THE HISTORY

OF THE

REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES.

CHAPTER XX.

THE chief objects of Washington, with his small force, now were, to maintain the Highland posts, to hold his army in a position to strike at New York in case the enemy's strength should be diminished by distant expeditions, and to prevent the reoccupation of Philadelphia. With these views his troops were hutted, a part along the Hudson under Heath, the residue under his immediate command at Morristown.

It was a winter of memorable severity. Its rigors were the more felt from the unprovided condition of the army. "It is lamentable," Hamilton wrote for Washington, on the first day of the new year, "that our magazines are so empty and that our future prospects are so alarmingly limited. The worst consequences are to be apprehended if some change does not speedily take place. Every information I obtain makes me fear we shall be driven to the necessity of a general forage upon the

country. To do this, I wish you to supply me with an immediate estimate of what flour and cattle each county can spare, besides what is already engaged for the public use, that a plan may be adopted as equal and as little inconvenient as possible to the inhabitants. I must also desire that you will, without fail, give me a week's notice of the period at which you have reason to believe our supplies will totally cease." *

This notice being received, a requisition was made upon the magistrates of New Jersey to collect supplies from the several counties, and instructions were issued to officers of the army, in case of refusal, to impress the quantity required. "This you will do," Hamilton wrote for Washington, “with as much tenderness as possible to the inhabitants, having regard to the stock of each individual, that no family may be deprived of its necessary subsistence. Milch cows are not to be included in the impress. I have reposed this trust in you, from a perfect confidence in your prudence, zeal, and respect for the rights of citizens. While your measures are adapted to the emergency, and you consult what you owe to the service, I am persuaded you will not forget, that, as we are compelled by necessity to take the property of citizens for the support of an army, on whom their safety depends, we should be careful to manifest that we have a reverence for their rights, and wish not to do any thing, which that necessity, and even their own good do not absolutely require."

Unwilling to remain inactive, expeditions were projected at this time by the Americans for the capture of Detroit and to the Natchez, but were discountenanced for want of present means, and the danger of exposing Fort Pitt. Still preliminary preparations were advised.†

* To Royal Flint, A. C. P.

Hamilton for Washington to Col. Broadhead, Jan. 4.

A nearer object presented itself, yet even this was looked to with hesitation, from the state of the army“men half starved and imperfectly clothed, riotous and robbing the country people of their subsistence from sheer necessity." Still, if the state of the ice permitted, it was a measure not to be relinquished at a time when it was important to occupy the minds of the soldiers by active

service.

It being ascertained that a passage over the ice to Staten Island was practicable, General Stirling crossed, in the middle of January, accompanied by Hamilton, at the head of twenty-five hundred men. The latter writes to Washington: "The defence of the stone house in which the enemy may attempt to defend themselves may be obstinate, and we should have it in our power, by the severity and duration of our fire, to bring them to reason." The enemy discovering his approach took refuge in this house. The communication with New York was found to be open. Thus their relief was certain and immediate. Under these circumstances the expedition returned without effecting any thing of moment. A second attempt was contemplated, but was not prosecuted. Incursions into New Jersey and Westchester were soon after made by Knyphausen, but of too limited effect to warrant a detail.

The settlement of a cartel for an exchange of prisoners was again attempted, though, as appears in a letter to La Luzerne written by Hamilton, Washington did "not entertain any sanguine hopes of success." Instructions prepared by Hamilton were issued to General St. Clair, Colonels Carrington and Hamilton on the eighth of March. They were "to transact nothing but upon principles of perfect equality, and on a national ground;" language dictated by the previous course of the British com

manders. Upon this basis, discretionary powers were given, and in the belief that a national cartel could not be established, they were to prepare the way for some particular agreement that would give relief to the officers and men in captivity.

The commissioners met at Amboy, whence Hamilton wrote "that the enemy, as was supposed, had no idea of treating on mutual ground; that the commission was broken up; and that they were in private conversation, entertaining hopes that the liberation of our prisoners would be effected on admissible terms."

The obstacles which arose are stated in a letter to Congress written for Washington by Hamilton. The desired result was not attained.

The disappointment was the greater, as it appears in a letter written by him for the commander-in-chief to the French envoy, that "the efforts of the British court for obtaining troops in Germany were attended with little success," and the motive to exchange would therefore be stronger. La Luzerne had transmitted an extract from a recent document prepared at Madrid. In allusion to it, Hamilton remarked, "the inconsistency of the court of London so well delineated" in it, "would appear extraordinary, if their whole conduct in the course of the war did not exhibit many similar examples. But it is evident, that their refusing to consider these States as independent, of fact, during a negotiation, was a mere pretext to cover their unwillingness to concur with the pacific views of his Catholic Majesty; and the memorial from the British ambassador shows, that they were artfully aiming to effect a separation of interests between France and these States, the better to prosecute their hostile designs against either or both."

The policy of the next campaign now came into view.

What it should be would chiefly depend on the succors from France.

While measures were being taken to improve the discipline of the different corps of the army, as shown by letters from Hamilton's pen, a direct opinion was called for by a memorial addressed by Steuben to Congress. Hamilton, in behalf of the commander-in-chief, stated to him, that it was "not possible to decide the question," whether it should be offensive or defensive, "without a more intimate knowledge of our resources of finance than I at present possess, and without ascertaining whether our allies can afford a squadron for an effectual co-operation on this continent." He doubted whether an adequate force for offence could be maintained without assistance from abroad. "If a foreign aid of money and a fleet are to be depended upon, I should then recommend that all our dispositions should have reference to an offensive and decisive campaign," and with this intent, "a general draft" of men.

Every indication, however, was believed to point to a defensive campaign, in which view, assent had been given to a reduction of the number of battalions, as a submission to the urgency of the finances. This compelled him to decline a movement proposed by the French minister. In a subsequent letter to Steuben on the same subject, Hamilton remarked in Washington's name: "My sentiments concerning public affairs correspond too much with yours. The prospect, my dear baron, is gloomy, and the storm threatens. But I hope we shall extricate ourselves, and bring every thing to a prosperous issue. I have been so inured to difficulties in the course of this contest, that I have learned to look upon this with more tranquillity than formerly. Those which now present themselves, no doubt, require vigorous exertions to overcome them, and I am far from despairing of doing it."