Though, in truth, the general seems to have known very little of what became of his army. Had he placed his militia on his right, supported by the morass, and his continental troops on his left, where it seems he was most vulnerable, his right would have been more secure, and his left would have opposed the enemy; and instead of going backward when he ordered to attack, would have gone forward. The reverse of what has happened might have happened. But was there ever an instance of a general running away, as Gates has done, from his whole army? And was there ever so precipitous a flight? One hundred and eighty miles in three days and a half! It does admirable credit to the activity of a man at his time of life. But it disgraces the general and the soldier. I always believed him to be very far short of a Hector or a Ulysses. All the world, I think, will begin to agree with me. But what will be done by Congress? Will he be changed, or not? If he is changed, for God's sake, overcome prejudice and send GREENE. You know my opinion of him. I stake my reputation on the events, give him but fair play. But above all things, let us have, without delay, a VIGOROUS GOVERNMENT and a well constituted ARMY FOR THE WAR."

On the same day, he wrote to a near friend: "This event will have very serious consequences to the southward. People's imaginations have already given up North Carolina and Virginia; but I do not believe either of them will fall. I am certain Virginia cannot. This misfortune affects me less than others, because it is not in my temper to repine at events that are past, but to endeavor to draw good out of them; and because I think our safety depends on a total change of system, and this change of system will only be produced by misfortune.” *

Tarleton, i. 109, indicates the errors of Gates: 1. "Not breaking in

Gates, overwhelmed by his disgrace, wrote to Washington in plaintive, submissive terms. He would "most cheerfully submit to the orders of Congress and resign an office few generals would be anxious to possess; and where the utmost skill and fortitude are subject to be baffled by the difficulties which for a time must surround the chief in command here.

"That your excellency may meet with no such difficulties; that your road to fame and fortune may be smooth and easy," was "his sincere wish." He announced to him the surprise and defeat of Sumter by Tarleton, with much carnage, two days after his own.

The endeavor of Hamilton to draw good out of misfortunes is seen in his letters of this period. The suggestions in the letter of the twentieth of the last month in relation to the army, were now before Congress. It was of the utmost moment to press the subject upon that body. With this view, five days after the preceding letter to Duane, he wrote in behalf of Washington to the President: "I am happy to find that the late disaster in Carolina has not been so great as its first features indicated.

"This event, however, adds itself to many others, to exemplify the necessity of an army, and the fatal consequences of depending on militia. Regular troops alone are equal to the exigencies of modern war, as well for defence as offence; and whenever a substitute is attempted, it must prove illusory and ruinous. No militia

upon the British communications as soon as he arrived near Lynch's creek." 2. "His second error was moving an army, consisting of young corps and undisciplined militia, in the night." 3. "His third error, in the disposition of his army before the action." 4. "His last and greatest fault was, attempting to make an alteration in the disposition the instant the two armies were going to engage, which circumstance could not escape the notice of a vigilant enemy, who, by a skilful and sudden attack, threw the American left wing into a state of confusion, from which it never recovered."

will ever acquire the habits necessary to resist a regular force. Even those nearest to the seat of war are only valuable as light troops to be scattered in the woods, and harass rather than do serious injury to the enemy. The firmness requisite for the real business of fighting is only to be attained by a constant course of discipline and service. I have never yet been witness to a single instance that can justify a different opinion; and it is most earnestly to be wished, that the liberties of America may no longer be trusted, in any material degree, to so precarious a dependence. I cannot but remark, that it gives me pain to find the measures pursuing at the southward still turn upon accumulating large bodies of militia, instead of once for all making a decided effort to have a permanent force. In my ideas of the true system of war at the southward, the object ought to be to have a good army rather than a large one. Every exertion should be made by North Carolina, Virginia, Maryland and Delaware, to raise a permanent force of six thousand men, exclusive of horse and artillery. These, with the occasional aid of the militia in the vicinity of the scene of action, will not only suffice to prevent the further progress of the enemy, but, if properly supplied, to oblige them to compact their force, and relinquish a part of what they hold. To expel them from the country entirely is what we cannot aim at, till we derive more effectual support from abroad; and by attempting too much, instead of going forward, we shall go backward. Could such a force be once on foot, it would immediately make an inconceivable change in the face of affairs, not only in the opposition to the enemy, but in expense, consumption of provisions, and waste of arms and stores. No magazines can be equal to the demands of an army of militia; and none ever needed Speaking of magazines, I beg

economy more than ours.

leave to observe, that it is of infinite importance to endeavor to establish ample ones in the Southern States. In the course of the present month, the army here has had scarcely one-third of the established rations of meat; and our distress continues without any prospect of relief."

A few days after,* a communication from Duane to Washington shows the impression made upon him by Hamilton's letters, though his mind did not come up to his chief and leading suggestion. "We are deeply engaged," Duane wrote, "on the subjects of your excellency's letters. Considerable progress is made in that which is the principal, the raising a permanent army. Congress unite in sentiment, that it is essential; that it is the surest and the only means of producing an honorable peace. I find with great satisfaction, that the legislature of New York have fallen in with the view of the eastern convention, and particularly to strengthen the hands of Congress and enable them to enforce their decisions."

This letter was acknowledged in Washington's behalf by Hamilton, on the fourth of October:

"I thank you, my dear sir, for your letter of the nineteenth of September. I should have been happy in the information you give me that some progress has been made in the business of raising a permanent army, had it not been intimated to me through other channels, that in the resolutions framed on this article, the fatal alternative of for one year has been admitted. In my letter to Congress of the twentieth of August, I recommend a draft for the war or for three years, and say, 'a shorter period than one year is inadmissible.' You will perceive, however, that the general scope of my arguments looks to an army for the war, and any other idea crept in from an apprehension that this plan would not go down. The present junc* Sept. 19.

ture is in my opinion peculiarly favorable to a permanent army, and 1 regret that an opening is given for a temporary one. It also gives me pain to find that the pernicious State system is still adhered to by leaving the reduction, incorporation, &c., of the regiments to the particular States. This is one of the greatest evils of our affairs.

"I share with you the pleasure you feel from the measures taking to strengthen the hands of Congress. I am convinced, it is essential to our safety that Congress should have an efficient power. The want of it must ruin

us.

"The satisfaction I have in any successes that attend us, or even in the alleviation of misfortunes is always allayed, by a fear that it will lull us into security. Supineness and a disposition to flatter ourselves seem to make parts of our national character. When we receive a check, and are not quite undone, we are apt to fancy we have gained a victory; and when we do gain any little advantage, we imagine it decisive, and expect the war is immediately to end. The history of the war is a history of false hopes, and temporary expedients. Would to God they were to end here. This winter, if I am not mistaken, will open a still more embarrassing scene than we have yet experienced to the southward. I have little doubt, should we not gain a naval superiority, that Sir Henry Clinton will detail to the southward to extend his conquests. I am far from being satisfied that we shall be prepared to repel his attempts.

"Reflections of this kind, to you, my dear sir, are unnecessary; I am convinced you view our affairs in the same scale that I do, and will exert yourself to correct our errors, and call forth our resources.

"The interview at Hartford produced nothing conclu