VERDICT. General verdict. Art and part. Addition to verdict may destroy its effect. Special verdict. nor will the accused be permitted to impeach its accuracy (1).. If the libel contains one charge, or two or more stated cumulatively, a general verdict of "guilty as "libelled," is sufficient (2). "Guilty art and part," has the same effect as "guilty" (3). A general finding of "guilty" may be an insufficient ground for sentence, in consequence of an addition made to it. Thus, where the accused pled "not "guilty," a verdict of "guilty in terms of her own "confession," was held inept (4). And the same would hold, a fortiori, if there was added to the finding of guilty a crime not libelled at all;e.g., if the jury in a case of theft were to find guilt of reset (5). But if the addition merely indicated that the jury had proceeded on insufficient evidence or the like, this might not render the verdict nugatory (6). Verdicts finding facts, and unaccompanied by any general finding (7) are now unknown in practice, and 1 Hume ii. 425, note 1.-ii. 430, case of Nicol there. -Alison ii. 649. 2 Hume ii. 442, case of Gilchrist in note 2.-ii. 454, case of Blair and others in note 1.-Allison ii. 644,Ezekiel M'Haffie, H.C., Dec. 19th 1827; Syme 295 and Appx. 38. It is not necessary to notice the questions which formerly arose as to the application to the libel of general verdicts (Hume ii. 452 to 454, passim), as verdicts are now invariably returned viva voce, and the words "as libelled " are always added by the Clerk of Court in recording the verdict, and are acquiesced in by the jury, when the verdict is read over to them. 3 Hume ii. 225, cases of Johnston; Peacock; and Collins and Owens in note 2.-ii. 441, cases of O'Neil and Macneil; and Crawford and Bradley, in note 3.-ii. 442, cases of Watson: and Peacock there -Alison ii. 643. 4 Hume ii. 449, case of Murray in note 1.-ii. 462, case of Ramsay there. See also Graham v. Todrick, H.C., May 21st 1864; 4 Irv. 504 and 36 S. J. 558. 5 Hume ii. 449, case of Graham there, and case of Stewart and Irvine in note 1. To this rule exceptions were formerly admitted where the jury found the accused guilty of an offence of the same kind but of a lower degree (Hume ii. 450, 451) But in modern practice no exception is made in any case except that of charges of murder, where, as already mentioned, a verdict of culpable homicide is admissible in every case. 6 Hume ii. 461, and case of Hay and Thomson there. 7 See Hume ii. 445 to 447, passim.-ii. 457, 458, passim. infer guilt. would probably not be received, until general findings, VERDICT. exhausting the questions raised by the libel, had been prefixed or added (1). Where the verdict finds specific facts, it is requisite to constitute a conviction that the facts found necessarily infer guilt of the offence (2). Must necessarily A verdict in a case of reset, finding that the accused received goods "suspecting them to be stolen," or a verdict in a case of robbery, finding that certain property was carried off by robbery "or lost in the scuffle," would not be held sufficient to warrant any sentence (3). Again, where a railway bye-law made it an offence not to deliver up a ticket, unless the passenger paid the fare from the station from which the train originally started, a verdict that he had "failed "to deliver up his ticket," without stating that he had not paid the fare, was held bad (4). Nor is it sufficient that the facts infer the crime, if they are not consistent with the narrative of the libel. A verdict Must be consisunder a libel for murder by stabbing, which convicted of murder by poisoning would be inept. But a verdict is not inept because of deviations from the narrative of the libel not amounting to inconsistencies, but covered by the general latitude allowed to the prosecutor (5), as where the prosecutor names a sum as 1 See Jas. Cumming and others, H.C., Nov. 9th 1848; J. Shaw 35, observation by Lord Justice-Clerk Hope on p. 61. 2 Milne v. Simpson, Aberdeen, April 28th 1874; 2 Couper 562. 3 Hume ii. 444, case of Cochrane there, and case of Johnie in note 2.-ii. 445, case of Carruthers there.-ii. 447, cases of Alexander: Walker and Grant and others there.-ii. 448, cases of Boyd and others and Carnochan there.-ii. 449, case of Munro there.-Alison ii. 647, 648.-Davilin v. Jeffrey, H.C., March 12th 1836; 1 Swin. 41. -Duff v. Simpson, H.C., Dec. 6th 4 Craig v. the Great North of 5 Hume ii. 456, and case of Kirkpatrick and others there. tent with libel. VERDICT. though it negatives qualities attached by the libel. embezzled, and the jury find that only a part is proved Conviction good to have been embezzled (1). Farther, if the verdict convicts of the charge, it is not a good objection that some of the qualities attached to it in the libel are negatived. Thus a verdict of "culpable neglect of duty," under a charge of "culpable and reckless neg"lect of duty" (2), or a verdict which convicts of an offence but negatives a special averment of malicious intention, is a good ground for sentence (3). Where a charge of sedition, after a narrative of certain acts, averred that they were intended and calculated to produce a certain result, a verdict that they were "calculated" to produce it was held good (4). Where culpable homicide by folding up a bed in the knowledge that a child was lying in it was charged, a verdict which negatived the knowledge, but found that the accused "did not give the thought she ought to "have done before folding up the bed," was held a good conviction (5). Again, a verdict finding guilt of lewd practices, but specifying part of the acts libelled as being alone found proven, was sustained (6). Lastly, a verdict of malicious mischief, but negativing an averment that the act was done with the intent to injure the owner, was held sufficient, the averment of interest being held to set forth a mere additional quality (7). The same rule applies where several offences are stated together, without being distinctly set forth as separate charges. Thus a verdict of 1 Will. M'Gall, H.C., Mar. 13th 1849; J. Shaw 194. 2 Thos. Henderson and others, H.C., Aug. 29th 1850; J. Shaw 394 (see the verdict p. 443 of the Report). 3 Dougal v. Dykes, H.C., Nov. 18th 1861; 4 Irv. 101 and 34 S. J. 29. See also Donald Kennedy, H.C., Dec. 3d 1838; 2 Swin. 213 and Bell Notes 297. - 4 Jas. Cumming and others, H.C., Nov. 7th and 9th 1848; J. Shaw 17 and 35. 5 Williamina Sutherland, Inverness, Sept. 18th 1856; 2 Irv. 455. 6 Pet. Sneddon, Perth, Sept. 18th 1866; 5 Irv. 305 and 2 S. L. R. 275. 7 Arch. Thomson, Perth, April 25th 1874; 2 Couper 551. "guilty with the exception of the deforcement," was VERDICT. dispose of whole Must distinctly find as to each accused. sistent. The verdict must dispose of the whole libel, except- Verdict must ing any charges which may have been passed from on libel. the Record. If the jury return a verdict only on one charge of several, or only as to one prisoner of several, the Court will call upon them to dispose of the rest, but if this should be omitted, the verdict must be held. an acquittal as to those which it fails to notice (2). The verdict must expressly find as regards the guilt of each accused. A verdict that " both or either" of two accused did a certain act, does not warrant any sentence (3). It must also be logically consistent Must be conwith the charge. Thus a verdict of "guilty" will not warrant any sentence, if the charges are alternative, as General verdict "theft or reset" (4). But this does not apply where charge. under a statute one offence may be charged as done in one or other of several ways (5). If a libel contain a general charge, and other charges which bear to be a particularization of it, a verdict which acquits of the general charge but convicts of the special, is inept (6). And the same will hold where two things are charged as together constituting one offence, and the verdict finds that only one has been committed (7), or where Incomplete Notes 126. John Reeves, Glasgow, 6 Thos. Hunter and others, H.C., 7 Hume ii. 450, case of Peddie there.-Alison ii. 646. on alternative verdict. VERDICT. Aggravation alone. Ambiguous verdict Verdict to be an act is charged coupled with an aggravation, and the verdict finds the aggravation alone proved (1). The verdict must not leave it doubtful of what it finds the accused guilty. Thus, a finding that the accused intimidated two persons, 66 or one or other of them" was held inept (2). But verdicts must be construed fairly. interpreted according to common sense, and not dealt with in a strict and technical manner where the meaning is plain (3). Thus, a verdict finding guilt of the "wilful and culpable neglect charged," was held to cover the whole charge, as if it had said, "guilty as "libelled" (4). Where the libel contains several charges, it is sometimes necessary to use numbers, thus-" find the panel "guilty of the 1st, 3d, and 5th charges, as libelled, "and find the remaining charges not proven." Such a verdict will not be held bad on a mere strict comparison of the libel with the verdict, if it plainly appear what parts the jury found proved (5). A verdict acquitting on certain charges, and convicting of another in general terms was held good, although the charge found proven depended, for some qualities of aggravation, upon the other charges being proved, the Court holding that the verdict was a good conviction of that part of the charge which was independent of the previous charges (6). It has even been held that 1 Hume i. 94, and case of Hen- 3 Hume ii. 456. 4 John M'Rae or M'Crae, and Catherine M'Rae or M'Crae, Glas gow Sept. 20th 1842; 1 Broun 395 and Bell's Notes 297. 5 Hume ii. 453, case of Napier and Grotto in note 1.-Alison ii. 650.-Grant v. M'Kenzie, Inverness, Sept. 14th 1854; 1 Irv. 548 and 27 S. J. 1-See also Macfarline v. Procurator-Fiscal of Perthshire, H.C., July 15th 1843; 1 Broun 585. 6 Mary Reid or Hamilton, H.C., Nov. 18th 1844; 2 Broun 313. |