Justificatory Liberalism: An Essay on Epistemology and Political Theory

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Oxford University Press, 14. mar. 1996 - 392 strani
Gerald Gaus draws on current work in epistemology and cognitive psychology to defend a modest version of cognitive relativism. Building on this theory of personal justification, he asks, "How do we justify moral and political principles to others?" Here, the "populist" proposal put forward by "political liberals"--that the assent of all reasonable citizens must be obtained--is considered and rejected. Because reasonable people often ignore excellent reasons, moral and political principles can be considered conclusively justified, even in the face of some reasonable dissent. Conclusive justification, however, is difficult to achieve, and Gaus acknowledges that most of our public justifications are inconclusive. He then addresses the question of how citizens can adjudicate their inconclusive public justifications. The rule of law, liberal democracy and limited judicial review are defended as elements of a publicly justified umpiring procedure.

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Vsebina

EPISTEMOLOGY AND POLITICAL THEORY
3
PART IPERSONAL JUSTIFICATION
15
PART IIPUBLIC JUSTIFICATION
111
PART IIIPOLITICAL JUSTIFICATION
193
LIBERAL PRINCIPLES IN A WORLD OF STATES
296
NOTES
303
BIBLIOGRAPHY
340
INDEX
363
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Stran 220 - But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.
Stran 166 - There is the greatest difference between presuming an opinion to be true, because, with every opportunity for contesting it, it has not been refuted, and assuming its truth for the purpose of not permitting its refutation. Complete liberty of contradicting and disproving our opinion is the very condition which justifies us in assuming its tmth for purposes of action; and on no other terms can a being with human faculties have any rational assurance of being right.
Stran 56 - A certain town is served by two hospitals. In the larger hospital about 45 babies are born each day, and in the smaller hospital about 15 babies are born each day. As you know, about 50% of all babies are boys.
Stran 36 - Now, the skilful workman is very careful indeed as to what he takes into his brainattic. He will have nothing but the tools which may help him in doing his work, but of these he has a large assortment, and all in the most perfect order. It is a mistake to think that that little room has elastic walls and can distend to any extent. Depend upon it, there comes a time when for every addition of knowledge you forget something that you knew before. It is of the highest importance, therefore, not to have...
Stran 171 - The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute.
Stran 102 - A rule is amended if it yields an inference we are unwilling to accept; an inference is rejected if it violates a rule we are unwilling to amend.
Stran 114 - This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule. The answer was: if everything can be made out to accord with the rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with it.
Stran 195 - Civil law is to every subject those rules which the Commonwealth hath commanded him, by word, writing, or other sufficient sign of the will, to make use of for the distinction of right and wrong; that is to say, of what is contrary and what is not contrary to the rule.

O avtorju (1996)

Gerald F. Gaus is Professor of Political Science and Philosophy at the University of Minnesota, Duluth and President of the International Economics and Philosophy Society. He is the author of Value and Justification: The Foundations of Liberal Theory (1990) and The Modern Liberal Theory of Man (1983).

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