With regard to methods of preventing a deadlock between the two Houses, the Canadian Statute may be said to belong to a pre-scientific epoch. As originally drafted it entails no provision to this effect at all, and the limited power given by the Act of adding, if necessary, six additional senators, will in the event of a real deadlock be a very Mother Partington's mop. The different methods adopted by the Commonwealth and the South African Act reflect the different character of their Second Chambers.

The Australian Senate, being based on the idea of at least a partial equality, can force a general election before at a joint sitting it yields to superior numbers. In South Africa, on the other hand, the method of a joint sitting can be employed without the intervention of a popular vote; while instead of a half, the Senate consists of only one-third of the popular assembly. Similarly, the Australian is the only one of the three Constitutions which directly adopted the principle of the Swiss referendum; though it should be noted that free use has been made of the principle of the direct popular vote in Canada on the temperance question. Both the later Statutes showed more capacity than their predecessor, in establishing as part of the original foundation a High Court of Justice for the new systems of government. We shall see that it was not till 1875 that effect was given to the clause in the British North America Act enabling the Canadian Parliament to establish a Court of Appeal for Canada. As was to be expected, the most democratic of the three Constitutions has gone furthest, at least on questions relating to the Constitution, in the road of independence of the Imperial Privy Council.

These are a few of the points of difference and similarity between these three Constitutions; nor is it necessary to anticipate conclusions which the student, with the text before him, should draw for himself. But, behind and beyond these apparent differences and similarities, it must always be remembered there was this fundamental point in

common-that, at a certain stage of their political and economic development, each one of these communities found it necessary to give to their growing sense of common nationhood the outward expression of a common Constitution; that each is a marvellous amalgam of ancient precedents and new experiments, so that, were the British Empire to follow the fate of its predecessors, its memory would still, if for nothing else, always survive; because, although indirectly and mediately, it has, like the wise householder, brought forth things new and old.

It is natural in turning from these examples of the success of the Anglo-Saxon race in the work of achieving greater union to ask oneself what light or leading these precedents afford to those who believe that only by a more systematic method of cohesion can the separate portions of the British Empire be prevented from, sooner or later, drifting apart. Assuredly the difficulties in the way are great. Though the need of closer union is now more clearly realized than at any previous date, few would now support the simple proposal of converting the present Parliament into a Parliament of the Empire by giving representatives to the oversea Dominions and Colonies. Moreover, the vis inertia which naturally opposes change is still powerful. It was only the compelling force of necessity, the recognition of the fact that without union existence itself might become impossible, which persuaded the jealous American States to accept the Constitution imposed on them by the genius of Hamilton and the character of Washington. But to the masses in the British Empire, who dictate under democracy the policy of governments, the necessity for closer union is, as yet, far from clear. In Canada the fact that a union, though an uneasy one, already existed between the French and English of Lower Canada, made easier the foundation of the Dominion. In Australia and South Africa the boundaries between the various Colonies were, for the most part, arbitrary and fortuitous. In broad contrast

UNIV. OF

with the United States after the War of Independence, and with the Dominion, the Commonwealth, and the Union of British South Africa, the British Empire has already reached a stage of development at which its component parts consist of communities with most of the attributes of distinct nations. The most keen-sighted of imperialists now recognize that what is necessary is a federation of nations, not of provinces. In this state of things past precedents count for very little; and a new form of Constitution must needs be evolved to meet a condition of affairs wholly new. A consensus of opinion seems to regard the Imperial Conference as the point of departure, from which may be evolved a more systematic organization of the Empire. But the British Empire of which Lord Salisbury spoke has not yet risen from the sea, and the consideration of its probable form still belongs to the field of speculation and theory. Meanwhile all that we can say with regard to the precedents of the past is that if they teach no practical lesson, at least they are of excellent omen as showing the spirit and the temper in which the problem should be approached.

ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION

BETWIXT THE PLANTATIONS UNDER THE GOVERNMENT OF THE MASSACUSETTS, THE PLANTATIONS UNDER THE GOVERNMENT OF NEW PLYMOUTH, THE PLANTATIONS UNDER THE GOVERNMENT OF CONECTICUTT, AND THE GOVERNMENT OF NEWHAVEN, WITH THE PLANTATIONS IN COMBINATION WITH ITT.1

[The text is as given in New Haven Colonial Records, 1638-1649. Edited by C. J. Hoadby. Hartford, 1857; pp. 98-104.]

WHEREAS We all came into these parts of America with one and the same end and ayme, namely, to advance the kingdome of our Lord Jesus Christ, and to enjoy the libertyes of the Gospell, in purity with peace; 2 and whereas in our settling (by a wise providence of God) we are further dispersed upon the sea-coasts and rivers then was at first intended,3 so thatt wee cannott (according to our desire) with conveniencie communicate in one government and jurisdiction; and whereas we live incompassed with people of severall nations and strange languages which hereafter may prove injurious to us and our posterity: 4 and forasmuch as the natives have formerly comitted sundry insolencies and outrages upon severall plantations of the English and have of late combined against us and seeing, by reason of the sad distractions in England, which they have heard of, and by which they know we are hindered both from thatt humble way of seeking advice, and reaping those

5

1 No stress is to be laid upon the fact that the agreement was in form between the Plantations of the Governments and not the Governments themselves.

2 The aim of the New English settlers was not so much idem velle de re publica as idem velle de rebus sacris.

3 These words allude to the separate foundation of Plymouth and Massachusetts, and to the further dislocation caused by the foundation of Connecticut and New Haven.

The French and the Dutch.

5 After the destruction of the Pequot Indians there was at this time no serious risk of an Indian combination against the English.