THE settlement of difficulties between the rebels of the Riff and the Franco-Spanish Governments of Morocco has been contemporaneous with the death of Sir Basil Scott, who for many years past had been British legal member on

THE LATE SIR BASIL SCOTT.

the Governing Body of the International City of Tangier. For the port of Tangier, like that of Dantzig, is an international city governed by an international commission, although, unlike Dantzig, it does not derive its status from the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations, but came into existence by agreement between the United States and the European Powers nearly twenty years ago. The Europeans resident in Tangier are still protected by the old Turkish Capitulations, no longer enforced in Consular Courts, but by a Civic Council on which all the leading states have a representative to protect the interests of their nationals. Sir Basil Scott went as British member to Tangier in 1912, after serving for many years as Advocate-General and afterwards as Chief Justice of Bombay. His knowledge of Turkish, Arab, and Mohammedan Law was very great, and he, no doubt, received his appointment because Bombay is the Indian Presidency which has most to do with these systems of jurisprudence. Indeed, until very recently, East Africa and Zanzibar were subject in legal affairs to the Government of India, and an appeal still lies from some of the East African Courts to the High Court of the Presidency of Bombay.

AMERICAN
BAR

CONFERENCE.

SOME 3,000 lawyers were gathered last week in the auditorium of Denver University for the annual meeting of the American Bar Association. Mr. James M. Beck, who three years ago was made an English barrister (and an honorary Bencher of Gray's Inn) in order to argue a case between the United States and Canada before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, delivered an address on the future of democracy, which comes at a very apt time when Parliamentary institutions throughout Europe are under so heavy a cloud. Mr. D. Campbell Lee, who is a member of both the English and New York Bars, read a paper explaining the salient points of the recent changes in the English law of property. Dealing with the abolition of the law of primogeniture, he made the point, which was considered by the framers of Lord Birkenhead's Act to justify the change, that an examination of a large number of modern wills showed the rule of inheritance of land by the eldest son not to be the rule which most people adopted when they made their wills. It was seldom done, in fact, in the case of estates of moderate size. He also said: "The English will not hereafter use that effete expression Indenture' in documents of conveyance. Each deed will be called by the name by which it is known in practice, mortgage, trust, and so on."

MANY members of the Bar who attended the inauguration of the statue to Blackstone in the Central Hall of the Law Courts two years ago have been wondering how long the plaster cast is to remain THE BLACKSTONE there. It was intended that the sculptor, Mr. Paul Bartlett, should complete his fine work in a more durable form, but his premature death in France last year has made this impossible. It will be remembered that this gift of American lawyers to the English Bench and Bar was made as a reminder to future generations that

STATUE.

The

the Commentaries of Sir William Blackstone, the great Middle Temple jurist, were the main link between the legal systems of the two English-speaking races. Hon. George W. Wickersham made the presentation, and the statue was accepted on behalf of the Bench and Bar

by the then Lord Chancellor, Lord Haldane, and the

Attorney-General, Sir Patrick Hastings. It has now been decided by the American Bar Association that the statue shall be reproduced in marble, and it is understood that its permanent resting-place will be its present site, and not outside Blackstone's old chambers in Brick Court. No doubt it will be considered proper to place on it the name and a suitable inscription.

MR. BINGLEY on Monday pointed out that if magistrial with the assent of the accused, almost every class of trates exercised to the full their new powers of summary

THE BAR AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT.

commonly occurring crime, except murder, could be tried by them, and few cases would be committed for trial. He added that counsel who practise at the Old Bailey would starve. We are afraid that very few members of the Criminal Bar either at the Old Bailey or on Circuit have ever been able to live by this class of practice alone; the chief exceptions are the Treasury Counsel at the Central Criminal Court, who will not, in fact, be much affected by the new powers, so that the vaticinations of the learned police magistrate are perhaps unduly gloomy. It is undeniable, however, that the number of cases committed for trial must greatly diminish as the new Act comes into force; this is already apparent at the Old Bailey; and steps have been, in fact, taken by the Bar Mess to adapt the "court brief" system in its diminished dimensions to the new conditions. Whilst we may sympathise with such members of the profession as find their incomes reduced by improvements in the law or its reforms may administration, the possibility that decrease forensic opportunities is not, of course, relevant consideration for reformers. An extension of the system of legal aid to such accused persons as are committed for trial-even on the restricted lines advocated by Mr. Justice Finlay's Committee-would do something, incidentally, to console the practitioners in the criminal courts.

RECORDERS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT.

*

a

RECORDERS, on the other hand, are affected by the new Criminal Justice Act not by the diminution, but by the increase, of their work. For under the new Act, indictable crimes, with certain exceptions, are to be committed for trial to the next available Quarter Sessions, where formerly committed to Assizes; at least, this is the practical result of the somewhat complicated provisions in the Act. Moreover, cases can be committed for trial to the Quarter Sessions of an adjacent county or borough, if this is convenient, so that Recorders are receiving for trial many charges arising outside their own jurisdiction. The result is greatly to increase the work of this court in small boroughs, and to compel the Recorders of large boroughs to hold adjourned Sessions, thus sitting more frequently than four times in the year. In many large cities it seems possible that the system of monthly Sessions,

hitherto found only in London and Liverpool, may be the ultimate consequence of the recent increase of jurisdiction. Here Recorders have a grievance, of which many are complaining. No provision is made in the Act for the increase of their stipend, which in many cases is purely nominal; and several are said to be contemplating resignation. One learned Recorder of a Midland town, asked

by the local Mayor, a member of the Labour Party, whether Recorders were paid for "overtime," replied that they were not, but suggested that in accordance with the principles of his Trade-unionist supporters, the worshipful Mayor should exercise his powers of proposing an increase.

MR. JUSTICE MCCARDIE AND UNCAUGHT CRIMINALS.

66

IN a recent charge to the Grand Jury on Assizes, Sir Henry McCardie called attention to the great increase in the number of crimes the perpetrators of which go undetected by the police. His Lordship suggested as a large contributory cause of this (we do not gather that he considered it the only cause) the great change which has come over the duties of the police force in the last fifty years, and more especially since the war. When Sir Robert Peel replaced the old obsolete system of elected city watchmen and of professional detectives-known as Bow Street Runners "by the modern organised and disciplined police force, the duties of a constable were practically confined to the prevention of breaches of the peace and the arrest of felons engaged in serious crimes. Except when directed to execute the warrant of a Justice of the Peace or to serve on some defendant a summons issued at the instance of some private or official prosecutor, it was no part of his duty to assist in conserving the local government of the country. Nor was he expected to interfere with the ill-treatment of children or animals. He was proverbially warned to leave alone the quarrels of husbands or wives, and with several other offences he had nothing to do. Nuisances it was no part of his duty to abate or prevent. Drunks he had no power to arrest unless they committed an assault or were otherwise guilty of breaches of the peace. Motor-cars, and the multitudinous duties they impose on the protectors of the public safety, had not yet come into being out of Tartarus, or wherever else Vulcan may have instigated the designing of these contrivances which the unsophisticated native of Africa and India still calls " devil-machines." Now all this is changed. The legislature has set about controlling the lives of its citizens by enacting innumerable statutes, and the local authorities are equally busy with bye-laws. The relations between the sexes are the subject of rigid interference which grows ever more drastic. Motor-cars, public-houses, and those who resort of them, matrimonial disputes, children, animals, nuisances; all these are now within the view of the policeman. A knowledge of law is expected of him, and he has to attend courses of instruction therein, and even to pass examinations. It is inevitable that he has less time to watch for and shadow the professional criminals who commit burglary or larceny, or to follow like a sleuth-hound on the trail of the murderer.

IN Re Cayzer, Irvine and Co. (Times, 20th inst.) the Court of Appeal have reversed a much-discussed judg

AWARDS AND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

ment of Mr. Justice Rowlatt (42 T.L.R. 163). A steamer chartered by the Admiralty had been lost in 1917 by a risk which was ultimately held in an arbitration to be a war risk, and, therefore, the subject of compensation by the Crown, not the underwriters, in accordance with a princi

ple now very familiar. The award was not issued, however, until 1923. In an action on the award, the Crown pleaded the Statute of Limitations, and the question arose whether in the circumstances the statute runs from the date of the loss, or from that of the award. Primâ facie, one might be disposed to think, as did Mr. Justice Rowlatt, that since the subject's right to sue accrued in 1917, the statute runs from that date. But the charterparty constituting the requisitioning was in the form known as "T99," in which form clause 21 provides for arbitration to decide (inter alia) whether the loss is due to a "marine risk " (which under clause 19 falls on the underwriters), or a war risk" (which under clause 19 falls on the Admiralty). And the Court of Appeal have taken the view that the claim creates a submission to arbitration which automatically suspends the owner's right to recover compensa

66

tion until an arbitration has been held and an award made. His right to sue, therefore, arises only on the date of the award, and it is from this date that the Statute of Limitations commences to run. In so deciding, the Court of Appeal considered that the case was really governed by the rule laid down in the leading case of Scott v. Avery (5 H.L.C. 811), where the judges were summoned to give their opinion in the House of Lords, and where it was held that no complete right of action in a dispute submitted to arbitration exists until an award has been made. Since in an action between subject and subject this principle applies, the Court further held that, in a submission to arbitration by the Crown, there must be an implied condition which imposes on the Crown a similar rule of procedure.

RECOVERY OF BETTING DEBTS.

THE recent decision of the Court of Appeal (Bankes, Atkin, and Sargant, L.JJ.), in Hyde v. Tyler (Times, 25th ult.), would seem to indicate that the Courts of Common Law are now engaged in calling a halt to the tendency which commenced a generation ago of trying to find roundabout devices by which the winner of a bet can sue the loser, notwithstanding the statutory bar to the recovery of such debts. At Common Law, as is well known, the King's Bench held that wagers were not indeed irrecoverable but could only be recovered in actions provided the Court had no other business. Then the Legislature began to interfere. The Gaming Act, 1845, rendered void and irrecoverable all gaming and wagering debts; and under two earlier statutes, the Gaming Act, 1710, and the Gaming Act, 1825, cheques given in payment of such wagers were deemed to be given for an illegal consideration. There has been other statute law on the point, not relevant to our immediate purpose. But after the last important statute, the Gaming Act of 1892, a reaction in the Courts set in. Ways and means of getting out of the legislative prohibition were devised by ingenious counsel and found unexpected support and sympathy from the bench. Thus it was held in De Mattos v. Benjamin (1894, 63 L.J., Q.B. 30), that the Act of 1892 does not deprive a principal, employing an agent to make bets for him, of his right to recover from such agent any money in his hands received on account of such bets.

AGAIN in O'Sullivan v. Thomas (1895, 64 L.J., Q.B. 398),

holder money deposited with a shareholder by him before

THE RULE IN HYAMS U. STUART

KING.

he had paid it over to the winner. Finally, in Goodson v. Grierson (1908, 1 K.B. 761), and in Hyams v. Stuart King (1908, 2 K.B. 696), the Court of Appeal (Moulton, L.J., dissenting), found what practically amounted to a way out of the statutory prohibition altogether. It was there held that if a bookmaker or other winner of a bet threatens to sue the loser, or to have him posted at Tattersall's, or elsewhere, as a defaulter, and then forbears to sue in consideration of the loser promising to pay the debt, or giving a cheque in payment, such forbearance "to sue is a "new consideration" supporting a new promise to pay, or the implied promise contained in a cheque, which is in no way tainted with the character of a betting transaction, and therefore can be sued upon in the courts. Since 1908 there has been a harvest of litigation in which the limits of this principle have had to be constantly considered. In Hyde v. Tyler, where a party to a bet had agreed to abide by the decision of Tattersall's as to the odds, the odds, the plaintiff sued on this as on an implied promise to pay. It is difficult to distinguish this case from Hyams v. Stuart King on any ground of substantial principle. But Mr. Justice Horridge held that here there was no implied new promise to pay and the Court of Appeal have upheld his decision.

THE EVIDENCE OF HANDWRITING EXPERTS.

MR. JUSTICE SWIFT, in a recent case, refused to pay any attention to the evidence of a handwriting expert on the ground that such evidence was worthless. This view is not at present supported by any authoritative decision, although, ever since the error of M. Guerin (afterwards handsomely acknowledged and retrieved) in the famous Adolf Beck case, many judges have warned juries not to attach too much importance to it. A practical difficulty is found in ascertaining the qualifications which a witness must possess before he can be accepted as an "expert." There are only one or two persons who actually practise as experts. But bankclerks, cashiers, shorthand writers, and others who have professional or commercial experience in the deciphering of scripts, are, in fact, generally permitted to be called as expert witnesses at the Old Bailey. Forgery and libel cases, of course, are those in which this crime most frequently arises, but in murder cases the identification of an accused person's handwriting is sometimes material. In the case, two years ago, of the Frenchman, Jacques Vacquier, who was accused of poisoning the landlord of a public-house, and who had purchased poison of a Bloomsbury chemist, the question seemed at one point likely to be material, but the accused in the event admitted the purchase. In the Maybrick case a similar issue was Even if experts were excluded from the not immaterial. courts in charges involving comparison of handwritings, juries would have to exercise their own opinion by an investigation of the scripts alleged to be identical, and experience shows that they are, in fact, assisted by having their attention drawn to similarities or dissimilarities which are only discoverable by experts, although, once detected, the jury can discern their presence.

LINCOLN'S INN.

July 22, 1926.

THE NEW CONVEYANCING: A REVIEW.
II.

I MENTIONED last week the three primary changes made by the Property Acts: the abolition of copyhold tenure; the repeal of the Statute of Uses; and the simplification of legal estates; and I added that a legal estate cannot be held by an infant, and cannot exist in undivided shares. I should also have included the abolition of descent to the heir. Other changes there are which might well, from their general utility, be placed in the front rank; notably the trust for sale imposed in the case of undivided shares. But I reserved this for notice as part of the machinery for facilitating the transfer of land.

I have been reading the very interesting article on "The Reform of the Land Law" by Prof. Holdsworth which was published in The Law Quarterly Review for last April, and amongst other matters he sketches, as I did a year ago (60 L.J. 505) the attempts which were made in the 17th century to introduce a system of registration of deeds. Those attempts, as is well known, only got as far as the establishment of the Middlesex and Yorkshire Registries, just as-to come to a later date the attempts at establishing compulsory Registration of Title have only, up to the present, succeeded in London-and Eastbourne. It is a curious commentary on the partial manner in which changes in the law are sometimes made. It might have been thought that a 200 years' trial was sufficient to show whether Registration of Deeds was a good system or not, and yet the only result of the trial has been that the counties which had it-Yorkshire, at any rate-have not desired to give it up, and the counties which were left without it have never shown any desire to have it. Registration of Title has not been in operation sufficiently long to make any such observation appropriate, and indeed during the 19th century opinion was hesitating as to which system was more worthy of general adoption. Prof. Holdsworth reminds us that the Commissioners who reported in 1878-9 put the argument as follows:

"That Registration of Titles is in the abstract to be preferred to registration of assurances may at once be conceded, for the former aims at presenting the intending purchaser or mortgagee with the net result of former dealings with the property, while the latter places the dealings themselves before him, and leaves him to investigate them for himself. In one case he finds, so to speak, the sum worked out for him; in the other he has the figures given him, and has to work out the sum for himself.” That, speaking " in the abstract," puts the case neatly enough, and I need not just now consider whether there is the same advantage, when the process is turned into the concrete. But the quotation aptly enough serves my purpose, for what the draftsman of the Property Actsor, rather, I should say, Lord Birkenhead's Bill-designed was to attain for private conveyancing the advantages which previously had been thought possible only with Registration of Title. And that is why a halt has been virtually called in the attempt to extend the system of Registration of Title. It is now a case of "Wait and See,"

private or deed-conveyancing which were relied on to make it a rival in simplicity of Registration of Title. The first and chief of these was the new arrangement of legal estates which I have mentioned as one of the fundamental changes made by the new law. A legal estate must either be the entire fee simple, or it must be a term of years. Granted the division of tenure into freehold and leasehold, then there can be only one person— or several jointly-who represent the freehold estate, and one person representing the leasehold estate. It is the same with registered titles. The freehold and leasehold estates are registered separately, but only a single personor several holding jointly-can be registered as proprietor. Under the new conveyancing the owner of the legal estate -the estate owner-represents the freehold or the

There were three leading features in the new system of

leasehold interest, as the case may be, and corresponds to the registered proprietor.

circumstances, to have a true overreaching effect; that is, it does not simply divide the proceeds of sale among the beneficiaries pointed out by the settlor or testator; it may overreach equitable interests paramount to the trust, and transfer these also to the proceeds of sale. As I have in a former Letter pointed out, it has been thought by some that, under the Law of Property Act, 1925, this was the ordinary effect of a trust for sale. But the new form given to s. 2 (2) of that Act shows, if necessary, that this is not so, and that the overreaching effect of a trust for sale is confined to cases where the trustees have been

The curtain provisions of the Property Acts are no more than an extension of the system which has been in operation for very many years in the case of trusts for sale, and for the last forty years in the case of settled land. It has always been recognised that, even though the beneficiaries might be regarded as having an interest in the land, yet their interests substantially existed only in the proceeds of sale. So much so that the creation by a testator or settler of an imperative trust for sale-or, as it is called in the new Acts, an immediate binding trust for sale operated as a conversion of the real estate into personalty. Consequently, unless so required by the trust, no consent of a beneficiary was necessary to enable the trustees to sell. In selling, they only executed their trust, and the beneficiary was bound to accept the proceeds of sale, or his share of the proceeds, in full satisfaction of his interest. Thus, a sale by the trustees for sale did not, properly speaking, overreach any equitable interest; it simply gave the equitable interests the form which they were always supposed to have; that is, it gave the beneficiaries the proceeds of sale to which alone they were entitled. The effect of a sale by a tenant for life under the former Settled Land Acts was in principle quite different. It operated both on legal and equitable interests, and, provided they were not a security for money actually raised, it extinguished them as interests in the land, and gave to the persons entitled a substituted interest in the proceeds of sale. This was an overreaching effect, and was the result of the Settled Land Act, 1882.

The curtain provisions of the Property Acts are simply an extension of these two devices. It is a mistake to suppose that the owner of the legal estate has any general power to overreach equitable interests by a conveyance of that estate. He can, indeed, defeat the equitable interests by conveying the legal estate to a purchaser for value without notice, and under the new system of registration of equitable interests as land charges, the purchaser may take free from them even if he has notice. But this does not depend on any power in the estate owner to overreach equities. That he can do only where there is a trust for sale or a settlement.

There have been, however, certain changes in the application of these devices. They are as follows:

(1) The scope of trusts for sale has been extended by introducing statutory trusts. These are now well known. They arise where land was on January 1st last held in undivided shares, or since that date there has been a purported conveyance of a legal estate in undivided shares; and similarly where land is held beneficially in joint tenancy (Law of Property Act, 1925, s. 36; Sched. I, Part IV). This is a change of great benefit where the shares are numerous, or where, for other reasons, the title is complicated. It is not required where the beneficial owners are few, and are absolutely entitled, and it would in such cases frequently be productive of inconvenience. But here conveyancers have the remedy in their own hands. They can, and should, ignore the statutory trust for sale, and let the parties deal with the land in the ordinary way as beneficial owners. This is the principal statutory trust for sale. There is also a statutory trust for sale of the real estate of an intestate (Administration of Estates Act, 1925, s. 33).

(2) The trust for sale has been allowed, under certain

trust corporation. In all ordinary cases, therefore, a trust for sale has no overreaching effect at all in the proper sense.

(3) The scope of settlements has been extended by including in the statutory definition of settlements various cases where there is no settlement at all in the ordinary sense. The list of settlements, actual or notional, is given in s. 1 (1) of the Settled Land Act, 1925. In some respects the extension is beneficial. Thus, it enables a married woman entitled in fee simple, but subject to restraint on anticipation, to sell the land, thereby overriding Bates v. Kesterton (1896, 1 Ch. 159), and it increases the facilities for disposing of land of an infant. And generally there would have been no objection to the extension, but for the condition imposed by s. 13 that where there is a settlement there must be a vesting deed, before the estate owner can sell the land. This condition was meant to be a factor in simplifying titles. In the case of larger settled estates it has probably had that effect. In other cases it has proved a source of trouble and expense, and it has been one of the chief causes of dissatisfaction with the new system. However, to the supposed necessity of retaining the compulsory vesting deed as one of the corner stones of the system I shall return.

(4) The overreaching effect of settlements has been increased by extending it to certain interests which do not arise under the settlement. These are specified in s. 72 (4). They are certain charges which are capable of regis tration under the Land Charges Act, 1925, and a conveyance under the Settled Land Act by the tenant for life overreaches them, notwithstanding registration under the Land Charges Act.

So far, then, we have the legal estate vested in an estate owner, and there may be equitable interests in the land vested in other persons. If there are, then they can be overreached by virtue of a trust for sale or a settlement, but only to the extent above stated. It remains to be seen how far the re-classification of legal estates, and really the extension of trusts for sale and settlements, have simplified conveyancing. It will be necessary also to bring under review the registration of land charges, including puisne mortgages, and the rules as to devolution of the legal estate in unsettled and settled land.

LAWYERS' ESTATES.

J. M. L.

SIR THOMAS ERSKINE HOLLAND, K.C., D.C.L., LL.D., of Poynings House, Woodstock_Road, Oxford, and of All Souls College, for 36 years Professor of International Law at Oxford, and a Bencher of Lincoln's Inn, who died on May 24, aged 90 years, left estate of the gross value of 33,6251., with net personalty 32,2871. He left: To the Bodleian Library the rare volume containing the "Commentationes de Jure Belli" of Albericus Gentilis published in 1588-9, also if the library undertake to preserve them his large collections, mostly contained in portfolios, of documents relating to the said Gentilis and to his birthplace, and such other early edition of the works of Albericus Gentilis and Richard Zouche as are already possessed by All Souls College, to which college "I give the edition not hitherto possessed by it." To All Souls College his books and pamphlets relating to International Law, Diplomacy, and Treaties.

MR. WALTER NEWTON, of Corringham Road, Golder's Green, N.W., and of Salter's Hall Court, E.C., solicitor, who died on May 26, aged 63, left estate of the gross value of 21,6431., with net personalty 21,1431. He left :-£350 to the Oxford and Bermondsey Mission; 450l. to Dr. Barnardo's Homes; 350l. to the Boy Scouts' Asso

ciation; 500l. to King Edward's Hospital Fund; 250l. to the Young

Men's Christian Association; 500l. to the Vicar and Churchwardens of St. John the Baptist Church, New North Road, Hoxton, for the poor and charity; 500l. to the Vicar and Churchwardens of Christ Church, New North Road, Hoxton, for the poor and charity; 50l. to his late housekeeper, Charlotte Hine.

RESIDENTIAL OR

quite a subsidiary matter that the trade or business of innkeeping was substantially the object in view : the same in the reverse way appears in Re Russell and Harding,

A CASE recently dealt with by His Honour Judge Ingham in the Shropshire County Court (only reported in the local papers) opened up a question which has several times been argued in the High Court, and which is of importance in landlord and tenant cases, and also in revenue and rating matters.

The facts of the case in question (Phillips v. Karslake) which arose upon case stated by an arbitrator under the Agricultural Holdings Act, were that a property consisting of a mansion house, a farm, and some 280 acres of land, was purchased by the husband of the respondent. He spent nearly £5,000 in enlarging and altering the mansion, and farmed the land himself. Upon his death the widow let the whole to the applicant, whose tenancy came to an end at Michaelmas, 1925, upon notice given by the respondent. On quitting, the tenant (the present applicant) sought to recover compensation for disturbance. This was refused on the ground that the estate constituted a gentleman's high-class country residence, the amenities of which had been enjoyed by the applicant at a rental of 4251. per annum, and that he had not, therefore, been the occupier of an agricultural holding within the meaning of the Act so as to be eligible for disturbance compensation. The arguments in the case, so far as the lay newspaper reports indicate, seem to have followed those which centred in the well-known 66 country inn" case (Re Lancaster and Macnamara, 1918, 2 K.B. 472; 87 L.J., K.B. 1250), where the property demised consisted of a country tavern rated at 321. together with 86 acres of farm land rated (with the farm buildings included) at 1021. per annum. There it was held that the property so demised did not come within the definition of "agricultural holding" because that would practically involve the application of that definition to every case where a parcel of agricultural land formed part of a mixed demise.

But Re Lancaster and Macnamara was decided in 1918, and subsequent legislation has to a large extent nullified its value as a precedent. Sec. 33 of the Agricultural Holdings Act, 1923, deals quite pointedly with cases of this sort. It creates a distinction between the purely agricultural portion of the demised property and that which is not agricultural (terming the latter "nonstatutory" land) and provides for the usual system of compensation in respect of improvements and disturbance to be applied to the agricultural portion "unless otherwise agreed in writing." This, however, does not apply to any contract of tenancy made prior to January 1, 1921, so that it would have no bearing upon the case before Judge Ingham, whose decision in favour of the tenant presumably was based on the broader view taken in Re Russell and Harding (1922, 57 L.J. 399; 39 T.L.R. 92; 128 L.T. 476), where a farmhouse had been used as a resort for paying guests whilst the occupier had continued to farm the land attached to it in the usual way. Indeed, that would seem to be the only view possible for there is a vast distinction between keeping a country inn to which a parcel of land is attached, and residing in a mansion, to which a large acreage of land is attached, as tenant of an owner who presumably has found the mansion too expensive or too unwieldy to keep up, and accordingly has let it like an ordinary farmhouse for the occupancy of a farming tenant.

How, then, do we stand in this matter, and what are the tests to be applied in order to determine whether a "mixed" occupancy dating prior to January 1, 1921, is to be treated as an agricultural tenancy or a residential? Obviously the main purpose underlying the occupancy must be considered. In the village inn case, the evidence clearly showed that the cultivation of land was

and the reception of guests in the farmhouse a subsidiary or incidental matter. It is clearly not permissible to apply the new principle introduced by sec. 33 of dividing the demised premises into agricultural and non-agricultural. Therefore, it would seem that the determining factor is the main or prevailing purpose for which the premises were let and occupied. This would apparently mean that the decision in the case before Judge Ingham would have been otherwise had the original owner or his widow remained in occupation, for in that case the residential objects of the owner would have prevailed. And so we should get this curious anomaly-that the same premises which might at one time constitute an agricultural holding, at another time might rank as merely residential. Happily sec. 33 has come along to remedy this for the

future.

COSTS IN TAX CASES.

THE gross hardship to the taxpayer of the system by which he is mulcted in the costs of successful appeals by the Crown was well exemplified by the debate in the House of Lords on Tuesday, of which a report will be found in another column. Mr. Seymour, the Kent cricketer, having received the proceeds of a benefit match, was assessed to income tax on the amount. The Commissioners discharged the assessment and Mr. Justice Rowlatt upheld their decision. The Crown appealed, and the Court of Appeal, by a majority, held that the proceeds of the benefit were liable to income tax, and allowed the appeal with costs. As Lord Harris pointed out, if the case goes no further the result will be that nearly half of the amount received by Mr. Seymour will be swallowed up by the costs, whilst if he should decide to appeal to the House of Lords, and should lose there, there will be little, if anything, left for him of the whole

sum.

The Lord Chancellor, in his reply to Lord Harris, said that it was the duty of the Crown to appeal in doubtful cases, and that, although the amount in any particular case litigated might be small, the decision was taken as a precedent and applied to "hundreds or thousands" of other people. This argument has, of course, no force at all in the case of a professional cricketer's benefit, and it has very little, if any, force in any other case. For the truth is that, if the Crown loses and the matter is regarded as of any importance, a clause is introduced into the next Finance Bill to alter the law on the point, sometimes with retrospective effect. Clause 22 of this year's Finance Bill, which was introduced in consequence of the decision in Whelan v. Henning (61 L.J., N.C. 120), is a case in point. To talk in such circumstances of the danger of encouraging the taxpayer to litigate claims by the Crown if he were not liable for costs is really adding insult to injury. Where the taxpayer is the first to invoke the aid of the Courts, there may be something to be said for the view that he should pay the costs if he loses. But where the appeal from the Commissioners is brought by the Crown it should be an invariable ruleunless the Court for good cause should otherwise orderthat the question should be determined without expense to the subject.

THE reopening of the Howard Hotel in Norfolk Street, Strand, marks the final removal of the grip which the Government had imposed on the Hotel System in London at the time of the Armistice. Nothing but the outer shell remains, the interior being entirely remodelled, and no less than £100,000 has been spent on this venture. A minute's walk from the Law Courts, the Howard contains an atmosphere of perfect relaxation and artistic beauty which is essential to the legal profession.

Mr. T. P. O'Connor, presiding at a dinner at the Hotel, stated there was once a shameful contrast between our hotel system and that of America, but we had outlived that, and London's latest hotels could compare in quality and accommodation with any hotel in the world.