a new province in 1784, under the name of New Brunswick. The last of the Maritime Provinces, Prince Edward Island, originally named St. John's, was till 1770 a part of Nova Scotia, when, according to the prevailing policy of division, it was formed into a separate government. It was a significant commentary on the wisdom of this action that separatist influences proved so strong in this little island that, but for financial considerations, it would probably have remained for some time beyond 1873 outside the Confederation.

Still, whatever artificial distinctions may have been engendered, themselves largely the outcome of mistaken policy in England, the Maritime Provinces were a homogeneous community, destined in the long run to the enjoyment of a common life. Identity of race, of interests, and of policy, must in the end have brought about union, even though the negotiations at Charlottetown in 1864 had, for the time, proved abortive.

But the same causes which pointed to a union of the Maritime Provinces, were directly hostile to a greater union. Nova Scotia, with its face to the Eastern sea, saw little to attract in the vision of union with the interior Colony, of whose politics it had little understanding, and with whose population, so far as it was French, it had not a little racial antagonism. Lord Durham had gone out to effect a federation of British North America; but, if there were no other difficulties in the way, the indifference and isolation of the Maritime Provinces must in any case have wrecked the scheme. Nova Scotia was largely under the domination of Halifax, and Halifax as a commercial and social centre was jealous of anything that might diminish its comparative importance. Many retired officers of the British army and navy had found a home in Halifax, and these men, with those related to them by marriage or social connexions, formed a Conservative stronghold which distrusted absorption in a greater Canada. At the other

extreme the Radicals, with the great Nova Scotian orator, Joseph Howe, at their head, were in 1865 equally opposed to Confederation. Imperilled business interests barbed the opposition to Confederation, and Howe, apart from personal motives, saw in it the deathblow to his splendid ideal of an imperial federation. In this state of things the wonder is, not that complete union was not achieved, but that even a federation was at length accomplished. On the other hand, it may be argued that a resolution in favour of the Confederation of British North America was passed by the Nova Scotian Assembly as early as 1854; but the subsequent history showed that this hardly reflected the settled opinion of the Colony.

In Canada, which, from her position and population, possessed the controlling voice in any scheme of closer union, the cause of Confederation was mainly won by two motives, themselves wholly separate, working in the same direction. In the first place there was the melancholy fact that party government in Canada had resulted in deadlock. In order to understand this state of things, it is necessary to review very briefly the constitutional history. The prolongation of the French system of paternal government, as recognized by the Quebec Act of 1774, came to an end in 1791, when the coming of loyal Americans into Upper Canada brought about the division of the province and the granting to both Upper and Lower Canada of a representative Assembly. Shrewd critics have doubted the wisdom of thus formally sanctioning the continuance of French separatism; but, if the French nationality and language were to continue-and there is no evidence that at that date, any more than at a later one, the province could have been successfully anglicized-it was surely wise for the British Government to yield with a good grace what might have been successfully extorted; especially as thereby the powerful weight of the Catholic Church was thrown into the scale on the side of the English predominance. The

position of the Catholic Church had been secured by the Quebec Act of 1774, and any attempt to anglicize the province would have been resisted, as making for the triumph of heresy. But although the division of Canada and some of its consequences may have been inevitable, none the less the political situation in both provinces became difficult and wellnigh impossible. The FrenchCanadians were without apprenticeship in local selfgovernment and were for the most part wholly uneducated, so that they became as wax in the hands of their popular leaders. For many years an eloquent and genial demagogue, Louis Papineau, was the uncrowned king of the French-Canadian democracy; whilst there were marshalled in reserve on the side of law and order the forces of the Catholic Church. In the long quarrel between the English Executive and the French-Canadian Assembly there were faults on both sides. Not till nearly the close of the controversy did the French leaders begin to realize that responsible government would give the solution of their difficulties; and, in their demand for an elected Legislative Council, they were opposed by the full strength of the British minority, who knew enough of the doings of the French majority in the Assembly to fear their complete dominance in an elected legislature. When Lord Gosford's Commission found themselves compelled to reject the proposal which was the sheet-anchor of the FrenchCanadian demands, it became clear that some wholly new solution must be found if neither a policy of coercion nor of renunciation was to be adopted.

Meanwhile in Upper Canada causes, in appearance the same though in their essence altogether different, had brought about a political situation hardly more satisfactory. Here the grievance of an irresponsible Executive, confronted with an Assembly genuinely representative, was aggravated by the treatment of the clergy reserves question, which secured for the Church of a small minority of the popula

tion the favoured position of the Church establishment at home. Archdeacon Strachan, a stalwart champion of his Church in its most militant mood, supplied political opposition with a weapon which it soon learnt how to wield. As in Lower Canada so in Upper, a single leading demagogue was able to put a match to the fire; though in the case of Upper Canada William Lyon Mackenzie's efforts would probably have been unavailing had they not been abetted by the eccentric and egotistical proceedings of the British Lieutenant-Governor, Sir Francis Bond Head. The conclusion was that in both Provinces there was an abortive insurrection, from a military point of view trifling enough; but most menacing, so far as it seemed to mark the breakdown of British colonial government. The next act in the drama is sufficiently familiar. Lord Durham's mission of 1838 was soon followed by his repudiation in the matter of the political prisoners banished to Bermuda, and his consequent resignation. In the following year the publication of his memorable Report marked an epoch in the history of colonial self-government, forcing as it did the hands of the Home Government, and involving a new state of things which as late as 1837 had seemed to the liberal mind of Lord John Russell incompatible with the continued existence of the colonial connexion. Lord Durham (as I have already mentioned) entered on his task with the idea that the solution of difficulties was to be sought in the application of the federal principle; but he found on his arrival that, while what had to be done must be done quickly, the French-Canadians were in no mood to become friendly partners in a federal British America. (There was the further difficulty, which I have already noted, that neither were the Maritime Provinces prepared at this time for such a solution.) But if federation was impossible, the only alternative seemed a complete union of the two Canadas. Such a union had been intended in 1822, when the difficulties with regard to the share of the Upper Pro

vince in the customs duties received at Quebec and Montreal threatened an impasse. The measure had been then withdrawn in the face of the opposition of the French and of many of the English colonists; but the French-Canadians were now brooding in sullen despair, so that union could hardly add to their ills; whilst the outbreak in Upper Canada had sufficiently shown that the system of 'family compact' government could not ignore the writing on the wall. Moreover, Lord Durham believed that his other remedy for the existing evils, viz. the granting of complete responsible government, would finally appease all popular disappointment. It is worth noting that even Durham's conception of responsible government did not include the management by the colonial authorities of questions of trade, the Crown lands, or military defence. He recognized that, as things were for the moment, it would be impossible to give complete self-government to the French Province. As an Imperialist, he had no intention to diminish the British Empire; but the first act of a French-Canadian Executive, irresponsible except to its own Legislature, might have been to announce a peaceful secession. Responsible government was the goal; but responsible government postulated that the majority of the people in question were loyal subjects of the British Empire. Had Lower Canada stood alone, there might have been no answer to the dilemma; but happily the presence of Upper Canada pointed to the solution. Durham at once recognized, and it is to his credit that he so recognized, that, in spite of family compact government and William Lyon Mackenzie and his tragi-comedy of a rebellion, there was no real doubt as to the loyalty of Upper Canada to the British Crown. Could, then, a fusion be made of the two Provinces, the Upper Canadian electors might be trusted to secure the permanence of the British connexion. It was true that the population of the Lower Province was still greatly superior in numbers, but Durham was willing to trust to