single witness. (Distinguish between establishing the fact of a previous declaration of intention and the fact of the intention itself.)

(f) Necessity for declaration.-Except where the statute expressly provides otherwise, as in the case of minors and married women (widows), it is thoroughly well settled from a very early date that the oath of naturalization can not be taken unless there has been a prior declaration of intention made according to the form provided by law. There are a number of cases on this point. Ex parte Sanderson, 1804, 1 Cranch C. C., 219; McCarty v. Hodges, 1846, 2 Edm. Sel. Cas., 433; Ex parte Brownlee, 1848, 9 Ark., 191; In re Merry, 1880, 14 Phila., 212; In the matter of Desty, 1880, 8 Abb. N. C., 250; State v. Brandhorst, 1900, 156 Mo., 457.

A question which may be confused with the question of necessity for declaration is as to the proof of intention to become a citizen, which is required from minors who are not under the law required to make the preliminary declaration. The Revised Statutes, section 2167, provide that he (the minor alien) shall

further declare on oath, and prove to the satisfaction of the court, that, for two years next preceding, it has been his bona fide intention to become a citizen of the United States.

In the case of In re Fronascone, supra, the court held that the— vague oral statement of a single witness, commonly offered under section 2167, in substitution for the documentary evidence required by section 2105, can not be sufficiently relied upon

by the applicant. In taking his final oath, as indicated by the statute, it is necessary that he should make a declaration which is regularly required of applicants of age. This would seem to require that the same formality be gone through with as in the normal case, but that it be done at the time when the oath of naturalization is taken. In In re Randall, 1880, 14 Phila., 224, it was held that this declaration. must be so made and must clearly set forth the time when the intention to become a citizen was actually formed.

(g) Effect of declaration.-It is thoroughly well established that although by special provision of the mining and agricultural laws certain rights have been given to those who have merely declared their intention to become citizens, still that one who has complied with this formality only is not a citizen of the United States. The question has arisen oftenest with reference to the power of the Federal courts to take jurisdiction over controversies arising between citizens and aliens, and it has been repeatedly held that one who had taken a declaratory oath was still an alien. Baird v. Byrne, 1854, 3 Wal, jr., 1; Lanz v. Randall, 1876, 4 Dill., 427; Maloy v. Duden, 1885, 25 Fed., 673; City of Minneapolis v. Reum, 1893, 6 C. C. A., 31; s. c. 56 Fed., 576, and see In re Wehlitz (1863), 16 Wis., 443; State v. Cole, 1864, 17 Wis., 674; In re Conway, 1863, id., 526.

The State courts have held that they did not lose jurisdiction within the constitutional provision of a case which arose between an alien and one who had taken his declaratory oath, on the ground that the latter was still an alien and therefore the suit was between two aliens. Orosco v. Gagliardo, 1863, 22 Cal., 83. Nor was one who had taken the declaratory oath a citizen within the meaning of the statutes of Congress, which provided that a citizen of the United States who had suffered from Indian depredations might recover from the Government the amount of his losses. Johnson v. United States, 1893, 29 Court of Claims, 1. Moreover, it has been held that

it is immaterial that at the time of taking the declaration the applicant also took the oath of allegiance, since the latter was unauthorized and of no effect. Richards v. McDaniel, supra. And, further, it is immaterial as to the question of citizenship, that the taking of the declaratory oath may entitle the applicant, under the suffrage laws of the State, to vote. Lanz v. Randall, supra, and Berry v. Hull, supra. There is some conflict as to the effect upon the rights of minor children alien born to inherit from a father who has merely taken his declaratory oath of citizenship. In Schrimpf v. Settegast, 1873, 38 Tex., 96, the court held that under such conditions the alien took. A directly opposite result was reached in White v. White, 1859, 2 Met. (Ky.), 189. These decisions, of course, must be viewed from the standpoint of the local regulations with reference to the descent of land.

The question has also arisen as to whether or not the taking of the declaratory oath makes a citizen of the wife of the declarant. It is entirely clear on principle that such should not be the effect, and such was the decision reached by the court. Dorsey v. Brigham, 1898, 177 Ill., 250.

It is of interest in passing to note the effect of a declaration to become a citizen of the United States under certain treaty provisions. For instance, it was provided by our treaties with Mexico that those who desired to become American citizens should indicate such desire by a declaration of intention and that they then should be considered American citizens. The courts have declared that such declaration was all that was necessary to make of such applicants American citizens; that no further step in the ordinary process of naturalization need be taken. Carter. Territory, 1859, 1 New Mex., 317.

(h) Declaration with residence. It has sometimes been sought to establish the proposition that declaration with a long continued period of residence thereafter, the declarant having taken no further steps to naturalization, should make of the party a citizen. But the courts have steadily refused to adopt such a principle. One of the most extreme cases on this point is that of Lanz . Randall, supra, in which there had been a residence of some fifteen years after the first declaration of intention, but the court held that this was of no avail in making of the declarant a citizen. The same rule has been held even where the applicant came to this country as a minor 13 years old; had, sometime after becoming of age, taken his declaratory oath, but had not, after a total of eighteen years of residence, then taken out his naturalization papers. The court declared he was not a citizen. Johnson v. United States, supra.

It seems clear of course that if the period of residence has not been sufficient to give a right to take out the second papers it should not be equivalent to naturalization, and this has been held in Baird. Byrne, supra; and see generally on the topic Richards . McDaniel, 1820, 2 Nott & McCord, 351.

(i) When the declaration is dispensed with. The declaration is never dispensed with except by the positive provisions of the statutes. It has been customary to dispense with it in the case of minors, and in the case of widows of aliens who have made the declaration; and by some special statutes relating to soldiers and seamen. The cases of In re Fronascone, supra; Schutz's Petition, 1886, 64 N. H., 241; and In re Randall, supra, bear upon the question where it concerns infants.

B. PETITION FOR NATURALIZATION.

(a) When the petition may be made. This point has already received a sufficiently full consideration under the heading of "Residence," section 3 B, supra, where the extracts from the statutes controlling this matter were collected. It is sufficient here to say that the usual period that must elapse before an alien might take out his naturalization papers, with the single exception of fourteen years provided by the statute of 1798, has been five years. While this period, as suggested, provided that proceedings could not be brought earlier than that, they, of course, might be instituted at any time after that period. (b) To whom the petition must be made.--The statutes are uniform in providing that the petition must be made to the court itself, and the cases generally, in which any question of citizenship is involved, show that the proceedings have usually been before a court. One case, however, In re Clark, 1854, 18 Barb., 444, shows that in New York at least it was for a considerable time the custom for clerks of the court to issue naturalization papers to applicants, but in the case cited Dean, J., took occasion to express his disapproval of this method and to assert that the proceedings could be lawfully taken only by the court itself.

(c) What the petition must contain.-One of the best brief statements of what must be contained in the petition for naturalization is that given In re Bodek, 1894, 63 Fed., 813, 814, where the court says:

Every such petition must, of course, allege the existence of all facts and the fulfillment of all conditions, upon the existence and the fulfillment of which the statutes which confer the right asserted have made it dependent, and I believe that the petitions usually presented conform to this rule.

As to just what these allegations are must be determined by reference to the statutes under which the naturalizing proceedings were held. The Revised Statutes, section 2165, provide that—

any alien who was residing within the limits and under the jurisdiction of the United States before the twenty-ninth day of January, one thousand seven hundred and ninety-five, may be admitted to become a citizen, on due proof made to some one of the courts above specified that he has resided two years at least within the jurisdiction of the United States, and one year at least immediately preceding his application with the State or Terrtory where such court is at the time held.

Other cases bear out the statement made In re Bodek. The court In re Alien, 1845, 7 Hill, 137, expressed the same idea by saying that the petition must allege a compliance with all conditions. In Cumming's petition, 1860, 41 N. H., 270, two questions arose, the alien in that case being a minor at the time of his immigration into this country and was seeking to be naturalized under the act of Congress of March 26, 1824. The petition alleged in substance the residence of the petitioner with his father's family in a specified county in June, 1848, when he was a minor under the age of 18 years, continued residence therein until August, 1857, and a subsequent residence until August, 1859, in various parts of the United States, when he returned to his father's family in the county named, where he had since remained. This was held faulty on the ground that it contained no allegation that it had been the bona fide intention of the applicant for three years next prior to his application to become a citizen of the United States. The court declared, however, that this

defect might be readily remedied by an amended or new application. The court further declared that the failure in the application for naturalization to allege a residence in the State for the year immediately preceding the application for naturalization was not a fatal defect; and, as already indicated with reference to this case, the holding was made that this period of residence did not need to be the last year preceding the application.

In Richards . McDaniel, 1820, 2 Nott & McCord, 351, a petition alleged that the petitioner was an alien born under the allegiance of the King of Great Britain and was desirous of becoming a citizen of the United States. The petitioner then prayed that the judge would cause to be administered in open court the oath prescribed by the act of Congress. This was supplemented by the oath of allegiance and renunciation of foreign allegiance. The court seems to have considered this petition sufficient, though the actual question decided in the case, as has been suggested above, was that the oath of allegiance and renunciation taken at the time of the declaratory oath was mere surplusage and of no effect. The decision, of course, is therefore of little value.

(d) The final hearing. The act of 1790 provided for the taking of an oath to support the Constitution of the United States, "which oath or affirmation such act shall administer." The act of 1795 provided for such declaration on oath or affirmation" before some one of the courts aforesaid." Practically the same provision was made in the act of 1802 and subsequent acts down to the Revised Statutes, section 2165-second-of 1878, and it was substantially reenacted in the present recent law. The matters to be thus sworn to consist of the renunciation of allegiance and fidelity to any foreign State, indicating the sovereign by name, and a further oath to defend the Constitution of the United States and to bear true faith and allegiance to the same. This is to be recorded by the clerk of the court, and forms, as will be later seen, a part of the record. At this hearing also certain matters must be proved to the satisfaction of the court. One of the best statements on this is also to be found in In re Bodek, supra, in which the court continued, after the quotation given above:

But the presentation of the petition merely brings the matter before the court, and the burden then rests upon the petitioner to establish its material allegations by such evidence as the law has made requisite.

And the same idea is expressed in In re Randall, supra.

The question has arisen once as to whether or not in taking this oath the defect is fatal that the sovereign was not specified by name, in the particular case the oath being taken "to renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to the Queen of Great Britain. and Ireland," the name "Victoria" being omitted. The court held that this omission was not fatal. Ex parte Smith, 1847, 8 Blackf.,

395.

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SECTION 5.-Nature of naturalization proceedings.

At various times the courts have been called upon to decide, usually because of some attack made upon the record of naturalization or because evidence invalidating the same has been sought to be introduced, what the true nature of the naturalization proceedings is. The matter seems to have been first acted upon by Washington, J., in

Campbell. Gordon, 1810, 6 Cranch, 176, 182, where he said: "The oath, when taken, confers upon him the rights of a citizen, and amounts to the judgment of the court for his admission to those rights;" and the same principle was declared in the later case of Spratt v. Spratt, 1830, 4 Peters, 393, Marshall, C. J., saying:

The various acts upon the subject submit the decision on the right of aliens to admission as citizens to courts of records. They are to receive testimony, to compare it with the law, and to judge on both law and fact. This judgment is entered on record as the judgment of the court. It seems to us, if it be in legal form, to close all inquiry; and, like every other judgment, to be complete evidence of its own validity.

This remark of the Chief Justice has been frequently cited by the courts, and was expressly followed in State v. Hoerflinger, 1874, 35 Wis., 400; McCarthy. Marsh, 1851, 5 N. Y., 263, 279; Ex parte Cregg, 1854, 2 Curtis, 98, 100. More recently the matter has been again stated in the Supreme Court of the United States, this time by Mr. Justice Hunt, as follows:

A certificate of naturalization issues from a court of record when there has been the proper proof made of a residence of five years, and that the applicant is of the age of 21 years, and is of good moral character. This certificate is, against all the world, a judgment of citizenship, from which may follow the right to vote and hold property. It is conclusive as such. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Tisdale, 1875, 91 U. S., 238, 245.

The State courts have taken exactly the same position where the question has come up before them. In State v. McDonald, 1877, 24 Minn., 48, 58, the court said:

All of the other objections urged by the relator to the validity and sufficiency of defendant's alleged naturalization appear to us to be disposed of by the fact that the record upon which the defendant relies is a genuine record of the district court of Ramsey County, in due form, of what purport to be regular proceedings in naturalization in that court, resulting in a judgment which admits the defendant to become a citizen of the United States.

The principle, indeed, may now be considered as absolutely settled, as will be seen by reference to the following cases: Ritchie v. Putnam, 1835, 13 Wend., 524, 526; In re Alien, 1845, 7 Hill, 137, 141; People v. Snyder, 1869, 41 N. Y., 397, 409; The Acorn, 1870, 2 Abb. C. C., 434, 444; State v. McDonald, 1877, 24 Minn., 48, 58; In re Coleman, 1879, 15 Blachtf., 406; Pintsch Compressing Co. v. Bergin, 1897, 84 Fed., 140, 142; Green's Son v. Salas, 1877, 31 Fed., 106.

It follows, of course, that if a naturalization proceeding is to be considered as a judgment it is to be governed in all particulars with reference to its proof, impeachment, etc., as other judgments, and the courts have insisted in so regarding it; and in discussing the propriety of any evidence looking to an attack upon a certificate they freely quote cases and rules which are applied to judgments in general. See United States v. Norsch, 1890, 42 Fed., 417 (in which the matter was treated as an original proceeding seeking to impeach on the ground of fraud). And see, generally, to the effect that such proceedings are judgments. In the matter of Clark, 1854, 18 Barb., 444; Harley v. State, 1867, 40 Ala., 689; In re McCoppin, 1869, 5 Sawy., 630; Scott v. Strobach, 1873, 49 Ala., 477; United States . Walsh, 1884, 22 Fed., 644.