismissed. Solicitors: Smith, Rundell, Dods & Brocket, agents for Morgan, Bruce & Nicholas, Pontypridd, for appellant ; Kensholes & Prosser, Aberdare, for respondents. (Reported by C. E. Malden, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.) COURT OF APPEAL. BANKES, L.J. IDEAL FILMS, LTD. v. RICHARDS AND This was an action by the plaintiffs claiming 2341. 7s. 8d. for films supplied to the Llanbradach Workmen's Hall and Institute, an unregistered and unincorporated society in South Wales, and the defendants were eleven members thereof, sued as the committee of the society, and six other persons, sued as the trustees thereof. On an application under Order XXV, rule 4, Horridge, J., struck out the names of the trustees from the writ and statement of claim as showing no reasonable cause of action, and gave judgment for them with costs. The plaintiffs appealed, but on October 13, when the appeal came on for hearing, the matter was adjourned for the purpose of giving the plaintiffs an opportunity of amending their statement of claim, as, in the opinion of the Court, it did not sufficiently raise the question as to the liability of the trustees. The statement of claim is set out below, the words in italics showing the amended portion thereof. "1. The Llanbradach Workmen's Hall and Institute is an unregistered association of miners and other workmen employed at Llanbradach, South Wales. The first eleven defendants are and were at all material times members of the said association, and also are and were members of a committee appointed by the general body of members to conduct the affairs of the association on the members' behalf, and are sued as representing the general body of the members. The remaining defendants are and were at all material times the trustees of the said association and the funds of the association and certain leasehold premises, situate at Llanbradach, the property of the association, are and were vested in them as such trustees. The said funds and premises are and were at all material times the common property of the members of the association and vested in the trustees upon trust for the members. 2. The said association has for some years carried on upon the said premises a cinematograph theatre for the benefit of the members, and has hired films for the purpose of exhibition at the said theatre. "3. By various contracts in writing made between the plaintiffs and the said committee acting for and on behalf of the members of the said association by one W. J. Jones, the secretary of the said association, the plaintiffs agreed to supply the films therein mentioned for exhibition at the said theatre upon the terms and at the prices specified in the said contracts. The plaintiffs duly supplied the said films, together with posters ordered by the said committee acting as aforesaid, and the sum of 2341. 78. 8d. is due and owing to the plaintiffs in respect of the said films and posters and the carriage thereof. "The plaintiffs claim: (1) A declaration that the sum of 2341. 7s. 8d. is due and orcing to the plaintiffs from the members of the association; (2) an order directing the trustees to pay the sum, together with the costs of this action, to the plaintiffs out of the property and assets of the association in the hands of the trustees; and (3) an order charging the property and assets with payment of the sum and costs to the plaintiffs." W. E. P. Dane for the appellants; A. W. Cockburn for the respondents. THE COURT allowed the appeal. In view of the decision in Walker v. Sur [1913] (83 L.J., K.B. 1,188 ; [1914] 2 K.B. 930) the present claim, as amended, had been correctly drawn for the purposes of a claim against representative members of an unincorporated society. In the case of trade unions, the question as to whether an action was maintainable would depend on statutory provisions, but, in the present case, there was direct authority-see per Lord Lindley in Taff Vale Railway v. Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants [1901] (70 L.J., K.B. at p. 913; [1901] A.C. at p. 443)-for the contention that the trustees in whom the property of the association was vested could be joined as defendants in the action against the committee. Appeal allowed. Solicitors: Hugh V. Harraway for the appellants; Marlyn and Martyn, agents for Edward Horley & Son, Cardiff, for the respondents. (Reported by W. Grist Hawtin, Esj., Barrister-at-Law.) CLAUSON, J. BIRD, In re; WATSON U. NUNES. Oct. 20. Settled Land--Will-Real Estate in Trust for Sons Attaining 21-One Son Attaining 21-Land Appropriated for Payment of Annuities-Trustees for Purposes of the Settled Land Acts, 1882-1890-Settled Land Act, 1925 (15 Geo. 5, c. 18), secs. 1, sub-sec. 1 (iii) (v), 19, 20, sub-sec. 1 (ii), 117, sub-scc. 1 (ix). THIS was an Originating Summons taken out by the present trustees of the will of B. to have certain questions as to whether land devised by the will was settled land within the meaning of the Settled Land Act, 1925, and, if so, who was the tenant for life or the person having the powers of the tenan: for life under the Act. By his will dated July 17, 1902, the testator appointed the plaintiffs executors and trustees, and declared that the trustees should be trustees of his will for the purpose of the Settled Land Acts, 1882 to 1890,and after bequeathing a number of annuities devised and bequeathed the residue of his property unto and to the use of his trustees upon trust after payment thereout of all outgoings to pay the net annual income thereof to his cousin N. for his life, and, after his death, as to the capital and income of his residuary estate in trust for the children of N., who, being sons, should attain the age of 21 years, in equal shares. The testator directed his trustees to set aside and appropriate suficient of his property to meet the annuities bequeathed by his will, and declared that such annuities should be a charge upon the properties appropriated, but should not constitute a charge upon the remainder of his estate when such appropriation had been made. Three of the annuities bequeathed by the will still remain payable. The testator died on October 4, 1902, and the trustees of his will, by a deed dated April 4, 1903, appropriated certain freehold ground rents to meet the annuities given by the will. The estate of the testator included certain freehold properties which had not yet been realised. N. died on January 5, 1918, having had issue three sons only, the defendants, R. A. N. who attained the age of 21 in 1925, and II. O. N. and E. C. N. who will attain the age of 21 in the years 1927 and 1929 respectively. The plaintiffs recently contracted to sell part of the testator's residuary real estate and also part of the real estate appropriated to meet the annuities, and the purchasers raised questions in each case as to whether the plaintiffs were trustees for sale. The summons asked to have it determined (1) who was entitled to the income of the testator's residuary estate accruing between the date when the defendant R. A. N. attained 21 and the date when the defendants should all have attained 21 or died under that age; (2) whether the plaintiff's as trustees of the will were trustees for sale of (a) the unrealised residuary real estate of the testator, (b) the real estate which had been appropriated to meet the annuities, and (3) if the plaintiffs were not such trustees for sale, whether the residuary and appropriated real estates was settled land, and, if so, who was tenant for life or had the powers of a tenant for life under the settlement made thereof by the will. His Lordship, having regard to his decision on question 3 of the Summons, did not think fit to give a decision on the second question, which involved the construction of provisions contained in Part IV of the First Schedule to the Law of Property Act, 1925. Under the definition of “land ” given by sec. 117, sub-sec. 1, para. (ix), of the Settled Land Act, 1925, the word 'land is made to include a number of things, and includes any estate cr interest in land net the defendants, were interests in undivided shares. Sec. 1, sib-sec. 1 (v), of the Act provides that any instrument, whether made before or after the Act by virtue of which any land stands charged with the payment of any rentcharge for the life of any person or of any annual or periodical sums for the benefit of any persons creates or is for the purposes of the Act a settlement, and by para. (iii) of sec. 1, sub-sec. 1, such an instrument under which land is limited in trust for any person for an estate in fee simple, or for a term of years absolute contingently on the happening of any event, is also a settlement for the purposes of the Act. L. W. Byrne for the trustees; W. H. Aggs for the son who had attained the age of 21; I. Kelly for the two infant sons. 66 CLAUSON, J., said that the adult son was not entitled to more than one-third of the income at the present time. He did not propose to give an answer to question 2 of the Summons, as it was unnecessary by reason of the decision he had come to upon the remaining point. As to whether the residuary and appropriated real estate was settled land, though the interests of the sons were interests in undivided land and could not be settled land by reason of the definition of "land" in sec. 117, sub-sec. 1, para. (ix), of the Settled Land Act, 1925, land which was the subject of a settlement within sec. 1, subsec. 1, of the Act would remain settled land notwithstanding that ultimately some estate might come into being which was an estate in an undivided share only. The annuities came within the expression in sec. 1, sub-sec. 1 (v), of the Act of 1925, annual or periodical sums for the benefit of any persons," and accordingly, as to the appropriated real estate, the will operated as a settlement within the Act. With regard to the residuary real estate not appropriated, sec. 1, sub-sec. 1 (iii) applied, as the son who had attained 21 was a person for whom land was limited in trust for an estate in fee simple contingent on the happening of various events, and therefore the will as to that land also operated as a settlement under the Act. The appointment by the will of the trustees as trustees for the purpose of the Settled Land Acts, 1882 to 1890, made them trustees for the purpose of the settlement under the Act of 1925, and under sec. 23 of the Act they had the powers of a tenant for life unless there were some other person who had those powers, but as to the land appropriated there was no such person coming within the definition of a tenant for life in sec. 19 of the Act, the annuitants and the three sons or any of them not being entitled in possession to the entirety of the settled land. And as to both the land appropriated and the residuary real estate not so appropriated, though the eldest son fulfilled the conditions of a person having the powers of a te ant for 1 fe in sec. 20, sub-sec. 1 (ii), he could not be said to have that interest in possession, and was accordi igly unable to claim to have the powers of a tenant for life. Therefore the trustees of the will under sec. 23 were the persons who could exercise the powers of a tenant for life. Solicitors: Watson, Sons & Room. (Reported by Geoffrey P. Langworthy, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.) Vages Master and Servant-Deduction from Wages-Minimum Wage -Age of Servant-Burden of Proof Agricultural W (Regulation) Act, 1924 (14 and 15 Geo. 5, c. 37), sec. 7, sub-secs. (1), (2) and (11). CASE stated by the Justices for the County of Monmoutth. On August 11, 1924, the respondent, a farmer, engaged one, F. D. Pugh, as a general farm labourer at a weekly wage of 8s. with board and lodging. Pugh continued in the respondent's service on these terms until August 6, 1925. The value of the board and lodging was 178. per week. At the time of entering the respondent's service, Pugh stated that he was 18 years of age, whereas it was stated before the Justices that he was, in fact, 21 years of age. On September 17, 1925, the appellant preferred two informitions against the respondent for that he, on July 25 and August 1, 1925, did employ Pugh, a worker in agriculture, and did not pay Pugh at a rate not less than the minimum fixed by the Agricultural Wages (Regulation) Act, 1924, and the Orders of the Agricultural Wages Board made thereunder. By an Order of the Monmouthshire Agricultural Wages Committee, dated July 4, 1925, it was prohibited to reckon, a; the payment of wages, the benefit of board and lodging provided. By an Order of the Agricultural Wages Board, dated March 10, 1925, the wages payable for employment of workers in agriculture in Monmouthshire were fixed at the following minimum rates: 21 years and over, 32s. ; 20 years and under 21, 30s.; 19 years and under 20, 278.; 18 years and under 19, 248. The Justices held that an employer was not obliged by the Act and Orders made thereunder to pay the full amount of the minimum wages in cash without having regard to sums due for board and lodging, but was entitled to set-off such sums as a debt due and payable under an agreement entered into between the employer and employee in arriving at the rate of wages to be paid ; but that, as no such agreement had in fact been arrived at in the present case, a technical offence had been committed; and that 3s. 7d. was due from the respondent to his employee Pugh. The Justices imposed a fine of 2s. 6d. This case was stated at the request of the appellant. The Attorney-General (Sir Douglas Hogg, K.C.) and H. Hull for the appellant; J. E. Singleton, K.C., and W. H. Williams for the respondent. THE COURT allowed the appeal, and remitted the case to the Justices to determine the amount of the arrears due. Two questions arose. First, whether in arriving at the amount of wages payable a deduction might be made on account of board and lodging. The terms of the Act were sufficiently clear, and as from July 4, 1925, the sum of 17s. was improperly deducted, and the respondent had no right of set-off for the board and lodging. The second question related to the age, and the mode of proof of the age, of the worker concerned on the facts of the case. It had been suggested that under sec. 7, sub-secs. (1) and (2) of the Agricultural Wages (Regulation) Act, 1924, the whole burden of proving the age of a worker fell upon the employer. That seemed an erroneous interpretation of the sub-sections. In the opinion of the Court it was the duty of the prosecution to establish a prima facie case. The prosecution here ought to have begun in the Court below by showing the age of the worker, so as to enable the Court to ascertain the rate of wages payable. But what was the age of this young man at all material times was left vague. The Justices appeared to have concluded that they were entitled to accept the evidence of the employer that the youth had said he was 18 years of age, and that, not being contradicted by satisfactory evidence, they were entitled to treat the youth as being of that age. But it was obvious that where the amount of a minimum wage depended upon the age of the worker, what was in question was his true age, not statements which he might have made about it, because in proceedings of that kind it was an official, acting on behalf of the community and in the interests of the community, raising the question. It was now too late to prove that the worker's age was 21 and not 18 as stated to the employer, but this case must go back to the Justices with a direction that the wages should be calculated at the appropriate rate from July 4, 1925. Appeal allowed. Solicitors Solicitor for the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries for appellant; Ellis & Fairbairn for respondent. (Reported by C. B. Pearson, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.) PROBATE, DIVORCE AND ADMIRALTY DIVISION. LORD MERRIVALE, P. BEDFORD v. BEDFORD AND Ост. 15. POWDRILL. Divorce Damages-Assessment by Court without Jury in Undefended Case-Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857 (20 and 21 Vict., c. 85), sec. 33-Judicature (Consolidation) Act, 1925 (15 and 16 Geo. 5, c. 49)-Matrimonial Causes Rules, 1924, Rule 30 (13). A HUSBAND petitioned for divorce on the ground of his wife's adultery, and claimed damages from the co-respondent. The case was undefended. The Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857, sec. 33, provided that the damages to be recovered on any petition should in all cases be ascertained by the verdict of a jury. The Juries Act, 1918, sec. 2, and the Administration of Justice Act, 1920, sec. 2, gave power to the Court to order that, in an undefended case, the damages should be assessed by a judge alone. The. Administration of Justice Act, 1925, repealed sec. 2 of the Administration of Justice Act, 1920, and the operation of sec. 33 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857, was thereby revived. The Judicature (Consolidation) Act, 1925, which came nito operation on January 1, 1926, repealed sec. 33 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857, and the practice is therefore now regulated by R.S.C. Order XXXVI, rules 2-6, and by the Matrimonial Causes Rules, 1924, rule 30 (13), which latter provides that, unless a Registrar shall otherwise direct, all causes in which damages are claimed shall be tried by a common jury. On January 21, 1926, upon an ex parte summons taken out by the petitioner, a Registrar made an order that the case should be heard before the Court itself, and it was accordingly placed in the undefended list. H. B. D. Grazebrook, for the petitioner, referred to the various changes in the practice above indicated. LORD MERRIVALE, P., pronounced a decree nisi, with costs against the co-respondent, and assessed the damages at 251. Solicitors: Williamson, Hill & Co., agents for Bates and Mountain, Grimsby. (Reported by Herbert Rolfe, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.) PRACTICAL POINTS. Questions from Annual Subscribers only are answered; these must be typewritten, and should be in duplicate, the name and address of the subscriber being stated. Owing to the large number of questions rceeived, a proportion only ean be published in this Column, answers to questions not selected for publication being sent to the subscriber by post. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS. 1. Children. Legitimation by Subsequent Marriage. We are under the impression that a Bill was before Parliament which would have the effect of legitimising children if the parents subsequently married, with the consequent rectification of the registers. We seem to have lost sight of the progress of this Bill, and we should be extremely obliged if you could inform us whether such Bill has been passed and become operative, ANSWER. The Bill has not yet become law. The Prime Minister, in answer to a question on August 29 last, said he hoped it would be possible to pass the Bill into law before the end of A. L. the present Session. 2.-Executors and Administrators.--Outstanding Legal Estate -Vesting of-Law of Property Act, 1925, Sched. I, Part II. By his will A., who died in 1895, gave the residue (including a leasehold property) to his trustees on trust to carry on his business and provide a home for his wife, and, after her death, on trust for his son B. and his daughter C. in equal shares ; and appointed his wife and his son B. executors and trustees. Both executors proved, and the widow died in 1909. In 1918 the son B. purchased the freehold reversion with his own moneys. In 1924 the son B. died intestate, leaving his sister C. sole heiress-at-law and next-of-kin. There was implied assent to the bequest of the said leasehold property (see Wise v. Whitburn [1921] 1 Ch. 460). C. is now selling the property as freehold. How should the legal estate in the leasehold interest be got in? Has Law of Property Act, 1925, First Schedule, Part II, 3 and 6 (c), vested the leasehold estate in C. already, or has paragraph 6 (d) done so, or should C. appoint new trustees of the will? ANSWER. I think that para. 6 (d) of Part II of Sched. I of the Law of Property Act operated to vest the leasehold estate in C. R. 3.-Executors and Administrators.-Executors also Residuary Legatees-Taking in Specie. A. by his will, dated May 28, 1894, appointed his two daughters executors and trustees thereof, and after certain specific devises devised the residue of his estate unto his trustees upon trust to sell and convert into money the same and to divide the net moneys arising therefrom between his two daughters in equal shares. A. died on March 20, 1926, and his will was proved on May 18, 1926. The two daughters appointed as executors and trustees are the same persons as the daughters entitled in equal shares to the net proceeds of sale of A.'s residuary real estate. Instead of exercising the trust for sale contained in the will, the daughters desire to take the property as tenants in common. Can the daughters as trustees sell to themselves so as to give a good title on a future dealing of the property? If so, please refer to a precedent. ANSWER. 5-Executors and Administrators.-Executrix becoming Entitled-Assent. A testator who died in 1914 appointed his daughter sole executrix and trustee, and devised real estate to her upon tust for sale with power to postpone and to pay the income to his widow for life, and at her decease in trust for his executrix absolutely. The widow has recently died. The property has not been sold, and the executrix wishes to retain it. Is it necessary or desirable for her to convey the property to herself? I know of no precedent (in the sense of decided case). But it is undoubted law, often acted upon, that the accused having chosen his tribunal, must abide by his choice. A. L. 7.-Mortgagor and Mortgagee.-Mortgage of ReversionRecovery of Interest-Statutes of Limitation. Is there any limitation of a claim for interest on a mortgage of a reversionary interest during the life of the tenant for life? In 1912 A. assigns by way of mortgage his reversionary interest in residuary estate under will of B. subject to life tenancy of C. The estate at that time was mainly pure personalty. The mortgage contains a covenant by A. to pay interest. C., the life tenant, has just died, and the estate becomes divisible. No interest has been paid. Can the mortgagee claim to receive all the arrears of interest as from 1912, or is there any limitation ? If so, what? ANSWER. There is no statutory period of limitation applicable for the foreclosure or redemption of a mortgage of personalty. A mortgage of a reversionary interest in the proceeds of the sale of land is within the statute, but a mortgage of a reversionary interest in residuary personal estate is not. (Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 19, pp. 100,173.) If the mortgage is by deed an action can be brought on the covenant within G. E. 20 years. (Ibid, p. 76.) 8. Master and Servant..-Heart Strain-Death-Workmen's Compensation Act, 1925. A gardener, aged seventy-five, was employed by a farmer to attend to and be in charge of his private garden for two days a week, and so worked for ten years, being paid at the end of each week for two days' work. The gardener was also working in a similar manner for another employer. His health had been excellent, but one day, while working for the farmer, he was taken ill. He had strained his heart while working, and was forthwith laid up, and died within a month. Will you please say if his widow, dependant on his earnings, can claim workmen's compensation? ANSWER. The question is one of fact; it is not possible to express a decided opinion. If it can be shown that in the course of his employment the workman had to do heavy lifting, etc., and might have strained his heart in that way, the claim might succeed. Reference should be made to Willis's Workmen's Compensation, twenty-fourth edition, pp. 77 et seq., where the very numerous cases on the point are considered. D. L. M. 10. Settled Land.-Vesting Deed-Death of Tenant for Life. Under the will of a testatrix, who died in 1907, freehold property was devised to trustees in trust to pay the income to the testatrix's daughter for life, and after her death in trust for conversion and division amongst the daughter's children. As there is no immediate trust for sale we assume it will be necessary to execute a vesting deed in favour of the testatrix's daughter, who is still living. We shall be obliged if you will tell us whether we are correct in this, and what steps will have to be taken when she dies? ANSWER. Yes, there should be a vesting deed as stated. When the daughter dies the Settled Land Act trustees as to whom see Settled Land Act, sec. 30 (3)—will take a grant of representation of her estate limited to the settled land, and then assent to the vesting of the land in the trustees for sale. See Settled Land Act, 1925, sec. 7 (1) and (5). R. 11.-Trusts and Trustees.-Trust for Sale One Trustee— Vesting Assent. By his will (proved in 1910) a testator gave his real and personal estate to his wife for life and after her decease to his trustees upon trust for sale, and division of proceeds between testator's grandchildren. No vesting deed was executed, and the widow died in 1926, leaving a will, but no free estate. A., the surviving trustee of testator's will, has taken a grant of probate of the widow's will, limited to the settled land (one small field) and has now arranged to sell. Are we correct in assuming that the proper procedure is for : (1) A. to appoint another trustee to act with him, so that there will be two trustees to give a receipt for the purchase money. (2) A. to then sign a vesting assent vesting the property in himself, and the new trustee, upon trust for sale. (3) The trustees then to convey to the purchaser. (4) We presume A. cannot deal with the property alone (as personal representative of the testator). 66 By her will, made in 1920, A. devised her real estate to and to the use of her (sole) trustee his heirs and assigns upon trust for sale. A. died this year, and the trustee is about (a) to appoint an additional trustee, so as to comply with sec. 14 of the Trustee Act, 1925, (b) to sell the real estate. (1) In view of the somewhat unusual wording of the devise, what clause should be inserted in the Special Conditions of Sale so that, assuming the validity of testatrixs title to the estate, the purchaser will be compelled to accept a conveyance from the trustee and the additional trustee. (2) How far does sec. 131 of the Law of Property Act, 1925, affect the position? ANSWER. (1) I do not think that any special condition is necessary or that any purchaser will be entitled to object to take a conveyance from the trustees. (2) Sec. 131 of the Law of Property Act does not appear to me to affect the matter at all. R. 13.-Vendor and Purchaser. Liability for Arrears of Taxes. A purchase of a freehold house was completed on April 3, 1925, the purchaser allowing the vendor two days' property tax and the vendor undertaking to pay the second instalment of tax. The vendor is in default and his present address is unknown. The collector of taxes claims that the purchaser, the present occupier, is liable for the whole of the tax. Is it not correct that the purchaser is liable only for tax for the time he has been in occupation? ANSWER. The rules as to the persons chargeable to Sched. A. Tax are now contained in the Income Tax Act, 1918, First Schedule, Sched. A., No. VII, and apparently Rule 3, proviso (b), precludes the levying upon the purchaser of any arrears which ought to have been levied upon and ultimately borne by the vendor (see Halsbury's Laws of England, vol. 16, p. 634, and Supplement for 1926). G. E. 14.-Will.-Legacy-Assignment-Notice to Solicitors. I shall be glad if you will advise me on the following points: A. dies, and by his will, after appointing B. administrator, he gives a legacy to C. C. subsequently assigns to D. The solicitor for D. gives notice of the assignment to B.'s solicitor, who acted in the administration, with a request that they will obtain acknowledgment of the receipt of the notice by the administrator. After about three weeks the solicitors for the administrator-write saying that they have no instructions, and accordingly return the notice. They are still acting for the administrator. Will you please advise me: (1) Whether the knowledge of the solicitors in this case constitutes knowledge of the administrator. (2) Whether in case of any further negotiation by the legatce, during the period between the receipt and return of the notice, the legacy (which in this case consists of a share in a certain business) can be followed and claimed by D.? ANSWER. (1) Notice to the solicitors of the administrator of the assignment is not sufficient unless they have authority expressed or implied to receive such notice. (See Halsbury's Laws of England, vol. 4, p. 385, and cases there cited.) (2) The assignment of the legacy is not complete until express notice in writing has been given (Law of Property Act, 1925, sec. 136), and D.'s only remedy would be against C. 15.-Will.-Construction-Contingent Gift. G. E. May I suggest that the reply to Query No. 10 in the issue of your paper for October 9 is incorrect. The facts of the case clearly suggest that the payment of the second 50l. to C. was postponed "to let in some other interest," and accordingly Hallifax v. Wilson applies. The legacy, originally contingent, became vested when C. proved the will and acted as trustee : it will, therefore, upon the death of A., be payable to C.'s executors. See Hawkins 277, Jarman 1,404, and Halsbury, vol. 28, p. 813, para. 1,465. ANSWER. As I said in my previous answer, the question is one of construction of the testator's will. I must be content to differ from my correspondent as to how this particular will might probably be construed by the Court. R. 16.-Will.-Gift to Children-Death of One Before TestatorLapse. A testator who died in 1918, after bequeathing a life interest in his estate to his wife, devised and bequeathed the residue upon trust for sale and directed his trustees to hold the proceeds for his two sons in equal shares as tenants in common." 66 17.-Will-Sale-Trust for-Sale by Personal Representative. Under a will proved in 1916 a testator appointed A., his widow, and B., a son, executors and trustees, and devised etc., all his estate to them upon trust for conversion with power to postpone sale at discretion. The estate included some freehold property which has not been sold. A. has recently died, leaving B. sole executor and trustee, and it is now desired to sell the property. Can B., being now the sole personal representative, convey the property to a purchaser, or will it be necessary for him to appoint another trustee of the will. ANSWER. If A. and B. never expressly or impliedly assented to the devise to themselves as trustees, B. can sell as sole personal representative. Cf. sec. 36 of the Administration of Estates Act, 1925. Otherwise the appointment of another trustee will be necessary. R. |