Thought ExperimentsOxford University Press, USA, 6. avg. 1992 - 336 strani Sorensen presents a general theory of thought experiments: what they are, how they work, what are their virtues and vices. On Sorensen's view, philosophy differs from science in degree, but not in kind. For this reason, he claims, it is possible to understand philosophical thought experiments by concentrating on their resemblance to scientific relatives. Lessons learned about scientific experimentation carry over to thought experiment, and vice versa. Sorensen also assesses the hazards and pseudo-hazards of thought experiments. Although he grants that there are interesting ways in which the method leads us astray, he attacks most scepticism about thought experiments as arbitrary. They should be used, he says, as they generally are used--as part of a diversified portfolio of techniques. All of these devices are individually susceptible to abuse, fallacy, and error. Collectively, however, they provide a network of cross-checks that make for impressive reliability. |
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Vsebina
Our Most Curious Device | 3 |
Scepticism About Thought Experiments | 21 |
Mach and Inner Cognitive Africa | 51 |
The Wonder of Armchair Inquiry | 76 |
Kuhntradictions | 111 |
The Logical Structure of Thought Experiment | 132 |
Conflict Vagueness and Precisification | 167 |
The Evolution of Thought Experiment | 186 |
Are Thought Experiments Experiments? | 216 |
Fallacies and Antifallacies | 252 |
Notes | 291 |
307 | |
315 | |
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absurdity actual analytic analytic philosophy analytic propositions answer antifallacy appeal to ordinary argument ball behavior beliefs bizarre borderline chapter cognitive conceive concept conclusion conflict vagueness contradiction counterexamples counterfactual definition difference earth effect empiricism empiricist enthymeme Ernst Mach ethics example executed experiments explain fact fallacy false faster fiction force Galileo Hence hypothetical imaginary experiments imagine implies impossible inconsistent inductivism inference instance introspection intuitions Jerry Fodor knowledge Kuhn Kuhn's linguistic logical Mach Mach's mental ments method of loci modal moral motion nature objects observation ordinary experiments ordinary language paradox person Peter Unger philosophical philosophical thought experiments Phosphenes physical possible world predict premise principle problem procedure propositions psychological question rational reason reflective equilibrium refutation relative relevant rules scenario scepticism scientists sense Ship of Theseus situation stipulation story suppose supposition theory thesis things thought experiment thought experimenter tion truth University Press utilitarianism visual