companies, the certificates of which were in London. The testator died in May, 1915, domiciled in Germany. By his will dated July 28, 1913, his property was bequeathed to German, Austrian, Polish and English beneficiaries. The will was proved in Germany, and on November 24, 1922, grant of administration in England was made to the plaintiff subject to an undertaking by him to account to the Public Trustee for such share of the testator's property in England as belonged to ex-enemy beneficiaries. At the date of the testator's death the securities were held by London agents. The Commissioners of Inland Revenue claimed that estate duty was payable out of the assets on all the English, South African and American securities, taking their value as the market value at the testator's death. The plaintiff thereupon took out this summons asking whether estate duty was payable upon the English, South African and American securities, and, if so, at what rate and on what basis of valuation and subject to what allowances the duty should be paid. It was contended that duty was not payable on the South African and American securities because the companies were not situate in England at the death. Cleveland Stevens for the plaintiff ; C. J. Radcliffe for the British beneficiaries; and Stafford Crossman for the Commissioners of Inland Revenue. EVE, J., said the fact that the testator's power of disposing of the shares had been temporarily suspended could not operate to change the location of the particular shares held by alien enemies, leaving unchanged the locality of shares held by those shareholders whose powers of disposition were not affected by emergency legislation. The shares remained throughout locally situate in this country. With regard to the value to be placed on the shares, the Finance Act, 1894, sec. 7 (5), provided that the value was to be estimated at the price such shares would fetch if sold in the open market at the testator's death. It was true that the testator was disqualified from transferring the shares, but in order to ascertain the market price of the shares, the broker was bound to find out the price at which such shares were being sold and to return that as the correct valuation. Solicitors: Harvey Clifton; Stanley Attenborough & Co.; Solicitor of Inland Revenue. (Reported by S. E. Williams, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.) CLAUSON, J. Nov. 4. SCOTT, In re; SCOTT v. SCOTT. Practice Administration Order-Further Consideration-Will— Settled Shares-Separate Sets of Trustees-Payment Out of Court-Trustees of Will Directed to Transfer to Separate Sets of Trustees. THE testator, Sir J. M. S., made his will in 1900, leaving his residuary estate in certain proportions to his three sons and two daughters, directing the trustees of his will to hold the shares of his sons upon trust to pay the income of each share to each son for his life and after his death in trust, subject to the life interest given by his will to his widow, for the children of each son on their attaining the age of twentyfive years, and to hold the daughters' shares in trust to pay the income from each share to each daughter during her life, and in the event of her marrying in trust to settle her share for her separate use, with remainder to her children. The testator died in 1912. In 1924 an action for the administration of the testator's estate was commenced, in which, on November 24, 1924, an order was made appointing two new trustees of the will, and separate sets of trustees for each settled share. This was a summons for the further consideration of the administration of the estate, the trustees of the will asking for an order that certain investments transferred to the credit of an account in Court should be transferred out of Court to the trustees of the will, and that they should be at liberty to divide the same and such of the residuary estate then in their hands together representing the residuary estate by appropriation of the investments in the proportions in which the settled shares were entitled amongst the separate sets of trustees of the settled shares. C. E. E. Jenkins, K.C., and F. H. L. Errington for the children of a deceased son and the children of the two daughters of the testator, said that such an order was made by Chitty, J., in Arnold v. Robinson, an unreported case (1874, A. 73); R. F. MacSwinney for the trustees of the will; H. O. Danckwerts for the tenants for life of three of the settled shares, the children of a deceased son, and the child of the other son. CLAUSON, J., said that, following the precedent of the order made by Chitty, J., in Arnold v. Robinson (supra), he would make the order asked for. Solicitors: Capron & Co. (Reported by Geoffrey P. Langworthy, Esq., Barrister-atLaw.) Settled Land-Person Having Powers of a Tenant for Life— Term of 99 Years in Trustees-During Continuance to Pay Income of Land to A. for Her Life-Vesting Deed in Favour of A., a Person Having Powers of a Tenant for Life-Settled Land Act, 1925 (15 Geo. 5, c. 18), sec. 20 (1) (viii). THIS was a summons under sec. 93 of the Settled Land Act, 1925, taken out by A. claiming to be a person having the powers of a tenant for life under a settlement dated September 13, 1906, and the respondents were the trustees of the settlement and the present Baron W., who claimed to be tenant for life under the settlement. The summons asked for a declaration that the applicant was a person having the powers of a tenant for life under the settlement, and that the trustees should execute a vesting deed in favour of the applicant. By the settlement the then Baron W. conveyed to the trustees the mansion house and lands known as the Bradfield Estate, to hold certain parts thereof to the use of the Baron during his life, and subject thereto as to the whole of the estate to the use of the trustees for a term of 99 years if Lionel Walrond, the only surviving son of the Baron, and Charlotte his wife or the survivor should so long live upon the trusts thereinafter declared. And after the expiration of such term of years, and in the meantime subject thereto and to the trusts thereof to the use of William,the infant son of Lionel W. and his wife, during his life with remainders over. The trustees were then directed to hold the term of years and during the joint lives of Lionel and Charlotte pay one moiety of the rents to Lionel and the other moiety to his wife, and in the event-which happened—of the wife surviving, to pay the whole to her during the remainder of her life. In 1915 Lionel died, and in 1920 his widow married A. Baron W. died in 1925, and his grandson William Walrond became the present Baron, and he attained the age of twenty-one years in March last. The question arose whether Mrs. A., the applicant, was a person having the powers of a tenant for life under the Settled Land Act, 1925, as coming within the meaning of sub-clause (viii) of sec. 20 (1) of that Act. Subclause (viii) was as follows: a person entitled to the income of land under a trust or direction for payment thereof to him during his own or any other life, whether or not subject to expenses of management or to a trust for accumulation of income for any purpose, or until sale of the land, or until forfeiture, cesser or determination by any means of his interest therein." 66 John Bradley Dyne for the trustees; C. P. Sanger for the applicant; Henry Johnston for the present Baron. CLAUSON, J., said that the question turned on the meaning of sub-clause (viii) of sec. 20 (1) of the Settled Land Act, 1925, and whether the applicant had an interest under the settlement such as was described in that sub-clause. She was entitled to the income of the land not for the whole of her life, but for her life or until the expiration of the term of 99 years vested in the trustees. Having regard to the language used in that sub-clause, if a person was entitled during a fixed term of years, if he should so long live to receive the income of the settled land, as the applicant was entitled, he came within the meaning of the sub-clause. That sub-clause referred to the determination of her interest by any means," and these words were wide enough to include its determination by means of the ending of the term during the life of the applicant. The result was, therefore, that the applicant was a person having the powers of a tenant for life under the settlement within the meaning of sec. 20 (1) (viii) of the Settled Land Act, 1925, and consequently she was the person in whose favour the trustees ought to execute a vesting deed. Solicitors: Peacock, Fisher, Chavasse & O'Meara; Linklaters & Paines. 66 (Reported by Geoffrey P. Langworthy, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.) KING'S BENCH DIVISION. LEONARD LORD HEWART, C.J. v. WESTERN SERVICES, LTD. OCTOBER 29, 1926 Hackney Carriage-Omnibus-Plying for Hire-Return Ticket -Availability in Omnibuses of Same Proprietor-Town Police Clauses Act, 1847 (10 and 11 Vict., c. 89), sec. 45Town Police Clauses Act, 1889 (52 and 53 Vict., c. 14), secs. 1 to 4. CASE stated by Monmouthshire justices. The appellant preferred an information against the respondents for playing for hire in the district of Risca with a certain omnibus, without being licensed in that behalf. The respondents were the proprietors of a number of motor omnibuses with which they maintained a regular service between Newport and Tredegar, passing through the district of Risca. They were licensed to ply for hire in every district through which their omnibuses passed, except Risca. The appellant entered one of the respondent's omnibuses at Newport, and took a return ticket to Risca station, which was within the " prescribed distance" of the Risca area. At Risca she got out, and waited for another of the respondent's omnibuses returning to Newport. On entering it she was asked if she had a return ticket, and said "Yes." Passengers who had not got return tickets were refused admission to the omnibus. The justices dismissed the information. E. W. Cave, K.C., and A. T. James for the appellant ; Paley Scott for the respondent. THE COURT dismissed the appeal. In the present case the appellant was accepted as a passenger in pursuance of her antecedent contract with the proprietors of the omnibus. It was therefore distinguishable from Armstrong v. Ogle [1926] (95 L.J. K.B. 908 [1926] 2 K.B. 438), where the passenger had no contract with the proprietor of the omnibus, but only with some one or other of a number of proprietors. The present case was much nearer to Sales v. Lake [1922] (91 L.J. K.B. 563; [1922] 1 K.B. 553). Solicitors: Smith, Rundell, Dods & Bockett, agents for T. S. Edwards & Son, Newport, for appellant; Rhys Roberts & Co. for respondent. (Reported by J. W. Hall, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.) Local Government-Repairs to Street-Inclusion of two Streets in One Account-Combined Expenses Apportioned Among Frontagers of Both Streets-Public Health Acts (Amendment) Act, 1907 (7 Ed. 7, c. 53), sec. 19. CASE stated by Hampshire justices. By sec. 19 of the Public Health Acts (Amendment) Act, 1907, where repairs are required in the case of any street, not being a highway repairable by the inhabitants at large, to obviate or remove danger to any passenger or vehicle in the street, the local authority may give notice in writing to the owners of the lands and premises fronting, adjoining or abutting on the street, and may require the owners to execute, within a time to be specified in the notice, such repairs as are described in the notice. Sub-sec. (2): "If, within the time specified in the notice, the repairs described in the notice are not executed, the local authority may execute the repairs, and may recover summarily, as a civil debt, the cost of the repairs so executed from the owners in default, and the amount recoverable from each owner shall be in the proportion which the extent of his lands and premises fronting, adjoining or abutting on the street, bears to the total extent of all lands and premises so fronting, adjoining, or abutting." The respondent was the owner of premises known as Thurlston, abutting on Victoria Hill Road in the urban district of Fleet. The appellant, on behalf of the Fleet Urban District Council, sought to recover from the respondent a sum of 35l. 12s. 6d. in respect of works executed by the said Urban District Council under sec. 19 (2) of the Public Health Acts (Amendment) Act, 1907. The respondent objected that the local authority had included in one account the expenses of repairs done by them to Victoria Hill Road, and to a separate street called Branksome Wood Road, which ran into Victoria Hill Road at right angles, and had divided the aggregate amount of such expenses among the frontagers of both roads. The justices found as a fact that Victoria Hill Road and Branksome Wood Road were separate streets, and they dismissed the complaint on the ground that the expenses of each should have been kept separate and separately apportioned. Blanco White for the appellant; W. H. Moresby for the respondent. The COURT held that the justices were right. The local authority had demanded the wrong sum, arrived at on a wrong basis. They had mixed up the accounts of two streets; if that were permissible why should not they include twenty streets in the same account. The complaint demanded a sum which never ought to have been demanded, arrived at by a confused and unjustifiable method. The justices had no jurisdiction to do, as the appellant had suggested that they ought to have done, and examine the accounts themselves and make the proper apportionment. They took the only course open to them by dismissing the complaint. Solicitors: Ernest Nash Fleet, Hants, for appellant ; Tucker, Hussey & Martin for Kempson & Wright, Farnham, Surrey, for respondent. (Reported by J. W. Hall, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.) ROWLATT, J. V. TODD (INSPECTOR OF TAXES) EGYPTIAN DELTA LAND AND INVESTNov. 21 AND 22 MENT COMPANY. Revenue Income Tax-Company-Management and Control Abroad Establishment in United Kingdom-Whether Taxable as Resident-Income Tax Act, 1918 (8 and 9 Geo. 5, Ch. 40), Schedule D, Cases IV and V. CASE stated by the Commissioners for the General Purposes of Income Tax for the City of London. The Egyptian Delta Land and Investment Company, Limited, was assessed to income tax under Cases IV and V to Schedule D of the Income Tax Act, 1918, for the years 1919, 1920 to 1924 and 1925. The company was incorporated in England on April 20, 1904, and its registered office was at 211-214, Gresham House, Old Broad Street, London. Among its objects were the purchase and development of lands in certain districts of Egypt. By a special resolution passed in May, 1907, it was resolved: "That it is desirable that the business and affairs of the company should henceforth be managed and directed entirely from Egypt and that accordingly the Articles of Association be varied.” In pursuance of that resolution the business of the company was in 1907 transferred to Cairo and had since that date been controlled, managed, directed and carried on entirely in Cairo. In that year all the London directors retired and a new board was appointed consisting of four members all permanently resident in Cairo. No directors' meeting had since been held in the United Kingdom. The secretary resided in Egypt, and the seal, the minute books, and all books of account belonging to the company were removed to Egypt and kept there. The banking account of the company was with the National Bank of Egypt at Cairo, but the company's former account with the London agency of the same bank was never formally closed, but was used only for debiting small disbursements, to the amount of 81. or 91. annually made by the London agency on instructions from Egypt. The register of transfers was kept in Cairo, where transfers of shares were passed before being registered in London. The accounts were made up and audited in Cairo, and dividends were declared in and paid exclusively from Cairo. All meetings of the company were held in Cairo. In order to comply with the requirements of the Companies Acts there was a registered office of the company in London at which the registers of members and directors and also a register of bearer warrants was kept. To meet those statutory requirements the company paid a fee to Mr. F. J. Horn, who provided it with a registered office at his address at Gresham House, where the name of the company appeared with the name of five other companies on the door. No separate room or part of a room was appropriated to the company and there were, in fact, more companies than rooms. The London secretary performed the statutory duties of filing the annual summary with the Registrar after it had been checked in Egypt and also dealt occasionally with correspondence from shareholders and transmitted to Cairo applications for share warrants and transfers which might be lodged at the registered office. His position was purely formal; he held no power of attorney from the company and had no authority to do anything more than the law required the company to do here. The company contended that it was resident in Egypt and not in the United Kingdom, and that the mere fact that it had a registered office in the United Kingdom and otherwise complied with the statutory requirements of the Companies Acts did not constitute residence in the United Kingdom for the purpose of the Income Tax Acts. The Crown contended that there were present in this case essential and important elements of incorporation in this country, of the situation of the registered office here, and of the activities required by law to be performed here; that the activities of the London secretary were appreciable and important; and that, therefore, the case was not distinguishable from Swedish Central Railway v. Thompson [1925] (94 L.J. K.B. 527; 1925 A.C. 495). The Commissioners held that the above case was distinguishable and that the company was not resident here. From their decision the Crown appealed. The Attorney-General (Sir Douglas Hogg K. C.), & R. P. Hills for the Crown; Sir John Simon, K.C., and A. Bremner for the respondents. Here 66 at ROWLATT, J., held that the question of residence was not decided by the mere fact of registration in this country. It was clear that a company resided, although not necessarily exclusively, where it had its control and management. the company was managed from abroad, but had an establishment in this country. Not only had the company to perform certain duties here, such as the making of returns, but it was required by statute to have a place here, or, applying the analogy of a natural person, it was always to be home here. The obligations of keeping a register here and allowing the public to inspect the register here constituted the idea of residence. The company had to possess an establishment somewhere and that establishment was here. He was confirmed in this view by the dicta of Warrington, L.J., in Swedish Central Railway Company v. Thompson (supra), which he did not regard as obiter. The appeal, therefore, would be allowed. Appeal allowed. MANCOMUNIDAD DEL VAPOR FRUMIZ v. DEC. 2. 66 On THE plaintiffs' ship Frumiz was insured under a time policy underwritten by the defendants. The policy contained, inter alia, a clause : Subject to the Institute free of particular average absolutely,' time clauses as annexed, but this insurance to include damage received by collision with any object (ice included) other than water." September 22, 1924, the vessel, after being anchored in shelter against bad weather, got under way and was proceeding up the Cuan Sound, off the west coast of Scotland, when she took a list to starboard and struck or came upon the ground which is there rocky, and in so doing sustained some damage. She remained aground and so became a stranded vessel. As the weather got worse, she was bumped on the rocks, and much more damage was done. Efforts to get her off incurred general average expenses, which were not disputed. The defendants resisted this claim for other damage as particular average and outside the risks covered by the policy. Robertson Dunlop, K.C., and I. H. Stranger, for the plaintiff Collision under this policy meant impact with any object other than water. W. N. Raeburn, K.C., and W. L. McNair, for the defendants: The collision clause did not cover impact with a natural object."Free of particular average absolutely' "excluded stranding, sinking or burning. If the original striking did constitute a collision within the meaning of this policy, the subsequent damage sustained while aground was also covered. a ROCHE, J. The question was whether this occurrence was a collision within the meaning of that term in this policy. No doubt, for many purposes and in many documents, "collision "had a narrower sense than was necessary to include this occurrence. In The Normandy [1904] 73 L.J., P. at page 57, [1904] P. at page 198, Gorell Barnes, J., had defined collision. The whole matter had been reviewed in an American case cited in 26 Lloyds List Reps. 82. There a limited construction had been put upon the word “collision,” which might have wider meaning in one document than in another. In Arnold's Marine Insurance, (tenth edition) para. 826, collision was defined as "contact of two objects, both of which are floating or navigable... but sometimes structures such as harbours . . . or obstructions such as ice or wreck." In Union Marine Co. v. Borwick [1895] 64 L.J., Q.B. 679), [1895] 2 Q.B. 279, in which a vessel was driven against a bank outside a breakwater, it was held that the loss was caused by collision. The headnote to that case is as follows: Held, that the loss was caused by collision and not by stranding He, Roche, J., did not find in the judgment anything to distinguish collision from stranding. The collision clause in this policy included ice, but excluded water. In that limited meaning of the word, he, Roche, J., thought collision with water meant striking a heavy wave or tidal bore or the like, while the inclusion of one natural body-ice-specifically with the term "any object," directed him to the opinion that contact with all natural bodies, including rocks, was included. 66 Judgment for the plaintiffs. Solicitors: Middleton, Lewis & Clarke; Parker, Garrett & Co. (Reported by C. B. Pearson, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.) DARNBOROUGH v. DARNBOROUGH & SMITH (CLARE INTERVENING). PROBATE, DIVORCE AND ADMIRALTY DIVISION. HILL, J. Nov. 10, 11, 12, 15, 18, 19 AND 24. Divorce-Husband's Petition-Cross Charges in AnswerCo-respondent Costs Intervener's Costs Judicature (Consolidation) Act, 1925 (15 and 16 Geo. 5, c. 49), sec. 50. Husband's petition for dissolution on the ground of the wife's adultery with the co-respondent. The wife and corespondent filed answers denying the adultery and the wife also cross-charged, in her answer, cruelty and adultery against the husband and pressed for a judicial separation. The woman named in the wife's answer intervened. During the hearing it was established that the co-respondent had taken part in the preparation of the wife's case and the same solicitor acted for them both. The learned Judge found for the husband on all issues, dismissed the intervener from the suit with costs against the wife and pronounced a decree nisi, reserving for further consideration the question what costs should be awarded against the co-respondent. Walter Frampton (W. O. Willis, K.C., with him), for the husband, asked the Judge to condemn the co-respondent in all the costs occasioned by the proceedings, including those of the intervener and those payable by the husband under the usual order for the wife's costs. H. B. D. Glazebrook for the co-respondent. HILL, J., said that there being only one petition, to which the wife and co-respondent were equally parties, there was jurisdiction to condemn the co-respondent in all the costs of the proceedings under the Judicature (Consolidation) Act, 1925, sec. 50, and that as the charges in the wife's answer were, in fact, though not in form, part of the co-respondent's case, it was just that he should be ordered to pay the costs occasioned by those charges, including the costs of the intervener. Solicitors: Ward, Bowie & Co.; agent for W. F. W. Rhodes, Bradford. Austin J. Wright, LEISURE MOMENTS. FORENSIC FABLES.-No. 33. MR. FLEDGLING AND THE APPLICATION FOR PARTICULARS OF THE STATE MENT OF CLAIM. MR. FLEDGLING was Filled with Wild Elation when his First Job Turned Up. It was a Summons in the King's Bench Division. He was to Appear at One-Thirty before a Master of the Supreme Court of Judicature and Apply for Particulars of the Statement of Claim. With regard to Paragraph 1 he was to Insist upon Precise Information as to whether the Alleged Agreement was Oral or in Writing, and, if the Latter, as to the Document or Documents Purporting to Contain it. So far as Paragraph 3 was Concerned, he was to Press for Further Details as to the Alleged Defects in the Said Goods. And the Vagueness of Paragraph 4, he Gathered, Necessitated a Closer Definition of the Loss and Damage Alleged to have been Suffered by the Plaintiff. Two Sleepless Nights were Succeeded by Two Days of Anxious Research, and on the Third Day Mr. Fledgling Tottered to the Field of Battle, Carrying his Books of Reference in a Blue Bag. He Arrived in the Bear-Garden to Find his Elderly Opponent already on the Spot. Mr. Fledgling Noted with Satisfaction that the Elderly Opponent Seemed to be Troubled at the Sight of his Authorities. Whilst Waiting for the Door of the Master's Room to be Flung Open Mr. Fledgling Quietly Went over the Heads of his Arguments. He was Glad to Find that he was Quite Calm. At last the Dread Moment Arrived and Mr. Fledgling was Standing before the Master with his Elderly Opponent at his side. The Elderly Opponent said "Good Morning, Master," in a Somewhat Familiar Fashion, but the Master, though rather Formidable in Appearance, did not Appear to Mind. While Mr. Fledgling was Explaining to the Master in a Shaky Voice the Terms of the Order and Rule under which the Application was being made, the Elderly Opponent said he was Quite Ready to give the Particulars. The Master said "All Right" and Wrote a Few Words in a Deplorable Hand on the Summons. Mr. Fledgling Could hardly Believe his Ears. He had Won, Hands Down. When he Got Home that Evening Mr. Fledgling Told his People all about it. They Gathered that Mr. Fledgling had Gone Through a Trying Ordeal; that it had been a Ding-Dong Thing and that, but for the Grim Determination of Mr. Fledgling and his Refusal to be Browbeaten by the Master or his Elderly Opponent, the Day would have been Lost. 0. MORAL: Be Thorough. DATES AND PLACES IN THE engrossment of an instrument falls within the province of the solicitor, and it may be doubted whether all solicitors have recently modernised the practice in their office in some respects. Take, for instance, the engrossing of a date. It always appears in the draft in figures. Should, say, 1896 be written down, as of old custom, one thousand eight hundred and ninetysix, or, according to the universal use to-day, "1896"? The use of the regnal year, or the insertion of the words "in the year of our Lord," or of the abbreviation "A.D.," is almost unknown to the present generation, and of course the word "day" has already disappeared from such a statement as "the eleventh day of November," or only lingers sometimes as a survival. Antiquarians, and quondam stewards of manors are well aware that Saints' days were in the past often used as dates. And to-day their use would create no ambiguity, though, perhaps, a little inquiry by the general reader; whereas the use of such a date as next Midsummer," or the expression "on the usual quarter days," would naturally convey a different meaning to two laymen, one of whom was resident in a district where the old quarter days are observed, and the other in a neighbourhood where nothing is ever heard of except the modern quarter days. 66 66 66 Nor do draftsmen appear to have always freed themselves as much as they possibly might from what was habitual when they were pupils. To refer only to small cases-cases, that is, involving 500l. or under, or demanding brevity as indorsed documents. Would any ambiguity be caused by the omission of the words on the one part and of the other part," where there are only two parties? The omission from a simple agreement of the words "whereby it is agreed as follows (that is to say)" has had the authority of Mr. Charles Davidson since 1877, if not earlier. And a description of a place as "in Essex or "in Devon " is surely quite sufficient without the word "the County of." Yet all such observations must be advanced and stand as mere suggestions, the adoption of which will depend on the amount of conservatism with which each practitioner deems it best to temper his progress in professional habits in the present changeful times. What is desirable to bear in mind is that any alteration once accepted and used in a particular draft should continue to be used from start to finish. Such a course is in accord with a well-recognised distinction between legal and literary prose compositions -a distinction however which some English and colonial draftsmen do not always appear to maintain. A variety in phrase or expression is agreeable in, and enlivens, literature, and, when not allowed to create undue doubt, may help to convey better and with greater force the author's meaning or suggestion. But among interpreters of legal instruments such things are anathema. G. PRACTICAL POINTS. Questions from Annual Subscribers only are answered; these must be typewritten, and should be in duplicate, the name and address of the subscriber being stated. Owing to the large number of questions received, a proportion only can be published in this Column, answers to questions not selected for publication, being sent to the subscriber by post. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS. 1.-Administration.-Assent to Devise. By her will made in 1918 A. appointed her husband and another to be executors and trustees thereof. Testatrix bequeathed the income of the whole of her estate to her husband for life, and at his death she bequeathed all her estate to her only son absolutely on his attaining twenty-five. In the event of her son dying before he attained twenty-five testatrix bequeathed all her estate to her husband absolutely. The will contained no trust for sale. Testatrix died in 1918, and her will was duly proved by the executors. The son has died before attaining twenty-five, and the husband is now absolutely entitled to the estate, portion of which consists of property (copyhold before 1926). Will sec. 36 (i) of the Administration of Estates Act, 1925, apply, and an assent by the executors to the husband be the proper means by which to vest the property in the husband? If so, is the precedent contained in vol. 6, p. 470, of the Encyclopædia of Forms, etc., adaptable to this case? It is presumed in that case that the stamp duty payable will be 10s., and that the assent will have to be produced to the steward of the manor in respect of the enfranchised copyhold property. ANSWER. If there has been no previous assent to the husband as tenant for life I think that the executors of A. could execute an assent under the Administration of Estates Act, 1925, sec. 36 (1). I would suggest that the assent should be under hand only, as in form 8 in vol. 6 of the Encyclopædia of Forms, p. 476, when no stamp would be required. The assent would have to be produced to the steward of the manor. G. E. 2.-Administration.-Deaths Prior to 1926-Surviving Trustee also Beneficial Owner-Vesting of Legal Estate. A., who died in January, 1924, by his will devised and bequeathed all his real and personal estate to his wife and his son B. upon trust to pay the income to the wife for life, and after her death to sell and divide the proceeds amongst all his children in equal shares. B. was testator's only child. The wife died in June, 1925. The estate included two freehold properties, one of which B. desires to sell and the other he desires to mortgage. Ought B. to execute an assent to the devise to himself as trustee for sale, or will the fact that he has since the wife's death received and applied to his own use the rents of the properties amount to an assent? In either case can the legal and equitable estates be treated as united so that B. can sell or mortgage as absolute owner, or must a new trustee be appointed to join with B. in a sale or mortgage and give receipts? Please refer to the Act and section conferring power on the trustees for sale to mortgage and say if the trustee must be expressed in the mortgage to be exercising the power so conferred upon them. ANSWER. If the wife died in June, 1925, and B. was the only child, then on January 1, 1926, he was the estate owner without reference to the Law of Property Act, 1925, and consequently can sell or mortgage as absolute owner. Trustees have power to mortgage under the Trustee Act, 1925, sec. 16, and the Law of Property Act, 1925, sec. 26 (3), as amended by the Law of Property Amendment Act, 1926 (Schedule). For a precedent of a mortgage by trustees see the Encyclopædia of Forms, vol. 10, p. 167. G. E. 4. Company.-Floating Debentures-Sale by Receiver. A company issues ordinary floating debentures to two persons, and later issues second debentures subject to the first. Receiver appointed by first debenture holders. Receiver sells the undertaking of the company, including freeholds. No trust deed. Who should convey? Please refer us to a precedent other than Encyclopædia of Forms and Precedents. Do the new Acts affect the position, there being only one person-the Receiver to receive the purchase money? ANSWER. As there was no trust deed the legal estate apparently remains vested in the company, and the company should concur with the Receiver in conveying the property. The Receiver can give a receipt for the purchase money, as he is in the same position as a sole mortgagee. I cannot refer the subscriber to a more suitable precedent than that in the Encyclopædia of Forms, vol. 15, p. 907. G. E. A. B. is entitled to certain property formerly copyhold and now enfranchised by the effect of the Law of Property Act, 1922, sec. 128. He wishes this property to be sold at his death by his executors. Prior to 1926 it would have been possible to save the fine on the admission of the executors by devising the property to such uses as they should appoint, etc. Glass v. Richardson (2 De G.M. and G. 658); re Heathcote and Rawson (108 L.T. 185). Assuming that the manorial incidents remain unextinguished at A. B.'s death : : (1) Is the lord entitled both to the fine which would have been payable on the admission of the executors and to that which would have been payable on the admission of the purchaser in the absence of the special form of devise above referred to ? (2) If yes, is there now any, and if so what, method of avoiding this double fine by inserting a special form of devise when drafting the will? ANSWER. In my opinion the lord is not entitled to claim a fine as on the admission of the executors having regard to the Law of Property Act, 1922, sec. 129 (9). See Hart on Copyholds, p. 37. Q. 6.-Copyholds.—Undivided Shares-Vesting of Legal Estate. A. and her daughter B. were tenants in common in equal shares of copyhold property, subject to a mortgage of the entirety, created by a predecessor in title, who was absolute owner. A. died in December, 1925, appointing C. sole executor, and devising her estate to him in trust for sale and to divide proceeds amongst her children equally. C. proved the will in February last, and now wishes to sell A.'s share to B. subject to the mortgage. In whom is the property now vested, and how should the proposed sale be carried out? ANSWER. Presumably A. and B. were admitted tenants on the Court Rolls and the legal estate appears to be vested subject to the mortgage term in the Public Trustee (Law of Property Act, 1922, Sched. XII, para. (8), proviso (iv), and Law of Property Act, 1925, Sched. I., Part IV, para. 1 (4), but new trustees can be appointed in his place (ibid., proviso (iii)). It would seem to be necessary that either the Public Trustee should be requested to act or substituted trustees appointed before C. can sell A.'s share to B. C., with the concurrence of the Public Trustee (or the substituted trustees), ean then convey to B. the consideration for the half share being expressed to be paid to C. The documents would have to be produced to the steward in accordance with the Law of Property Act, 1922, sec. 129 (see the Encyclopædia of Forms, vol. 19, pp. 43, 247, 405, and Hart on Copyholds, pp. 31, 127). Q. 7.-Executors and Administrators.-Tenant for Life. A. died in 1898, having by his will appointed B., C. and D. executors and trustees, and also trustees for the purposes of the Settled Land Act, 1882, and devised three dwelling-houses (naming them) to the use of E. during his life, and from and after his decease to the use of his children in equal shares. C. and D. are both dead, and E. has just now died intestate, leaving his only child F. him surviving. No vesting deed has been executed. How are the three houses to be vested in F.? Should the surviving trustee appoint a new trustee of A.'s will, and the two trustees then apply for representation to E. limited to the settled land? In that event would a vesting deed be necessary, and a deed of discharge on termination of the settlement? |