might vote on the appointment of a minister, but not

MODEL CHAPEL DEEDS.

LINCOLN'S INN.

July 1, 1926.

THE existence of Model Chapel Deeds is, I believe, generally supposed to date from the preparation of the Model Deed for Wesleyan Methodist Chapels nearly a hundred years ago, but I was interested recently to see in The Inquirer (June 12) an article by Mr. E. H. Mellone, headed A Model Trust Deed," and commencing :"We have before us the much-worn pages of a pamphlet bearing the following title: The Form of a Trust Deed for Dissenting Meeting Houses, etc., recommended by the Committee of Deputies of the Protestant Dissenters, of the Three Denominations in and near London, appointed to Protect their Civil Rights.' The title-page bears the imprint of Webster, Secretary and Solicitor, Cheapside, 1809'; and at the end of the draft appears the name of Richard Preston, of the Inner Temple.' The Three Denominations were the Independents (now called Congregationalists), the Baptists, and the Presbyterians, all, of course, long prior in foundation to Wesley's "Connexion," which, indeed, he never recognised as a dissenting body. He was an Anglican clergyman to the end, though he had taken the world for his parish. In a short preface to the Form of Trust Deed, the Committee say :

Many of the Deeds of Trust of the Meeting Houses and Burial Grounds of Dissenters have been drawn in a very imperfect manner, and have been materially defective in those forms which the law has prescribed; it has been found that many congregations have experienced great inconvenience both from the imperfection of their Trust Deeds and from negligence in filling up the vacancies occasioned by the death of Trustees."

To remedy these evils, the Committee had a Trust Deed drafted" by an eminent Conveyancer," and they directed it to be printed "for the general use of their for the general use of their Brethren." The writer of the article does not seem to appreciate that Richard Preston was not only an eminent Conveyancer, but a sort of super-eminent member of that class of practitioners, and his fame, with that of Fearne and Butler, has lasted until these days. However, in 1809 the Committee of Deputies, which was a body appointed to secure the repeal of laws inflicting disabilities on Dissenters, had discovered the disadvantages of leaving the drafting of chapel deeds to local ideas, and, whether conformity in matters of theology is desirable or not, it seems that conformity in the matter of trusts was considered as an ideal to be aimed at.

The actual text of this early Model Deed I need not summarise. The object of the trusts is stated to be "for promoting the Christian Religion, as professed by Protestant Dissenters of the Denomination of

at

and for enabling the professors of the same religion, of the Denomination aforesaid, more conveniently to exercise the forms of their religious worship and other ordinances of their persuasion at aforesaid"; and the primary trust is" from time to time and at all times hereafter [to] permit the said Meeting House and premises to be used, occupied and enjoyed as a place of public religious worship for the service of God, by the Society of Protestant Dissenters of the Denomination called and also by such other persons as shall be united to the said Society, and attend the worship of God in the said Meeting House." But as with all such trusts, the prudent draftsman provides for the possibility of the cause coming to an end, and in the event of the original Society being totally dissolved or dispersed, and public worship at the Meeting House being discontinued for two years, then the trustees were to sell the trust premises, but only on a written instruction signed by two-thirds of the male members of the Society who should have been subscribers during the year preceding dissolution. The insistance on males will be noticed, though this was not a universal restriction. Women

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Mr. Mellone is not able to state whether Preston's Model Deed ever came into use. Presumably it did, and even if dissenting chapels were not settled by reference to it, it may well have been used as a precedent. Many such trust deeds, of course, go back beyond 1809, but the spread of the "Three Denominations" after that date furnished ample opportunity for using it.

But the Wesleyan Methodist Model Deed referred to above is more familiar not only to myself, but to many other conveyancers, especially since its main provisions were set out at length some twenty years ago in the first edition of the Encyclopædia of Forms and Precedents, Vol. III., pp. 212 et seq., and are repeated in the new edition, Vol. II., pp. 712 et seq. The Encyclopædia, however, does not give the history of the Deed. This is quite interesting, and can be read in the Preface to the official print of the Deed issued by the Wesleyan Conference Office. The copy before me is dated 1892. The Preface is entitled "A Summary of Proceedings relating to the Adoption of the Model Deed by the Conference.' The matter was regarded as of great importance, and at the Conference held at Sheffield in 1829 a Committee was appointed to inquire into the eligibility of a Plan which had been proposed for obviating "the inconvenience, expense and insecurity to which trustees of chapels and the Connexion at large had in many instances been exposed." The Committee-who, by the way, had for their secretary the Rev. John Mason, the then "Book Room Steward," in whom I take a patronymic interestmet in London shortly after their appointment, but they declined to be hurried. Apparently it was not known that Preston had been engaged on the same matter twenty years earlier, and no use was made of his experience. Possibly he was then enjoying himself on the estate at Ashburton in Devon which he had purchased out of the proceeds of his drafts-long enough, he boasted, to go round the world-though he had by no means retired. It was a good deal later that he became Professor of Law at King's College, London. So, that the Committee might tread on sure ground, and be perfectly satisfied of the legal security of the proposed Plan," they directed a Case to be laid separately" before four of the most eminent Counsel in London." These were Sugden, then Solicitor-General (who had as his junior Richard Matthews), Bell, Brodie and Atherley, a sufficiently distinguished selection.

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The Case which was submitted to these Counsel recounted the origin of the Society of the " People called Methodists," the nature of the Trust Deeds which were in operation, and the proposal for a common form deed to which reference might be made in subsequent Deeds; and of the five questions put, the first was :-" Whether or not the Trusts, etc., in the Deed to be referred to can be attached to such subsequent Deeds by reference only, without actually transcribing them in such subsequent Deeds; and whether the Trustees, under the subsequent Deeds, will not hold the Estates subject to the Trusts, etc., expressed in the Deed referred to?" Sugden and Matthews replied: We think they can be so attached ; and that the Trustees of the subsequent Deeds will hold their Estates subject to the Trusts in the Deed referred to." Brodie: “ It will be sufficient in every subsequent Deed to refer to the original Deed; and the Trustees will hold the Estates comprised in each subsequent Deed upon the Trusts of the original Deed." Bell and Atherley advised to the same effect, but at greater length, and their opinions are not printed.

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"Fortified by these concurring authorities, the Committee no longer felt any hesitation to proceed, and, accordingly, forthwith directed Counsel to prepare the draft of a Deed which might serve as a model to be referred to by subsequent Deeds in pursuance of the Plan detailed in the Case.' "Who prepared the draft we are not, told; but the Draft, together with the Case and all the opinions, was submitted to the Conference held in Leeds in 1830. The Conference thereupon unanimously adopted the Plan and re-appointed the Committee, with power to

complete and carry it into execution. Still there was no undue haste. The Draft was printed and copies sent to some fifty persons for examination, and when it had been altered it was again circulated and further observations requested. "The Committee then directed two fair copies to be made, and laid separately before Mr. Brodie and Mr. Atherley for final settlement; and which, having been revised and finally approved by those gentlemen respectively, corrected printed copies with a letter signifying their approval were again circulated; and the Committee, having waited beyond the time specified for their return, considered themselves fully warranted in adopting the Draft so settled, without further delay." It was accordingly formally adopted by a resolution of the Committee on February 17, 1832, and final confirmation was given at the Conference held in Liverpool in the following August.

The

The Wesleyan Methodist Model Deed is, in fact, a Conveyance dated July 3, 1832, of a piece of land at Skincoat, Halifax, upon trust for the erection of a chapel and upon the further trusts which are the model trusts, and are set out in the Encyclopædia of Forms. recitals, which state the origin of the Connexion, and John Wesley's Deed Poll of February 28, 1784, which is the written constitution of the Conference, are of no professional interest and are not set out; nor the recital that the said Charles Wesley-the great hymnologist and the head of a family of famous composers and organists— departed this life in the lifetime of the said John Wesley, and the said John Wesley departed this life in the year 1791." John Wesley's conversion " was lately commemorated—an event which the Times, in its leader on the occasion (May 26), said began an epoch in English history, concluding: "He was a great Englishman, and a great leader of men, working to the last with unshaken conviction and indomitable confidence in himself and in his

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"So much I may be permitted to quote, though any observations of my own would be out of place. The Model Deed so carefully prepared with the view of spreading and establishing his work, has had many imitators, and almost every denomination is represented in the list of Model Deeds given in the Encyclopædia, Vol. II, pp. 727, 728. But, after all, I am bound in this page not to be interested in John Wesley, to whom, according to the Times, 32 million persons now look as their Founder, but in the names of Preston, of Brodie, and of Sugden, which I hope I have not inappropriately recalled.

J. M. L.

MY PRACTICE NOTEBOOK.

As a result of the changes in the law made by the Administration of Justice Act of 1925, new forms of order in administration actions have become necessary. As my readers will be aware, the form used in cases in which the suit is a brought by creditor is different from that used in a beneficiary's action. I am not proposing on this occasion to go into the question of suits for administration in detail, but, as the forms for use in cases where the person whose death causes the proceedings died after December 31, 1925, have recently been approved, it may be useful if I set them out here.

CREDITOR'S ACTION FOR ADMINISTRATION OF THE ESTATE OF PERSON DYING ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 1926. FORM OF JUDGMENT.

LET the following accounts and enquiries be taken and made:

(1) An account of what is due to the plaintiff and all other creditors of the testator.

(2) An account of the testator's funeral expenses. (3) An account of the property of the testator come to the hands of the defendant, the executor of his will, or to the hands of any other person or persons by the order or for the use of the defendant.

(4) An enquiry what parts if any of the testator's property are outstanding or undisposed of, and, as to any part of such property as is outstanding or undis

posed of, whether the same is subject to any and what incumbrance.

(5) [*An account of what is due to such of the incumbrancers, if any, as shall consent to the sale hereinafter directed, in respect of their incumbrances.

(6) An enquiry what are the priorities of such last mentioned incumbrancers.]

And let the testator's property be applied in payment of his debts and funeral expenses in a due course of administration.

[*And let the testator's real estate be sold with the approbation of the Judge, free from the incumbrances if any of such of the incumbrancers as shall consent to the sale, and subject to the incumbrances of such of them as shall not consent.

And let the money to arise by the sale of the testator's real estate be paid into Court to the credit of this action, re A- B—. v. C., 1926. A. 100. "Proceeds of sale of testator's real estate" subject to further order. And if such money or any part thereof shall arise from real estate sold with the consent of incumbrancers, the money so arising is to be applied in the first place in payment of what shall appear due to such incumbrancers according to their priorities.] Adjourn further consideration.

Liberty to apply.

*

The form to be used in a Beneficiary's action is as follows:

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ACTION WHERE

BENEFICIARY'S ADMINISTRATION
DECEASED DIED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 1926
FORM OF JUDGMENT.

ORDER administration.

LET the following accounts and enquiries be taken and made that is to say

(1) An account of the property (not specifically devised or bequeathed) of the testator come to the hands of the defendant, the executor of the will of the testator, or to the hands of any other person or persons by the order or for the use of the defendant [add, if necessary] distinguishing between capital and income.

(2) An account of the testator's debts.

(3) An account of the testator's funeral and testamentary expenses.

(4) An account of legacies and annuities.

(5) An enquiry what parts if any of the testator's property are outstanding or undisposed of, and whether any part of such property so outstanding or undisposed of is subject to any and what incumbrances.

And let the testator's property not specifically devised or bequeathed be applied in payment of the testator's debts and funeral expenses, and afterwards in payment of the legacies and annuities given by his will, in a due course of administration.

Adjourn further consideration. Liberty to apply.

These forms can, of course, readily be adapted for use in the case of an administration of the estate of an intestate. In a creditor's action, the only alteration necessary is, I think, the substitution of the word "intestate" for testator" throughout, and a reference to the "administrator of his effects" instead of to "the executor of his will"; in a beneficiary's suit, the same alterations will be necessary, and the words "not specifically devised or bequeathed" and the references to legacies and annuities will be omitted. *

*

The abolition of the rule that the land of an intestate descends to his heir-at-law has rendered unnecessary a separate enquiry in respect of real estate in cases in which the Court has to ascertain the persons beneficially entitled to an intestate's estate, and a new form of enquiry for persons entitled to the property of an intestate dying on or after January 1 of tnis year has been settled. It is as follows:

An enquiry who upon the death of A. B., became beneficially entitled to any property of his as to which he died intestate, and for what estates and interests and in what *The paragraphs in brackets are to be included where by reason of the estate being insolvent or otherwise a sale is necessary.

shares or proportions, and whether any such persons are since dead, and if they died entitled to any vested share or interest, who are their legal personal representatives.

It must not, of course, be overlooked that the forms given above apply only in cases where the testator or intestate died after December 31 last. In other cases the old forms will be used. The old forms of administration orders will be found in Seton at pp. 1347 and 1410, whilst the forms of the enquiries for the heir-at-law and for next-of-kin were given in this column at the end of last year, 60 L.J., p. 977.

*

In the County Courts Reporter issued with last week's LAW JOURNAL will be found a report of a case, decided by Judge Parry at Lambeth County Court, which should not be overlooked by those who practise in the County Courts. The short point of the case was whether or no a solicitor, whose client recovers costs on one of the County Court scales, is entitled to treat those costs as being party and party costs, so that he can charge his client with solicitor and client costs in addition, or whether the amount allowed on taxation is all that the solicitor is entitled to against his own client. The learned Judge decided that the latter is the true view, and, having considered sec. 118 of the County Courts Act of 1888, which is set out in full in the judgment, I think there is no doubt but that this is so. The section is not very happily worded, as it refers first to party and party costs, and later to solicitor and client costs, so that at first sight it would seem that the section implied that a solicitor might have a solicitor and client bill against his client as well as a party and party bill. But when one looks into it, I think it becomes plain that the reference to a solicitor and client bill is intended to apply in cases where there has been no order in the action for the taxation of the solicitor's costs. To take an instance, A. sues X., and recovers a sum of money and costs to be taxed on Scale B. That is a party and party taxation, and is covered by the first part of the section. If then X. desires to tax his solicitor's bill, that will be a solicitor and client taxation, and will take place on the application either of X. or of his solicitor. Whether the taxation be party and party or solicitor and client, the scale applicable is the guide "and no costs or charges

shall be allowed on such taxation which are not sanctioned by the scale then in force, unless the Registrar shall be satisfied that the client has agreed in writing to pay them." The heading to the Higher Scale also makes it clear that it applies to solicitor and client taxations as well as to cases where the taxation is between party and party. If then X.'s solicitor cannot recover anything from his client outside the scale, it can hardly be suggested that A.'s solicitor, who has recovered party and party costs from X., can be able to recover anything more from A.

In some cases, no doubt, this position is hard upon the solicitor, but the figures given in Judge Parry's judgment show that in cases such as that before him-and such cases are very common-any other rule would be very hard upon the client. It should, therefore, be clearly borne in mind that a solicitor for a litigant in the County Court is not entitled to any costs against his own client beyond those set out in the Scales, unless the client has agreed in writing to pay such extra costs. CURSITOR.

FRAUD AND PAYMENT
UNDER MISTAKE.

THE Case of R. E. Jones, Limited, v. Waring and Gillow, Limited (post p. 9), which has just been the subject of appeal to the House of Lords, raises some questions of great importance, and, perhaps in consequence, has had an unusually interesting career. The Judge of first instance was Lord Darling, sitting as an additional Judge of the King's Bench Division, who decided in favour of the plaintiffs. Then a Court of Appeal, consisting of Lord Hanworth, M.R., Lord Justice Scrutton, and Lord Justice Sargant, unanimously reversed this decision; they did this very emphatically, for they reversed it on

every one of the three separate and alternative grounds on which Lord Darling decided in favour of the plaintiffs. And now the House of Lords, overruling the Court of Appeal, by a majority of three to two (Lords Shaw, Sumner and Carson forming the majority, whereas Lords Cave and Atkinson dissented) has restored Lord Darling's judgment in favour of the appellants, who were the plaintiffs.

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The case is extremely interesting, because it involves consideration of the characteristics and properties which distinguish the famous equitable action which Lord Mansfield imported into the Common Law, namely, the action for "Money Had and Received" or "Money Received by the Defendant to the Use of the Plaintiff," which is used to recover by common law process and under common law remedies moneys clothed with what Equity would call a constructive trust "; this was, under the old system of pleadings, a form of the Indebitatus common counts, and is generally known as Lord Mansfield's action. Prior to Lord Mansfield's development of this count, it had been a mere action in Detinet, Debet, or Debt (the three alternative names for an action claiming payment of a fixed sum of money), where a principal sought to recover from an agent moneys belonging to the principal or actually received for the principal, in the hands of the agent. The agent, of course, was at Common Law a bailee of such funds, and his principal could recover them as bailed goods detained by the bailee. Lord Mansfield extended the action by a legal fiction so as to include also: (a) Money paid by A. to B. for a consideration which has wholly failed;

(b) Money paid by A. to B. under a mistake of fact ; and

(c) Money which A. has paid to B. under duress, or extortion, or fraud.

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Before discussing the application of this doctrine in R. E. Jones, Ltd. v. Waring and Gillow, Ltd., it is necessary to state briefly the facts in that case. A man named Bodenham (who at a later date was convicted and sentenced for obtaining money by false pretences on another charge) had obtained furniture from Waring and Gillow for which he had paid by a dishonoured cheque. They issued a writ against him for 5,000l, in respect of this cheque on December 30, 1919. Some days before this writ was issued Bodenham went to the plaintiffs, R. E. Jones, Limited, and represented to them that he was the agent of “ International Motors," a firm which manufactured Roma cars; he alleged that Waring and Gillow were the financiers behind International Motors "; he invited R. E. Jones, Ltd., to become sub-agents for the sale of these cars in the South and West of England; and he induced them to purchase 500 "Roma" cars in order to qualify themselves as agents for "International Motors.' On this purchase, which was arranged on December 31, the day after the writ issued against Bodenham by Waring and Gillow, R. E. Jones, Ltd., agreed to pay a deposit of 5,000l.; this, of course, corresponds with the amount which Waring and Gillow's writ claimed from Bodenham. R. E. Jones, Limited, in fact, drew two cheques, one for 2,000l., dated December 31, and the other for 3,000l., post-dated. At the request of Bodenham, both cheques were made payable not to "International Motors," but to "Waring and Gillow," who he pretended were his real principals, and, therefore, the real vendors. The cheques were crossed and marked "not negotiable."

Having got those cheques into his possession, Bodenham took them to Waring and Gillow, told some story to account for them, and tendered them in payment of his own debt of 5,000l. Waring and Gillow telephoned to R. E. Jones, Ltd., to ask if the cheques were in order, and received the reply that they were in order. Of course, not a word passed as to the real transaction for which the cheques had been given. Had anything been said about this, the true position must have come out, and the fraud must have been discovered. But apparently each assumed that the other must know of the supposed transaction in "Roma cars," and, therefore, no question was raised. Thus Waring and Gillow accepted the cheques and released Bodenham's furniture in the bona fide belief that the

cheques were being paid to them by R. E. Jones, Limited, on behalf of Bodenham.

cars.

It is scarcely necessary to add that Waring and Gillow were not, as alleged by Bodenham to R. E. Jones, Ltd., the real principals financing" International Motors ; Bodenham was not their representative at all; and they were quite ignorant of the supposed sale of "Roma Naturally the fraud was quickly discovered but meantime both cheques had been duly met. Thereupon R. E. Jones, Limited, claimed to recover from Waring and Gillow the sum of 5,000l. with which they had thus parted. They based their claim on three separate grounds: namely, (1) Money received by Waring and Gillow as principals of Bodenham, who had obtained it fraudulently; (2) Money paid for a consideration which had failed; and (3) Money paid under a mistake of fact. At one stage of the case the question also arose whether there had been a conversion of the cheque by Bodenham so that Waring and Gillow could not be "holders in due course," inasmuch as the cheque was marked "not negotiable." Lord Darling, however, rejected this contention on the ground that Waring and Gillow were the actual original payees of the cheque, receiving it directly from R. E. Jones, Limited, through the agency of Bodenham, and, therefore, were not transferees or indorsees at all, so that they could not be affected by questions of negotiability under section 81 of the Bills of Exchange Act or otherwise. The Court of Appeal agreed with this ruling of Lord Darling, and even seemed to think it possible that, had the mistake been discovered before instead of after the cheques had been paid by the bankers, Waring and Gillow, as payees, could nevertheless have sued upon them successfully, inasmuch as they were the original payees, and had accepted the cheques at the request of the drawer in consideration of releasing Bodenham's debt to themselves. In the Court of Appeal, however, this point was immaterial since Lord Darling, although rejecting this contention for the plaintiffs, had accepted another contention on their behalf, and had decided in their favour on other grounds.

Lord Darling, in fact, found that the cheques represented money received by Waring and Gillow to the use of the plaintiffs, because he held that they had been negligent in not enquiring into the relations between Bodenham and R. E. Jones, Ltd.; by this negligence they were estopped from contending that Bodenham was not their agent, as he had falsely held himself out to the plaintiffs, and, therefore, they were in law responsible for his fraud, notwithstanding their own innocence, on the doctrine of "Respondeat Superior" or some similar principle; therefore, they must account to R. E. Jones, Ltd., for moneys improperly received from them by Bodenham. Again, Lord Darling considered that, independently of this first ground of liability, they must be deemed to have received the cheque for a consideration which had wholly failed, namely, the supply of 500 "Roma cars to the plaintiffs, and, therefore, must repay it. Yet once more he held that in any event the money had been paid under a mistake of fact, and, therefore, was recoverable. He gave judgment accordingly for the plaintiffs.

Obviously this judgment of Lord Darling raised three issues of great subtlety. On the main issue, that arising out of the obscure relationship between R. E. Jones, Ltd., Bodenham, and Waring and Gillow, in respect of the cheque drawn by the first party, entrusted to the second, and by him presented to the third, the payee, the Court of Appeal held that there was no agency of any kind as between Bodenham and Waring and Gillow, so that the latter were not liable as his principal; nor yet was there any relationship of agency between Bodenham and R. E. Jones, Ltd., so that the cheque must be deemed to have been validly issued to the payees directly by the drawers. That being so, it followed from the rule laid down in Watson v. Russell (1864, 5 B. & S. 968) that the payees of the cheque were not bound by any equities as between the drawers and the person whom they authorised to hand the cheque to the payees; therefore no estoppel applied even if the payees had been careless in not making fuller enquiries. For this reason, the Court of Appeal considered that the case was simply one in which two

innocent parties had suffered by the fraud of a third party in such circumstances that neither was entitled to any preference in equity over the other; therefore they must be left to their legal rights, and the doctrine that "Possession is nine points of the law"prevailed to the advantage of the person who had obtained the money.

On the second issue, that of "failure of consideration," the Court of Appeal could not see its application to a case of this kind. There was no contract, express or implied, between plaintiffs and defendants; therefore there could be no failure of consideration. Bodenham was not the defendant's agent to sell "Roma" cars or for any other purpose; there was no estoppel by which he must be deemed to be their agent; nor had they ratified his agency or done any act which the law deems equivalent to ratification. Therefore, recovery of the money, on the ground that it was given to them in consideration of of a contract to sell cars meant the construction of a wholly fictitious contract between the parties, and could not be sustained.

The third issue, however, that of "Money paid under a mistake of fact was the one which really gave trouble to the Court of Appeal. The view that Court finally took was that the doctrine of "mistake" has no applicability at all unless the party receiving the money has in some way contributed to the mistake of fact under which the payer makes the payment; and on the facts of the present case they held that the defendants had not in reality in any way contributed to the mistake, which was solely due to the haste with which R. E. Jones, Ltd., concluded a transaction, relying on Bodenham, and waiving all inquiry into the truth of his representation to them. The Locus classicus of the doctrine of " Payment under a mistake of fact of course, is Baron Parke's very wellknown judgment in Kelly v. Solari, (9 M. & W. 54,) where that learned judge stated the rule as follows: "I think that where money is paid to another under the influence of a mistake, that is, upon the supposition that a specific fact is true which would entitle the other to the money, but which fact is untrue, and the money would not have been paid if it had been known to the payer that the fact was untrue, an action will lie to recover it back."

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It seems to be very difficult to reconcile the view of the Court of Appeal that here there had been no payment under a mistake of fact, with the positive language used by Baron Parke, and the limitation read by the Court of Appeal into his statement of the rule, namely, that the mistake of fact must have been one which is contributed to by the payee, is not supported by other authority. In Aiken v. Short (1 H. & N. 210), it is true, Baron Bramwell used these words: In order to entitle a person to recover back money paid under a mistake of fact, the mistake must be as to a fact which, if true, would make the person paying liable to pay the money; not where, if true, it would merely make it desirable that he should pay the money." The Court of Appeal applied this qualification of Baron Parke's definition to the present facts, by suggesting that here the payment by R. E. Jones, Limited, even had the facts been true, would have been purely voluntary. But is this really so? Surely, had the facts been true, there would have been a genuine contract of sale as between plaintiffs and defendants in respect of which plaintiffs were bound to pay defendants a deposit of amount actually thus paid. Other cases relied on by the Court of Appeal, e.g., Chambers v. Millet (32 L.J., C.P. 30) and Baker v. Courage (1910, 1 K.B. 56), seem to be equally inapplicable here, because they turn on the view (it is submitted an erroneous view) that the mistake of fact which accompanied and induced the payment was a mistake of fact as between Bodenham and the plaintiffs, not as between plaintiffs and defendants. This seems an unreal interpretation of the undoubted facts of the case and the House of Lords did not accept that interpretation.

From the criticisms of the decision of the Court of Appeal suggested in the foregoing paragraph it will have become clear that the differences of view which prevailed in the first instance court, in the Court of Appeal, and in the House of Lords turned not so much upon the principles of law which govern cases of this kind,

nor yet upon the findings of fact, which were never in any real doubt, but on the interpretations of the facts made by each of these three tribunals. Lord Darling interpreted the facts as showing that the plaintiffs, in making their payment by cheque of 5,000l., treated Bodenham as the defendants' agent, and made the payment solely because they believed him to be the defendants' agent. His Lordship further considered that the plaintiffs' erroneous impression would not have resulted in an actual payment had the defendants not contributed to that mistake (of course, quite innocently) by making no enquiry as to why R. E. Jones, Ltd., who were not bankers or financial agents or bill-discounters, came to be paying so large a sum on behalf of Bodenham. The Court of Appeal, on the other hand, interpreted the facts as meaning that the plaintiffs were fraudulently induced by Bodenham, without privity or negligence of the defendants, to pay the defendants a cheque in discharge of Bodenham's debt to them in consideration of which the defendants released Bodenham's furniture. The House of Lords took an intermediate interpretation. They held that in substance Waring and Gillow had obtained moneys belonging to R. E. Jones, Ltd., without any title thereto, and without a real assent of the latter to the payment, which they had made under an erroneous impression of the facts, and through the agency of a cheque which Bodenham was only authorised to issue in the event of certain facts being true, which were in fact untrue. Under these circumstances, the Lords by a majority held that the cheque was never a valid cheque; Waring and Gillow could never have sued upon it as validly issued ; and, therefore, having been paid without a right to payment, the moneys so paid could be recovered.

LEGAL LITERATURE.

PALEY ON SUMMARY CONVICTIONS. PALEY ON SUMMARY CONVICTIONS. Ninth Edition, by V. BLANCHARD BATESON, Town Clerk of the Metropolitan Borough of Stepney. 1926. London: SWEET AND MAXWELL, LTD.; STEVENS AND SONS, LTD.; BUTTERWORTH and Co. 21. 2s. net.

The first edition of this well-known work was published in 1814; the eighth edition appeared in 1904. The appearance of the present edition will be welcomed, not only because it is overdue, but because it will be found to have been carefully compiled, reliably edited, and attractively presented. The book deals with the law and practice of courts of summary jurisdiction and with the procedure on appeals from such courts. It does not purport to be, and is not, a justice's manual. Thus the law on such subjects as licensing, affiliation, and judicial separation are included only incidentally amongst the topics discussed.

The book is divided into five parts. Part I deals with matters antecedent to conviction or order; Part II with the conviction or order; Part III with proceedings subsequent to conviction or order; Part IV with proceedings by way of appeal; Part V with the responsibility and indemnity of justices and their officers. The book makes a timely appearance in view of the coming into force on June 1 last, of new provisions included in the Criminal Justice Act, 1925. It is to be regretted, however, that many new provisions should only be incorporated in the book by way of the Addenda and Corrigenda appearing at the commencement.

The powers of justices in particular cases to dispose summarily of offences are powers which are frequently difficult to ascertain or to recollect. The passages in the book (especially pp. 131-140) dealing with these matters, will be found of great use to the practitioner. So also will the passages relating to the right to a trial by jury and to the powers of the police to search or arrest. The memorandum approved by the judges relating to statements by persons suspected of crime is set out on p. 1127, but in view of some recent experiences which have engaged public attention, a fuller mention in the text of the treatment of a person before and on arrest would have been welcome; the provision in sec. 45 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1925, as to admission to bail before acceptance of a charge is but briefly noted on p. xcii of the Addenda, and p. 233 of the Text.

The book contains no references to offences committed during trade disputes. The mention of the Trade Disputes

Act, 1906, at p. lxxv of the Table of Statutes, appears to be a misprint for the Justices of the Peace Act.

The index, the table of statutes, and the index of cases cited (giving dates) are all well done, and contribute to the completeness of the book.

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE AND INDEX TO ALL THE STATUTES FROM 1235 TO 1925.- Forty-first Edition, 1926. Published by His Majesty's Stationery Office, London. Pages, Vol. I (Chronological Table), xi, 717; Vol. II (Index), iv, 1764; total 2496. Price, Vol. I, 17. 18. ; Vol. II, 21. 15s.; both volumes, 3l. 16s. ; in all cases net. At last the Stationery Office has relented, and done what it has been pressed to do for years. The two volumes of this most valuable work can now be purchased separately. Some people, including the writer, have very little use for the Index volume, the larger one, which analyses the statutes alphabetically under their subjects, but are continually referring to the other volume, which gives the date, regnal year, chapter, and subject of every statute in chronological order, with a list of every enactment and Order in Council, etc., which has affected it. Others find the Index volume the more useful of the two, and seldom refer to the other. No doubt many use both with equal frequency. Now everyone can buy what he wants. This, the forty-first edition, brings in every statute passed from the Statute of Merton, 20 Hen. III, c. 1 (1235) to the Mines (Working Facilities) Act, 1925 (15 and 16 Geo. V, c. 9), except local and personal Acts passed, apparently, since 1868. The last official index to the local Acts was published in 1899, and comprised all such Acts passed between 1801 and that year. It is a troublesome task finding local Acts before 1801 and after 1899, though since 1920 there have been annual indices. As this kind of work would be unremunerative to private enterprise, it is to be hoped that the Stationery Office will (if, say, the betting tax proves a greater windfall than is anticipated) bring this local Act index up to date. The Preface to the volumes before us is a fascinating study of the ramifications of statute law, indicates the highly complicated nature of the problems which have had to be tackled in the preparation of this work, and, by the sympathy it evokes, quickly stifles any inclination to criticise the system which has been adopted.

BOOKS AND PUBLICATIONS

RECEIVED.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW. June.

MEWS' DIGEST. Vol. XIII. Machinery-Mutual Will. SWEET AND MAXWELL, LTD.: STEVENS & SONS, LTD.: SOLICITORS' LAW STATIONERY SOCIETY, Ltd. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, 1925, and Relative Act of Sederunt, with Comparative Tables and Notes. Compiled by FRANCIS A. UMPHERSTON. WILLIAM HODGE & Co., LTD., 12, Bank Street, Edinburgh. 5s. CHITTY'S STATUTES.

Vol. XXIV. By W. H. AGGS. SWEET AND MAXWELL, LTD.: STEVENS & SONS, LTD. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AND INSURANCE REPORTS. Part 3. STEVENS AND SONS, LTD.; SWEET AND MAXWELL, LTD.; W. GREEN AND SON, LTD., Edinburgh. PREVENTION OF BRIBERY. BRIBERY AND SECRET COMMISSIONS PREVENTION LEAGUE, INCORPORATED. No. 126. May. JOURNAL OF SOCIETY OF COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL LAW. Vol. I, No. 1. July. 1s. (to non-members of the Society). THE SOCIETY'S OFFICE, 183, Fulham Palace Road, W.6.

This journal is the official organ of the Society, being published quarterly. In this, the first issue now before us, we notice an interesting article on the Law of Suretyship by Dr. J. B. Price Mr. H. Gordon Selfridge contributes an article on Man's Duty to the State.

1s.

THE BOMBAY LAW JOURNAL. Vol. IV. June. REPORTS OF TAX CASES. Vol. X., PART II. H.M.S.O. CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL, St. Louis, Mo. June 5. THE SCOTS LAW TIMES. June 19. W. GREEN & SON, LTD., 2 and 4, St. Giles' Street, Edinburgh. THE NATIONAL INCOME TAX MAĞAZINE, Chicago, Ill. June. CONVEYANCING PRACTICE IN SCOTLAND ACCORDING TO THE LAW IN SCOTLAND. By JOHN BURNS, Writer to the Signet. 3rd Edition. W. GREEN AND SON, LTD. 63s. 2 and 4, St. Giles Street, Edinburgh.

THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE. June 26.