Justificatory Liberalism: An Essay on Epistemology and Political TheoryOxford University Press, 14. mar. 1996 - 392 strani Gerald Gaus draws on current work in epistemology and cognitive psychology to defend a modest version of cognitive relativism. Building on this theory of personal justification, he asks, "How do we justify moral and political principles to others?" Here, the "populist" proposal put forward by "political liberals"--that the assent of all reasonable citizens must be obtained--is considered and rejected. Because reasonable people often ignore excellent reasons, moral and political principles can be considered conclusively justified, even in the face of some reasonable dissent. Conclusive justification, however, is difficult to achieve, and Gaus acknowledges that most of our public justifications are inconclusive. He then addresses the question of how citizens can adjudicate their inconclusive public justifications. The rule of law, liberal democracy and limited judicial review are defended as elements of a publicly justified umpiring procedure. |
Vsebina
3 | |
PART IPERSONAL JUSTIFICATION | 15 |
PART IIPUBLIC JUSTIFICATION | 111 |
PART IIIPOLITICAL JUSTIFICATION | 193 |
LIBERAL PRINCIPLES IN A WORLD OF STATES | 296 |
NOTES | 303 |
BIBLIOGRAPHY | 340 |
363 | |
Druge izdaje - Prikaži vse
Justificatory Liberalism: An Essay on Epistemology and Political Theory Gerald F. Gaus Omejen predogled - 1996 |
Justificatory Liberalism: An Essay on Epistemology and Political Theory Gerald F. Gaus Predogled ni na voljo - 1996 |
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adjudicate akrasia Alf's Alf's belief Amos Tversky analysis argued argument authority basic belief system believe ẞ Betty's Cambridge University Press chap citizens claim cognitive coherence theories coherentism commitment to public conception consensus Constitution Daniel Kahneman defeated Democracy democratic disputes epistemic epistemological Ethics Federalist Papers foundationalism Gaus Gibbard Ibid idea inconclusive individual inference insist interpretation intuitions issues judgments justifica justificatory liberalism justified belief justified principles law-making institution legislation liberal principles Logic moral beliefs Moral Realism Nisbett open justification openly justified Oxford person perspective Philosophy plausible pluralism Political Liberalism problem procedures proposal public justification public reason publicly justified R₁ R₂ Rawls reasons and beliefs reflective equilibrium reject relativism requires rule of law seems self-interest sense simply Social Choice social choice theory sort suppose system of beliefs system of reasons theory of justification tion truth umpire Value and Justification victoriously justified voting