V.

The separate registration of male children of American citizens who have reached the age of 18 years and who have either been born and lived all their lives abroad or have spent a long period of time in a foreign country is made expedient by the fact that it is at this age that, in several foreign countries, they become liable to military service. In the case of such children it is our national policy to claim them as American citizens, without regard to the place of their birth, as the offspring of American citizens; to protect them as such until they are 21 years of age, and to permit them on attaining their majority to choose whether they will remain American citizens or not. The practical defect in the execution of this policy is that our Government may be called on to protect during the period of liability to military service a person who has no intention of ever residing in the United States or performing any obligations to it, but who, fter shielding himself from the performance of his duty to the overnment under which he resides by the ambiguity of his position, ally accepts the allegiance of the country of his birth or continued domicil.

It would appear reasonable and desirable to resolve this ambiguity before it has served the purpose of a person whose intention is that of disloyalty to both the governments involved. In the case of such a person there are three alternatives: (1) He may escape the performance his duty to the government where he resides by claiming American protection, and at majority declare his allegiance to it; (2) he may escape that duty until his majority, and while still retaining a nominal American citizenship decide to continue his residence abroad, merely using that citizenship as a means of further protection; or (3) he may loyally accept allegiance to the United States, turn to his country for the purpose of there residing, and faithfully fischarge his duties as a citizen.

If the first or second of these three alternatives expresses the young van's real purpose, there appears to be no good reason why he should joy the protection of the United States. If, on the other hand, the third alternative represents his bona fide intention, he clearly deserves that protection. The recommendation, therefore, is that he should be required at the age of 18 to register his intention to reside in the United States and to take the oath of allegiance thereto upon attaining his majority if he wishes to enjoy its protection. Even in this case protection may, perhaps, be temporarily procured without a real purpose to execute the alleged intention; but, under the system of registration proposed in this report, a young man who should thus violate his pledge would be in danger of forfeiting not only his good name, but the further protection of his government.

VI.

The sixth recommendation, namely, that American citizens who have complied with the requirements of registration should be furnished with an official statement to that effect, hardly needs discussion. So long as a citizen has not passed into the category of aliens he should have the benefit of the evidence of his citizenship in such a

H. Doc. 326, 59-2—2

form as would meet the requirements of the police in the place of his residence. If the duration of his absence from the United States and the nature of his occupation should conclusively establish his intention not to return and perform the duties of citizenship, he would properly be denied both the consular statement of his nationality and the right to be registered as an American citizen.

In general, the spirit of the recommendations proposed has been (1) to furnish bona fide American citizens with suitable and wellauthenticated evidence of their citizenship; (2) to prevent the fraudulent use of American protection; (3) to render the course of the Government of the United States in exercising that protection more clear and certain. It is believed the system proposed will have the advantage (1) of showing what individuals are deserving of American protection, and (2) of aiding in the detection of those who intend to use the power and prestige of the United States merely as a shield for nefarious practices. American citizenship is the highest civic privilege enjoyed by free men anywhere. The Government of the United States has never failed to guard and uphold the rights and prerogatives of its citizens; but it has often been embarrassed by pretenses that were intended to procure immunity from obedience to law both at home and abroad. From whatever point of view the subject may be regarded, the duty of our Government is clear. If its protection be fraudulently sought against itself, evasion of the law becomes a double offense against the State. If, on the other hand, it be sought for the purpose of evading just obligations to another government, the continuance of protection is not only a violation of international comity too serious to escape reproach, but a disregard of national dignity too flagrant for good citizens to support. To protect to the fullest extent the rights of every American citizen, and to afford no refuge to imposters and pretenders this is the plain standard of national fidelity and international obligation.

II. PROTECTION ABROAD OF THOSE WHO HAVE MADE THE DECLARATION OF INTENTION TO BECOME CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES.

RECOMMENDATION AND OBSERVATIONS.

The report of the Naturalization Commission, submitted to Congress at its last session, recommended that the declaration of intention as a preliminary to naturalization as a citizen of the United States should be abolished, showing as an important reason for the recommendation that one who has made the declaration occupies the anomalous position of having effectually abandoned one allegiance without having acquired another; but the new naturalization law has retained this requirement, and it seems probable that it will continue to be a part of our naturalization system. Realizing this fact, the logical conclusion seems to be that the Government must accept the responsibilities which the law imposes, and accord under certain circumstances temporary protection to a declarant who goes abroad on a visit.

We offer, therefore, the following

Recommendation.

That the protection of this Government be accorded to those who have made the declaration of intention to become citizens of the United States and who go abroad for brief sojourn, but that such protection should not be effective in the country of their origin and should not be extended to those who have resided in the United States for a less period than three years.

Observations.

Under the law an alien who desires to become a citizen of the United States must declare on oath before the clerk of a court authorized to naturalize aliens that it is his intention to become a citizen of the United States and to renounce all other allegiance and that he intends permanently to reside in the United States, such declaration being made at least two years prior to his final application for admission as a citizen of the United States. (Sec. 4, par. 1, and sec. 27, form of declaration, act approved June 29, 1906.) This requirement is applicable to all aliens except those who have been honorably discharged from the military service of the United States (sec. 2166, Rev. Stat.), but as none can be enlisted in the Army who have not made the declaration (act of Aug. 1, 1894) this exception is now unimportant. It is not required in the case of one who has served five years in the Navy or one enlistment in the Marine Corps (act of July 25, 1894), but it is the policy of the Navy Department not to enlist aliens.

One who has made the declaration of intention enjoys in the United States certain rights which commonly pertain to citizens of

19

the several States and of the United States. He may vote at all elections, State or national, in Arkansas, Indiana, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, South Dakota, Texas, Oregon, and Wisconsin. Under the laws of Delaware, Kentucky, New York, and Washington he enjoys greater rights in the acquisition of real property than other aliens enjoy. In some places (notably in the States of Illinois and Idaho) he may be employed upon public works and other aliens may not. Under the preemption and homestead laws of the United States he may preempt and acquire public lands (secs. 2259, 2289, Rev. Stat.). Not only may he be enlisted in the Army, but during the civil war he was compelled to perform military service as though he were a full citizen (act of March 3, 1863, 12 Stat. L., 731). Under section 2168, Revised Statutes, the widow and children of one who has made the declaration may, if he dies before he is actually naturalized, be considered as citizens "upon taking the oaths prescribed by law"that is to say, the inchoate rights of the father are recognized as transmissible and the widow and children may secure full naturalization without themselves making the declaration. The sixth paragraph of section 4 of the act of June 29, 1906, has as its object the reenactment of this provision.

The Supreme Court in the case of Boyd v. Thayer said on this point:

Clearly minors acquire an inchoate status by the declaration of intention on the part of their parents. If they attain their majority before the parent completes his naturalization, then they have an election to repudiate the status which they find impressed upon them, and determine that they will accept allegiance to some foreign potentate or power rather than hold fast to the citizenship which the act of the parent has initiated for them. (143 U. S., 178.)

It is plain that those who have made the declaration are accorded privileges and perform duties from which other aliens are debarred. Nevertheless, the Government does not accord them protection if they proceed abroad.

Their citizenship is in a formative stage, and in order that it may be completed it is necessary that they reside continuously in the United States for five years, the term continuous residence being understood in the legal sense, and not as being interrupted by brief absence from the United States. By an act approved March 3, 1813 (2 Stat. L., 811), no person could be admitted to citizenship who had not resided in the United States for five years, without being at any time out of its territory, but the latter part of this requirement was specifically repealed by the act of June 26, 1848 (9 Stat. L., 240), and it is now beyond dispute that the continuous residence required by law does not make one who intends to apply for our citizenship a mere prisoner at large in the United States condemned to lose the benefit of his formally expressed intention and desire as a penalty for his stepping beyond our boundaries

even for an instant.

It is plain, however, that the Government does not owe protection to one who has declared his intention and goes abroad for a period of time long enough to destroy the continuousness of his residence. By this act his declaration would be nullified and as though it had not been made. It is equally true that he should not be protected if he should return to the country of his origin. As he has not yet accomplished expatriation from that country, it may of right

claim him as its citizen if he places himself within the jurisdiction of its laws, and this Government, not having yet invested him with its citizenship, can not justly dispute the claim. This principle should be of general application. It has been specifically recognized in our naturalization conventions with Austria, Germany, Wurttemberg, and Sweden and Norway.

The case of one who goes to a third country is different. Our practice now places him in the distressing attitude of having no government from which he can claim protection. Our laws have required him to declare that he intends to renounce allegiance to his parent government, and after he has done this the parent government can not be expected to extend him its protection, nor should he be encouraged to seek such protection. It may well be questioned whether if he did so it would not be considered as having vitiated his declaration of intention. As he has formally sworn that he intends permanently to reside in the United States and is actually domiciled in the United States, it is this Government to which he must look for that protection, which he should obtain nowhere else.

Residents of the United States who have made the declaration and are required for good and sufficient reasons thereafter to make a trip abroad frequently apply to the Department of State for some document to protect them in their travels, and these requests are always denied. It is specifically forbidden by law to issue a passport to anyone who is not a citizen of the United States (act of August 18, 1856) or a loyal resident of our insular possessions (act of June 14, 1902), and a passport is the only document issued by this Government to protect one who is proceeding abroad and the only document generally recognized by foreign governments as attesting the right of the holder to American protection.

Under the law any alien may make the declaration of intention at any time before a clerk of a court having jurisdiction to naturalize aliens. He may make it immediately upon his arrival in the United States or he may have resided here for many years before making it. It follows that if this Government should protect those who make the declaration and go abroad it would be liable to be imposed upon by aliens not domiciled in the United States, who might make the declaration falsely soon after their arrival so as immediately to proceed abroad under our protection. To guard against this imposition it would seem to be reasonable to require, as evidence that domicil in the United States has been really acquired, that the declarant who applies for our protection should be required to prove that he has resided in the United States for at least three years; and in order that the continuance of residence required by law before naturalization might not be disturbed, the passport which this Government might issue should be limited to a period not exceeding six months.

Until recent years the practice was not uniform in the matter of protecting those who had made the declaration, and there are notable instances where such protection was extended. The rule in effect at one time is thus stated by Secretary Marcy in an instruction dated September 14, 1854:

The declaration, indeed, is prima facie evidence that the person making it was at its date domiciled in the United States, and entitled thereby, though not to all, to certain rights of a citizen, and to much more consideration when abroad than is due to one who has never been in our country; but the declarant, not